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## Section 1 — ISG SUPPORT TO THE CAPT SPEICHER INVESTIGATION

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### SUMMARY

~~(C)~~ The ISG/POW Division, more commonly known as “Team Speicher,” began active operations as part of the ISG in Baghdad on 23 June 2003 and stood down on 6 May 2004. Team Speicher’s mission was to find information relating to the treatment and fate of CAPT Michael Speicher, USN, shot down over Iraq on 17 January 1991 and classified by the Secretary of the Navy as “Missing/Captured.”

(U) This report covers information obtained by Team Speicher during its assignment in Iraq. It also represents only significant actions by ISG Team Speicher to obtain and report intelligence acquired inside Iraq that supports the CAPT Speicher investigation. The ISG findings were included in the IC’s 2005 Interim Report that represents the extent of IC knowledge from November 2002 to the present — the last IC CAPT Speicher assessment was published in November 2002.

### Site Exploitations

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ The ISG Team Speicher conducted 28 major site exploitation missions. 



(b)(1),1.4 (c)


■ ~~(C)~~   



Neither CAPT Speicher nor any evidence of his captivity was found. The initials “M.S.S” were found in a cell at Baghdad’s Hakemiyah Prison by US Forces and on a carport I-beam near the former Iraqi Air Force Academy in Tikrit.

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)


■ ~~(C)~~ The Speicher crash site was visited 10 times: 



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

 No new material evidence belonging to CAPT Speicher was found at the crash site.

### Document Exploitation

~~(S)~~ 


(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S)~~ The documents obtained and reviewed thus far (primarily from MFA sources) indicate the Iraqis had little knowledge of the events following the crash of CAPT Speicher. The MFA documents delineate Iraq's effort to answer the US government's 2000 and 2002 requests for information on CAPT Speicher. MFA officials provided the MFA documents in a plastic shopping bag to a US representative after learning of US interest.




~~(C)~~ Whether these documents represent the totality of official Iraqi holdings on the CAPT Speicher case is unknown because a large number of official documents were systematically removed or were hidden or destroyed by Iraqi security forces prior to and during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

- ~~(C)~~ The US government continues to review or obtain additional MFA, Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Special Security Organization (SSO), and Special Republican Guard (SRG) documents for additional information on CAPT Speicher.

### Human Exploitation

~~(C)~~ Over 200 Iraqi government and Ba'ath Party officials, senior and junior military officers, intelligence and security officers, former regime prisoners, and private citizens were questioned for any information on the fate of CAPT Speicher. 

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(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ [Redacted]

**High-Value Detainees**

~~(S)~~ Every High-Value Detainee (HVD) apprehended since April 2003 was asked about CAPT Speicher during the initial interrogation. At least 80 HVDs were subject to one or more follow-up interrogations by ISG Team Speicher or the HVD's handler. All professed no knowledge of CAPT Speicher being found or held in captivity.

■ ~~(S)~~ At least 18 enemy POWs were identified as potentially having knowledge of CAPT Speicher and were questioned. All professed no knowledge of CAPT Speicher being found or held in captivity.

■ ~~(S)~~ Saddam Husayn was questioned by US interrogators and said he had no knowledge of CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ Several Iraqi sources reported on the association of [Redacted] with the CAPT Speicher case.

**Non-Detained Iraqis**

~~(S)~~ The ISG Team Speicher also interviewed a number of Iraqis who were not detained, but who were assessed by the ISG or IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell as having potential knowledge of CAPT Speicher. None professed any knowledge of CAPT Speicher being held in captivity or found deceased near his crash site. Among those interviewed were the following:

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ [Redacted]  
■ [Redacted]  
■ [Redacted]  
■ [Redacted]  
■ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] who were able to query the membership of any knowledge they had.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] supervisor, who buried remains delivered by the Iraqi intelligence and security services.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

■ (S) [Redacted]

**Bedouin Sources**

(b)(1),1.4 (d)

■ (S) Team Speicher [Redacted] began meeting with Bedouin tribal leaders in October 2003. The objective was to locate any individuals with knowledge of CAPT Speicher's fate immediately following the shoot-down or who were present during the 1995 [Redacted] investigation. Bedouin nomads transit the Speicher crash site area, a winter grazing range, during the rainy season from approximately November to February. Liaison with the Bedouin resulted in several leads with negative results. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

■ (S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

■ (S) In February 2004, the ISG Team Speicher visited the [Redacted] that transit the desert regions of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to seek his assistance.

