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SECTION 1 OF 2

/\*\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*/

**BODY** 

SUBJ: DIZ AL PRODUCT - UNITED STATES: MANPADS
THREAT TO CONUS AVIATION - ATTACKS COULD OCCUR WITH LITTLE WARNING.
(U<del>//FOUO</del>)

 $(U \frac{}{/ \text{FOUC}})$  A MANPADS ATTACK AGAINST AIRCRAFT IN CONUS, PARTICULARLY

COMMERCIAL AVIATION, MEETS MANY CRITERIA FOR THOSE WHO WOULD DO US HARM. WHILE THERE IS NO ACTIVE REPORTING INDICATING TERRORIST PRE-OPERATIONAL PLANNING OR DETAILS OF AN IMMINENT CONUS BASED MANPADS ATTACK, SEVERAL FACTORS SUGGEST THAT SUCH AN ATTACK COULD OCCUR WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING.

"(U<del>//FOUS</del>) MANPADS ATTACK WOULD MEET STATED TERRORIST GOALS: MASS CASUALTIES; SEVERE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT TO THE PUBLIC; AND A NEGATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT.

" ( <del>S//NF)</del>				
		(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)		

- "(U<del>//FOUC</del>) THE AL-QAIDA NETWORK HAS DEMONSTRATED THE INTENT AND CAPABILITY TO ATTACK CIVIL AVIATION. THE AL-QAIDA NETWORK HAS TRAINED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TERRORISTS TO OPERATE MANPADS.

  TERRORIST MANUALS INSTRUCTING MANPADS OPERATION HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATED VIA THE INTERNET.
- "(U<del>//FOUO)</del> MANPADS ARE HIGHLY PORTABLE. THERE ARE INNUMERABLE AVENUES AND METHODS TO COVERTLY INTRODUCE MANPADS INTO THE US; THEREFORE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THEIR PRESENCE REMAINS PROBLEMATIC. "(U<del>//FOUO</del>) MOST US COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH COUNTERMEASURES AND COMMERCIAL PILOTS ARE NOT TRAINED TO TAKE EVASIVE MEASURES. THIS FACT HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS. TERRORISTS MAY CAPITALIZE ON THIS VULNERABILITY.

 $(U \frac{//FOUG})$  MANPADS OFFER ONE-STOP SHOPPING FOR MEETING TERRORIST

OBJECTIVES. A SUCCESSFUL MANPADS ATTACK AGAINST COMMERCIAL AVIATION ON US SOIL WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN MASS CASUALTIES AND POTENTIALLY SEVERE COLLATERAL GROUND DAMAGE DEPENDING ON THE CRASH SITE. ECONOMIC LOSS WOULD ALSO BE STAGGERING. AIRLINES ARE STILL REELING FROM A \$12 BILLION LOSS FROM THE 11 SEPT ATTACKS, DESPITE THE \$5

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BILLION EMERGENCY FEDERAL CASH INFUSION TO THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY IN 2001. A SUCCESSFUL MANPADS ATTACK IN CONUS WOULD FURTHER STRESS THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY BY THE SUBSTANTIAL REVENUE LOSS FROM DECREASED AIR TRAVEL, CIVIL LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC'S INSISTENCE ON INSTALLING EXPENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT COULD COMPENSATE SOME COSTS, THE LARGEST INCALCULABLE COST WOULD BE THE PUBLIC'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN SAFE AIR TRAVEL.

(<del>S//NF</del>) MANPADS PROLIFERATION TO NON-STATE ACTORS REMAINS A SERIOUS

THREAT. THE NUMBER OF MANPADS OUTSIDE STATE MILITARY CONTROL IS UNKNOWN. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)	

(U<del>//FOUS</del>) PORTABILITY AND RELATIVE EASE OF USE MAKES

MANPADS A

WEAPON OF CHOICE. WHILE THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF MANPADS HAVING BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE US BY HOSTILE ELEMENTS, THEY ARE RELATIVELY SMALL WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT ARE CONDUCIVE TO INNOVATIVE CONCEALMENT AND SMUGGLING DECEPTION SCHEMES. CONCEALMENT IN MARITIME CONTAINER SHIPMENTS, SURREPTITIOUS SMUGGLING VIA SMALL WATERCRAFT IN REMOTE COASTAL AREAS, AND OVERLAND SMUGGLING THROUGH POROUS BORDER CROSSINGS ARE POTENTIAL TRANSPORTATION METHODS. THE NUMBER OF TERRORISTS PROFICIENTLY TRAINED IN MANPADS IS UNKNOWN, BUT THERE IS A WEALTH OF EVIDENCE THAT AL-QAIDA AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TRAINED EXTENSIVELY ON VARIOUS SYSTEMS. (b)(1):1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) FURTHERMORE,

THE LARGE NUMBER OF MANPADS FIRED AT OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM COALITION AIRCRAFT OFFER VALUABLE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE THAT COULD BE APPLIED AGAINST MORE VULNERABLE CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.