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

■ (S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

□ (S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) A [Redacted] of this story claimed secondhand knowledge of a body buried near the crash site. [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

[Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ ISG Team Speicher questioned more than 40 Bedouin directly in the course of operations and through outreach activities. The Bedouin were willing to help for humanitarian reasons but expressed distrust of all officialdom, to include the US military.

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

### Team Speicher Special Issues

(b)(1),1.4(c) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] **Assessments**

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

### Reports of a POW in Hit

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

### ***Camp Speicher I-Beam***

~~(S)~~ An I-beam with the initials "M.S.S" and a date "9-15 94" was discovered in an open-bay carport at the former Iraqi Air Force Academy near Tikrit in September 2003. At the time of discovery, the facility had been renamed "Camp Speicher" by US Forces residing there. Camp Speicher was named for a Korean War US Army Medal of Honor recipient, and its name is not associated with CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

### ***Special Republican Guards***

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ No SRG unit had visited the Air Academy and would not have done so without the knowledge and authorization of at least one or more of the senior SRG officers interviewed.
- ~~(S)~~ The 2nd Company, 1st Regiment had no connection with the SRG camp at Tikrit before 1995; did not have a classified mission to provide convoy security for Sad-

dam's motorcades, prior to 1995; and apparently did not handle, guard, or transport any POWs or other prisoners, other than SRG personnel, during or after the Gulf War.

- ~~(S)~~ The SRG was responsible for providing external security for Saddam's palaces and was not permitted inside without SSO permission or escort.

**Damascus SRG Documents**

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(e)

**Verification of Pre-War Sightings**

(b)(1),1.4(c) (b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ OIF enabled the ISG and the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell to verify [Redacted] reporting. Prior to the war, [Redacted] reporting appeared to give credibility to the [Redacted] allegations that CAPT Speicher was held captive after the Gulf War. At the request of the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell, ISG Team Speicher dealt with as many of these reports as possible, but was unable to confirm any actual sightings of CAPT Speicher in captivity. All the stories examined proved to be the result of rumors and perception based on a combination of fact, fiction, and unsubstantiated allegation that thrive throughout Iraqi society.

(b)(1),1.4(c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(e) [Redacted] The three were arrested immediately after the joint proposal to the Saddam regime to excavate the crash site. [Redacted] The presence of these "Americans" was known to many Iraqis and may be the source of several reports of an American being held in the post-Gulf War period.

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

Page #8 will not be submitted with this document; non-responsive to the request





## SITE EXPLOITATIONS

### Major Site Exploitation Missions

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S)~~ US Forces discovered that many of these facilities were either no longer in use or had been destroyed, burned, or looted. Consequently, no records regarding CAPT Speicher were found in any of these facilities.

~~(S)~~ The Speicher crash site was visited 10 times: [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

### Site Exploitations

ISG Team Speicher conducted 28 site exploitation missions of facilities and locations [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (d)

#### Prisons and Interrogation Facilities:

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

#### Government Facilities:


[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

**Site Exploitations (Continued)**

**Military and Internal Security Facilities:**


(b)(1),1.4 (c)



**Aircraft Crash Sites and Bedouin Liaison:**


(b)(1),1.4 (c)

Speicher Crash Site, 10, 22, 30 September; 7-11 October 2003

 Crash Site, 30 September 2003

Speicher Crash Site-Bedouin Liaison, 12 December 2003; 30 January, 14 February  
13 March 2004

(b)(1),1.4 (c)




Speicher Crash Site-Remains Search, 2-3 May 2004

**Overview of ISG Team Speicher Site Exploitations**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)



- ~~(S)~~ Local residents reported that US soldiers had entered the bunker on/about 23 April 2003. No evidence was found that indicated that POWs or other persons were detained or imprisoned on site, although documents and military correspondence relating to other civil defense bunkers, supplies, and some military correspondence were recovered and exploited.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(U) This facility was exploited on the possibility that CAPT Speicher may have been held covertly outside the known prison system.

- ~~(S)~~ The site appeared to be residential and contained children's toys, bedrooms, and associated furniture. The building was moderately looted. Full exploitation was not possible because of severe bomb damage to the visitors building and the main residence and because of more than 8 feet of water and debris flooding the vehicle ramp and basement. The few recovered documents found in the residential area included a list of Fedayeen members, a list of phone calls by Uday and others, and X-rays for Saddam's wife, Saya.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(U) This facility was exploited on the possibility that CAPT Speicher may have been held outside the known prison system.