(<del>S//NF)</del> ODDS ON FAVORITE FOR SUCCESS. SINCE 1975, THERE HAVE BEEN OVER 40 MANPADS ATTACKS AGAINST COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT WORLDWIDE

### SECRET//NF

## SECRET//NF

RESULTING IN 28 CRASHES AND THE LOSS OF OVER 700 LIVES. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN HUNDREDS OF UNSUCCESSFUL MANPADS LAUNCHES AGAINST MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, USING THESE STATISTICS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE DUE TO MOST MILITARY AIRCRAFT EMPLOYING COUNTERMEASURES, COMBAT FLIGHT APPROACHES/TAKEOFFS, AND HIGH CRUISING ALTITUDES.

SULTAN AIR BASE
(PSAB) IN SAUDI ARABIA AND AT MOMBASA, KENYA PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL DUE
TO EITHER SYSTEM FAILURE OR GUNNER ERROR, BUT THAT TREND MAY BE
CHANGING, AS WITNESSED BY RECENT ATTACKS IN IRAQ. A WELL-DOCUMENTED
MANPADS ATTACK AGAINST A COMMERCIAL DHL FREIGHT AIRCRAFT IN IRAQ

(U//FOUO) RECENT TERRORIST MANPADS ATTACKS AT PRINCE

MANPADS ATTACK AGAINST A COMMERCIAL DHL FREIGHT AIRCRAFT IN IRAQ RECENTLY CAUSED SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT AND AN EMERGENCY LANDING WAS REQUIRED. THIS ATTACK INVOLVED OLDER SOVIET-ERA MANPADS INCLUDING AN SA-7 AND AN SA-14. WHILE LESS CAPABLE THAN NEWER SYSTEMS, THESE OLDER WEAPONS CAN BE EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AGAINST COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT.

(C//NF) CIVIL AVIATION REMAINS A PERSISTENT TARGET. AS CIVIL AND GOVERNMENT AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAMS IMPROVE IN RESPONSE TO HIJACKING AND AIRLINE BOMBING THREATS, STAND-OFF WEAPONS LIKE MANPADS PROVIDE TERRORISTS WITH A CONTINUED CAPABILITY TO TARGET AVIATION.

MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS CONTAINING AIRLINE HUBS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED HIGH VALUE TARGETS. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c)

(U<del>//FOUO</del>) NEAR-SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS BY TRAINED TERRORISTS ARE A DISTINCT THREAT TO COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN THE US AND WORLDWIDE. ADHERENCE TO MILITARY MANPADS OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE COULD DRAMATICALLY INCREASE THE ATTACK SUCCESS RATE. PRE-COORDINATED ATTACKS AT MULTIPLE LARGE US AIRPORTS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SEPARATE CELLS OF ONLY A FEW INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF EACH OTHER. GOOD OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC), AS WITH MOST SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 \*\*\*\*\*\*/
ATTACKS, WOULD BE IMPERATIVE FOR MULTIPLE ATTACKS.

(U//FOUO) MANPADS WILL REMAIN A THREAT FOR THE NEAR TERM. TERRORISTS
CONTINUE TO EVOLVE THEIR TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (TTP).

IF THE TARGET BECOMES TOO DIFFICULT TO ATTACK DIRECTLY, THEN STANDOFF
WEAPONS TYPICALLY BECOME THE PREFERRED TACTIC. WHILE AL-QAIDA AND
OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE DEMONSTRATED ONLY LIMITED INTEREST IN

#### SECRET//NF

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MANPADS IN THE PAST, TIGHTER ANTI-HIJACKING SECURITY MEASURES INCREASES THE PROBABILITY USING THIS STANDOFF WEAPON. EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC AND WORLDWIDE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, ENHANCED BORDER MONITORING, VIGILANT PUBLIC ANTI-TERRORISM AWARENESS, AND THOROUGH INTER-AGENCY COORDINATED ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CONTINUE TO BE OUR BEST DEFENSE FOR THIS THREAT.

(b)(3):10 USC 424	•		

# **ADMIN**

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