- ~~(S)~~ The three moderately damaged and looted buildings apparently were used only for social gatherings and receptions. There were no offices, living quarters, or anything related to regime activities. US Army units had been at the site for nearly 2 months and reported they had found no evidence of regime activity or any documents.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(U) This facility was exploited on the possibility that CAPT Speicher may have been transported by VIP vehicles.

- ~~(S)~~ Several vehicle and driver logs were recovered and exploited but revealed no information of CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



~~(S)~~ This facility was exploited on the possibility that CAPT Speicher may have been held outside the known prison system. The tunnel system was believed to be used to hide personnel.

- ~~(S)~~ This facility consisted of two residences and several outbuildings, and US Forces had occupied it for more than 2 months. The exploitation team confirmed the existence of several tunnels inside a walled compound. The tunnels measured approximately 2 meters by 1-2 meters. The tunnels circled under the orchards and palm groves, probably for irrigation, but were dry when exploited. Recovered documents included medical records and security detail for a former regime vice president's wife and some film reels from a facility theater. The team found no documents of any intelligence value.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



~~(S)~~ On 28 May 2003, US Forces discovered this previously unknown prison. Locals indicated the Iraqis used this facility to imprison, torture, and execute Iranian dissidents. An Imam reportedly gave some recovered documents to the Free Iraq Prisoners, an association of people searching for lost and/or incarcerated family members. The team found no evidence of CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ Areas "Three, Four, and Five" of the complex were searched. [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Area Two was being used by

■ ~~(S)~~ Systematic destruction of documents was found in all three areas. A large number of unknown documents were removed from the file cabinets and burned.

■ ~~(S)~~ No documents were found mentioning or showing CAPT Speicher, any US prisoners, or a pilot.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

■ ~~(S)~~ The facility was looted and burned. Numerous documents were found scattered throughout the buildings. No documents were found mentioning CAPT Speicher. Documents recovered included a list of prisoners released in 2002, employee records, and other IIS-related administrative papers.

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ The initials "M.S.S" (or possibly "M.SH.S") were found carved into the wall of one cell. [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

■ ~~(S)~~ The special prisoner's section was searched, and no evidence of CAPT Speicher was found. A handful of documents reflected names of persons associated with the prison in August 1991. A mass grave was pointed out by a local source who gave the team a tour of the grounds.

■ ~~(S)~~ The larger barracks buildings, now destroyed, were originally for prisoners and in 1991 became military barracks. An SRG artillery unit was garrisoned here until early 2003. After OIF hostilities squatters moved into the facility.

- ~~(S)~~ Fifty-seven documents were recovered but held no information concerning the fate of CAPT Speicher. The documents consisted of lists of Republican Guard (RG) soldiers and officers, leave documents, payroll and training documents, training highlights, guard rosters, and the minutes of a Ba'ath party meeting.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 29 July 2003**

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ The search team found a document with CAPT Speicher's name mentioned. A field analysis suggested the document was a response to an open-press query. Preliminary translation of three pages of the eight-page document indicated it is a letter to a possible US person [Redacted] [Redacted] stating the Iraqi position on the Speicher issue and revealed no new information.

■ ~~(S)~~ [redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (e)

■ ~~(S)~~ [redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (e)

(b)(1),1.4 (e) [redacted]

(U) The primary objective was to locate any files concerning the shoot-down of CAPT Speicher and subsequent investigations of the crash site.

■ ~~(S)~~ The buildings exploited were heavily looted and inhabited by squatters. An extremely large batch of classified Iraqi Air Force documents relating to air defense were recovered but nothing concerned the shoot-down or crash site of CAPT Speicher.

■ ~~(S)~~ Preliminary identification of aircraft parts at the Iraqi Airman Statue at the facility revealed the monument did not contain any US Navy F/A-18 parts. Photographs were taken for further analysis.

■ ~~(S)~~ Some of the offices were occupied by the Iraqi Political Prisoners League who had retained a number of documents. [redacted] but revealed no information concerning CAPT Speicher or coalition POWs. [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

■ ~~(S)~~ [redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (e)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(S)~~ The [redacted] was a heavily looted maintenance shop without any documents of intelligence value. Nearby was another building containing military court files and Air Force personnel files.

■ ~~(S)~~ At the second site nearby, a local family offered to show the exploitation team some "buried" documents kept in their residence, which was undamaged. The "buried" documents were found in a basement accessed only from inside the house. The basement bunker with sealed doors contained numerous items, including purchasing

documents, personnel records, personal protective masks, and decontamination kits but nothing concerning prisoners or CAPT Speicher.

- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(C)~~ The [redacted] was found severely damaged, with the first, second, and fourth floors being severely bombed, burned, and looted. Four boxes of documents, including Iraqi aircraft crash site investigations from 1986 to 2002 as well as missing plane reports and other personnel documents were recovered.
- ~~(C)~~ Four heavily damaged and bombed bunkers were located near the intelligence building. These buildings were not exploited because they were structurally unsafe and extensively flooded.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ The mission objective was to locate and recover files that might identify facilities where CAPT Speicher may have been held.

- ~~(C)~~ A card catalog index system for the files was found but was not removed because of its size.
- ~~(C)~~ Several record books that appeared to have an index that matched the files were found in the microfiche room where the DGS was in the process of filming the records for fiche storage and retrieval. One roll of 35-mm film and two microfiche were recovered along with the record books.
- ~~(C)~~ A search of the administration building resulted in the recovery of numerous documents and record books that may aid in identifying DGS officers.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ This site was adjacent to the [redacted] and was inhabited by squatters. No documents were found in the facility for recovery.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ [redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ One 20-year resident said there was a pilot captured about 15 minutes from the facility during the Gulf War. He said the citizens “could not get near him” because the “security and IIS” had secured the pilot and the area. The source said the place of capture was “close to the Saddam Bridge” by the Euphrates River.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] The cell walls did contain etchings of animals, faces, numbers, dates, and other miscellaneous doodling as typically found in other Iraqi prisons.

### Speicher Crash Site Exploitations

#### Speicher Crash Site, 10 September 2003

(U) This first mission of ISG Team Speicher examined the “Latin Cross” and identified potential Bedouin burial plots.

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

- (U) Ten possible burial plots were identified.
- (U) Nearby animal dens were identified and plotted because it was the Iraqi government’s position that CAPT Speicher was probably eaten by “wolves.” No human remains were found in these dens.
- (U) There was extensive human activity in the areas exhibited by trash and numerous loose-surface vehicular tracks.

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

#### Speicher Crash Site, 22 September 2003

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ~~(S)~~ This second ISG mission to the CAPT Speicher crash site [Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ The GPS coordinates for an additional 27 potential Bedouin burial plots were obtained for later exploitation.



- ~~(S)~~ Four additional animal dens were identified.
- (U) Several unidentified vertebrae, a rib, and other bone fragments were recovered for further analysis and were later determined to be animal bones.
- (U) An oxygen system fitting and several carbon fiber composite fuselage pieces were found in the wadi. Non-aircraft debris found included a vehicle seat belt buckle and a large bundle of nylon and burlap cloth.
- (U) A Bedouin tent site was found on high ground above the wadi overlooking a potential grave site.

**Speicher Crash Site, 7-11 October 2003**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(S)~~ ISG Team Speicher [redacted] exploited potential grave sites.

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ Approximately 70 potential grave sites were exploited, including 37 previously identified sites. [redacted]

■ (U) A nearby wadi was searched twice for additional equipment and other potential burial sites.

■ (U) An area 1 kilometer south of the crash site that the JPAC team was unable to search in 1995 due to a lack of time was extensively searched.

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

**Speicher Crash Site, 12 December 2003**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(S)~~ Following the crash site visit of 7-11 October 2003, [redacted] Bedouin tribal and clan sheikhs were informed of the US humanitarian mission to locate anyone with information on the events of 17 January 1991, or knowledge of the status, fate, and possible location of CAPT Speicher or his remains. Detailed information on this effort can be found under "Bedouin Operations."

(b)(1),1.4 (e) ■ ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

- ~~(C)~~ Three Bedouin camps were visited. None of the Bedouin admitted to knowing anything, but promised to spread the word among any Bedouin they met of the US interest in information.

**Speicher Crash Site, 30 January 2004**

~~(S)~~ On 14 January 2004,

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

- (U) A few Bedouin were transiting the area, but they said they had not been in the area since before 1991.

**Speicher Crash Site, 14 February 2004**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ [Redacted] The nearest Bedouin, of the Shammar tribal confederation, were 20 miles north. They had no information on the crash site or the pilot [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted] Detailed information on this effort can be found under "Bedouin Operations."

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ Team Speicher, [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

**Speicher Crash Site, 13 March 2004**

(S) [Redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- (S) On 27 February 2004, [Redacted]
- (b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

**Speicher Crash Site, 27 April 2004**

(S) [Redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- (S) Fourteen of the most promising sites were excavated with negative results. The remaining five were not exploited due to time constraints.

**Speicher Crash Site, 2-3 May 2004**

(S) [Redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- (S) Remains were found, but were later determined to be that of a 25- to 30-year-old woman who had been buried 25 to 50 years ago.

**DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION**

**Major Exploitation Missions**

(S) All documents found at sites associated with coalition POWs during the 1991 Gulf War, or at sites believed to have possibly held CAPT Speicher based on pre-war reporting, were reviewed for information concerning CAPT Speicher, coalition POWs, and foreign pilots.  
(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [Redacted]

- (S) There appeared to be a systematic effort to burn or destroy many government documents after US Forces occupied the city. The extent of this destruction and the content of these documents are unknown.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [Redacted] All documents obtained and reviewed thus far show the Iraqis had little knowledge of the events following the crash of CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

### Department of Military Intelligence (DMI)

#### *Speicher Committee Investigative File*

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [Redacted]

- (S) The documents indicated the Iraqis believed the United States was using the Speicher issue for political purposes, and they established a committee to investigate the charges and to ascertain for themselves if there was any basis for US charges of Iraq withholding information on CAPT Speicher. The Iraqis also wanted to have a response ready for public disclosure should the findings be favorable to them. The documents revealed the names of individuals and organizations who participated in the investigation.

(b)(6)

- (S) This committee, established by order of MFA official [Redacted] in February 2000, consisted of representatives from the MFA, the DMI, Air Force, Border Guards, and Air Defense. They determined the pilot probably died in the desert as a result of his shoot-down.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

**2003 Iraqi Speicher Committee Correspondence**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

**Copy of DMI 1995 Excavation File**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

■ (C) Included in the file are the results of a CBS News investigation, a Washington Post article dated 6 June 2000, [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [Redacted]  
His report stated, "We could not reach the wreckage at the time (in 1991) because of the continuing enemy air raids and the difficulty of the terrain, to the point that the (Iraqi) pilot was never rewarded."

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [Redacted] His IIS report on the 1995 [Redacted] excavation was submitted to the Office of the Presidency.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [Redacted]

***Interrogation Results of US Pilots***

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

***Saddam's 1993 Rewards for Pilots***

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] contain internal DMI correspondence regarding a message from Saddam Husayn to all Corps Intelligence, Border Forces, all Intelligence services, all DMI sections, Unit 999, and the Military Intelligence School.

- ~~(S)~~ Saddam announced the following rewards in his message: "A reward of a half million Iraqi Dinars for anyone who shoots down a cruise missile; a reward of a quarter million Iraqi Dinars for who arrests a pilot who is still alive, and a hundred thousand Iraqi Dinars if the pilot is dead; a hundred thousand Dinars for the one who guides the authorities to the plane's wreckage, or brings it to the nearest party

center, or any official center after taking signed proof of receipt from the official, and communicates with the air bases to receive the reward, after handing/guiding to the aforementioned of the fugitives and wreckage; if communications are not available with the aforementioned authorities, for every action and step one takes, God will grant him a rewarding action and step, and an honorable life for him, his family and his grandsons after him, and (Allah Akbar) and the victory is for us, for our people, for our armed forces, for the members of the Air Forces, and the Air Defense if God willing and drive away the villains.”

(b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

**Iranian Radio Broadcast Alleging Iraq Captured USAF Pilot**

~~(S)~~ This memo is from a subordinate section to its DMI higher headquarters and concerns an Iranian radio announcement on 3 March 2002. The announcement stated an Iraqi officer, Colonel Mohammed al-Abdullah, deserted to Iran and told (or corroborated) to the Iranians the validity of US allegations that Iraq captured a US pilot after his aircraft was shot down over Iraq. The memo also stated page 10B of the INC newspaper *Al-Mu'tamar* reported the American pilot was captured by Iraqi forces a day after his aircraft was shot down in the first days of the war.

**Report on Speicher News Article**

~~(S)~~ Pages 3-8 contain handwritten letters internal to the DMI dated 5 May 1999 stating the MFA provided DMI with an Associated Press article by a possible US person, dated 19 March 1999, and titled “Navy Asked to Change Pilot’s Status.” The article concerned the debate by the US Congress to change CAPT Speicher’s status. The article was written in English and translated to Arabic.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)**

(b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~  
[Redacted]

**Speicher Dossier**

(b)(1),1.4 (e),1.4 (d)

■ ~~(S)~~  
[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~  
[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~  
[Redacted]

■ ~~(S)~~ The Iraqi chronology of events was a working document for internal use based on Iraqi correspondence, open-source reporting, official US correspondence, and [Redacted] correspondence. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~  
[Redacted]

### The 1995 Joint Excavation









(b)(1),1.4 (c) 

- ~~(S)~~ On 5 May 1995, the presidential cabinet notified the MFA to establish a working committee chaired by a representative from an intelligence agency. Membership was to include the MFA, DMI, and the Border Security Forces. The purpose of the committee was to learn about the “technical” aspects of the recovery fieldwork.



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(b)(1),1.4 (c)


### Iraqi Committee for the 1995 Crash Site Visit



- (b)(1),1.4 (c) 
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  IIS
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  DMI
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  MFA
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  Border Forces
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  Directorate of Air Safety
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  Directorate of Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence
- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■  Directorate of Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence


(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ On 2 October 1995, President Husayn approved the Iraqi planning committee recommendations. These recommendations were submitted to the  to be relayed to the United States. The  sponsored Iraq-US crash site field exploitation lasted from 11-15 December 1995. The Iraqi technical team noted the following results of the excavation, in part:

- ~~(S)~~ Pervasive coalition bombing prevented the Iraqis from accurately documenting the CAPT Speicher crash at the time of shoot-down on 16/17 January 1991.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(S)~~ 

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(S)~~ The US team confirmed the aircraft wreckage site   


(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(S)~~ 

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ ~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqi technical team concluded the pilot ejected from the aircraft and landed alive but probably was severely injured by shrapnel or debris when the missile hit his aircraft.
- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqi team believed the pilot died shortly after landing and that his remains were eaten by animals or he was buried by the Bedouin.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ ~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ ~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

### Reactions to US Report on the 1995 Excavation

(b)(1),1.4 (c)


■ ~~(C)~~ On 26 May 1997, the [Redacted] at the request of the United States, forwarded the US government investigative findings from the 1995 Joint [Redacted] excavation to the Iraqis.  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)


- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqis agreed with the description of the plane crash, the conclusions derived from the related analysis of the aircraft wreckage, and the pilot's recovered equipment.
- ~~(C)~~ However, the Iraqis noted the US report implied that some entity deliberately concealed, created obstacles, or removed evidence, thereby casting doubt about full Iraqi cooperation. The authors stated they could not corroborate this implied accusation.
- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqis suggested that the Bedouin and other locals in the area may have tampered with or removed parts of the wreckage, noting that the Bedouin had placed part of the aircraft on a nearby hill as a travel sign, but that this did not indicate official Iraqi exploitation of the crash site.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ ~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)




- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqis believed the United States was being ungrateful in its official response to them regarding perceived Iraqi exploitation and manipulation of the CAPT Speicher crash site. They commented that the US  Team expressed its thanks for Iraqi assistance at the end of the visit and did not express any concerns that the Iraqis were being deceitful.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

**Reactions to US Questions in 2000**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqis believed the questions placed Iraq in the position of being accused and responsible for detaining or concealing the American pilot or killing him. Consequently, the MFA rejected receiving them.
  - ~~(C)~~ On 27 February 2000, the Presidential Cabinet was notified of this information, and the MFA suggested establishing a committee to study the questions and prepare answers in case they were asked again by the United States or the international committee.
- ~~(C)~~ On 10 March 2000, the Presidential Cabinet directed  to establish an Iraqi internal committee to provide Iraqi responses to the questions. Their findings were that the pilot probably died in the desert because of injuries received when he was shot down.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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### Iraqi 2000 Investigative Committee

- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Director of Missing Persons Section, MFA (2000)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Director of Missing Persons Section, MFA (2001) (b)(1),1.4 (c)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Iraqi Air Force, [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Iraqi Air Force [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Iraqi Air Force, Directorate of Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Air Defense Headquarters & Intelligence
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] IIS (2000)
- [redacted] IIS (2001)

### Suspicion of US Motives

☞ The Iraqis believed the United States used the Speicher issue as propaganda to discredit and alienate Iraq internationally and to make Iraq appear uncooperative not only with the United States in its humanitarian search but with the United Nations and its resolutions, specifically with regard to WMD inspections.

- ☞ The Iraqis believed the 1997 US government response to the 1995 crash site investigation made unwarranted implications of a deliberate effort to conceal or remove evidence and to create obstacles to the US investigation.
- ☞ Iraqi internal documentation, including reports to President Saddam Husayn, stated the US allegations were false, citing previous US positions that CAPT Speicher was killed because of his shoot-down incident.
- ☞ The Iraqis believed the US memo sent to Baghdad on 10 January 2001 was “biased and pretentious in nature,” “full of falsifications and misinformation,” and “accused Iraq of hiding information.” They resented the US allegations and demands to provide answers to the [redacted] believing the United States had “elaborated and falsified facts to the International Committee.”  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)
- ☞ The Iraqis believed the United States also used the Speicher issue to remain on the Tripartite Committee when the United States no longer had missing personnel from the Gulf War by breaking historical precedent in changing CAPT Speicher from KIA to MIA.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

☞ [redacted]

- ~~(C)~~ The Iraqis also noted US press reports indicated the change was to provide financial support to the Speicher family.

**2003 Investigative Committee**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ~~(C)~~ As a direct result of these perceived allegations, [redacted] requested permission to reestablish the Investigation Committee to provide answers that could withstand international legal scrutiny and irrefutably resolve Iraq's role in CAPT Speicher's fate.

~~(C)~~ In early 2003, another Speicher Investigative Committee was established. The committee submitted its report to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in late March 2003. The findings of this report reaffirmed Iraq's earlier position that CAPT Speicher probably died in the desert as a result of injuries received during shoot-down or ejection. Foreign Minister Aziz received the report one week prior to OIF; Saddam Husayn did not receive the report.

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**~~(C)~~ The 2003 Speicher Investigative Committee**

- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Legal Department, MFA
- Major General Ghazi Ahmed Khalil, Iraqi Air Force, DMI, Director Branch 32 (he died in February 2003 of a heart attack)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] DMI, [redacted] (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Iraqi Air Force, Directorate of Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Iraqi Air Force, Air Defense Headquarters & Intelligence
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Permanent Committee of War Victims
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] IIS

The records are unclear about whether the following 2000 committee members were also members of the 2003 committee.

- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Missing Persons Section (2000)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] Missing Persons Section (2001)
- (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ [redacted] IIS (2000)


(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(C)~~ [redacted]

■ ~~(C)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)



**List of Coalition POWs Returned by the Legal Department, 4 March 1991**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(S)~~ This is a 4-page document including the Arabic- and English-language versions of an [redacted] certificate acknowledging custody of ten coalition POWs. CAPT Speicher's name was not among them.


**List of Coalition POWs Returned by the Legal Department, 5 March 1991**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ~~(S)~~ This is a 4-page document including the Arabic- and English-language versions of an [redacted] certificate acknowledging custody of 35 coalition POWs. CAPT Speicher's name was not among them. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)



**National Monitoring Directorate (NMD)**

(b)(1),(b)(5),(b)(6);1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)



(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ [Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ [Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)


■ [Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ [Redacted]

□ ~~(S)~~ IC POW/MIA ANALYTIC CELL COMMENT: The aircraft crash site was reported to US government officials by the UNSCOM team and subsequently identified as a USAF F-15.






**Iraqi Intelligence Service Files**

***Iraqi Crash Site Trip Report***

(b)(1),(b)(5),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)


█ indicates that █ and █  
█ directed Iraqi officials to provide complete support to the humanitarian mission, and he describes the flight suit as being “affected by the rain and weather.”

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)


(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ [Redacted]

***IIS: 1991 Memo from the Director of Investigations***

☞ This is a 66-page memo dated 22 February 1991 from the Director of IIS M7 (Investigations) to the Director of the IIS on the subject of "Procedures" for workplace safety and security, and the investigation of and then transfer of investigated personnel to Abu Ghurayb Prison. It is assessed this memo was written from Hakemiyah Prison. Paragraphs 23-25 address more than 200 prisoners in custody of their original captors.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)


[Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

### Miscellaneous Documents

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



- ~~(C)~~ The remaining pages of the document are draft Iraqi replies to the American 12 questions presented in a year 2000 demarche.



(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(S)  **Ministry Letter of Appointment and Informational Note**


(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(S)  Iraqi Air Force, Directorate of Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence provided two documents on 20 March 2004.


(b)(1),(b)(6),(k)(2)

- ~~(S)~~ One document is a 4 February 2003 letter from MFA Legal Department  to Air Defense Command Commander Lieutenant General Muzahim Saub Hassan requesting  be assigned to the 2003 Speicher Committee.


(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) (b)(1),(b)(5),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S)~~ The second document is a letter from  to Lieutenant General Muzahim, dated 3 February 2003, detailing his previous involvement in the Speicher case. In describing the 1995 search, he reported, "We arrived at the plane crash site, which was not known to us before. The search continued for 10 days, and the pilot suit and some survival kits were found, but there was no trace of the pilot's remains...The Iraqi and American teams reached the conclusion that the pilot was killed after ejection from the plane. Due to the terrain of the area and because no one went to rescue him and because of the weather and scavenging animals in this area, the team assumed that his body was torn apart and his remains spread over the desert."

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)




**Calendar Pages from Iraqi Air Force Headquarters**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)


~~(S)~~ A weekly reminder calendar found at Iraqi Air Force Headquarters contained a notation on 2 January 2003 about a "Dinner appointment with [redacted] at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the American pilot." The calendar owner's identity is unknown. [redacted] stated it was not his, and he did not know to whom the calendar might have belonged. (b)(1),(b)(5),1.4 (c)

**List of Planes and Crews Shot Down in DESERT STORM**


~~(C)~~ This 54-page Iraqi Air Force document was drafted sometime in 2000 to document all the Gulf War coalition losses. Page 13 deals with CAPT Speicher and states, "The crash site was found on 9 December 1995. The pilot was killed and the body is still missing."



(b)(1),1.4 (c)




(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)




**Post-War Evaluation of Air Defense**

(S) This 25-page Iraqi Air Defense document is a report on the effectiveness of Iraq camouflage, concealment, deception, and air defense activities in the 1991 Gulf War. The report indicates Iraqi air defense forces claimed 281 coalition aircraft and cruise missiles destroyed, and air defense support forces claimed 200 coalition aircraft and cruise missiles destroyed. Physical proof was found for 44 aircraft and approximately 120 cruise missiles using aircraft wreckage, POW interrogations, killed pilots, and coalition press statements.

- (S) The report states the difference in numbers between the coalition losses and Iraqi claims is partly attributable to Iraq's inability to search for crash sites, stating "it was difficult for our helicopters to scan vast areas searching for physical evidence to document aircraft, wreckage and pilots. Most of these areas were uninhabited and the enemy had rescued several of its pilots inside our land as well."



(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) These documents are assessed as fabricated.

- ~~(C)~~ The translator stated the handwriting of the alleged cover letter from the “Director, Intelligence Organization” is consistent with the handwriting of the captured documents generated by the [redacted] (b)(1),1.4 (c)
- ~~(C)~~ The translator observed the author of the documents lacked Arabic comprehension skills, used bad grammar, had uneducated handwriting and the text of both the cover letter and the notes lacked clarity.

## HUMAN EXPLOITATIONS

### High-Value Detainee Debriefings

~~(C)~~ Over 200 Iraqis, including approximately 150 HVDs, were interviewed between April 2003 and March 2004 concerning their possible knowledge of the fate of CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

- ~~(C)~~ Many HVDs claimed no knowledge other than what they heard through the Iraqi official press. Because these negative responses added little or nothing to the investigative process, they are omitted from this report for brevity.
- ~~(C)~~ No senior government official or military officer knew of, or would admit to having any direct knowledge of, CAPT Speicher having ever been captured or held prisoner or of his body having been recovered by the Iraqi regime following his shoot-down in January 1991.

~~(C)~~ Iraqi officials claim there was no reason to retain CAPT Speicher secretly. They claim that he would have been exploited like the Iranian pilot.

- ~~(C)~~ Most HVDs were aware of the Iranian pilot who was held by the IIS for 18 years as evidence of Iran beginning the Iran-Iraq War and to force total repatriation of all Iraqi POWs held by Iran.
- ~~(C)~~ With one exception, no HVD was aware of rumors concerning an American pilot, POW, or prisoner being held captive by the regime after the Gulf War. [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted] said rumors of Iraq holding a captive American would surface whenever the United States petitioned Iraq for more information on the fate of CAPT Speicher.

~~(C)~~ Iraqi officials claimed to be unaware of the location of the Speicher crash site until the 1995 joint excavation. According to regime officials, any perceived tampering of the aircraft wreckage was the result of Bedouin pilfering.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] Only the DMI and IIS were responsible for POWs or important foreign prisoners. The IIS was responsible for the handling of the Iranian pilot held for 18 years. No evidence was found that any unit of the RG or SRG ever held any POWs or prisoners outside its own personnel for disciplinary reasons or that it was involved in the POW handling process.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] **Knowledge of CAPT Speicher**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] had no direct knowledge of CAPT Speicher.

- ~~(S)~~ The 1995 Speicher committee found equipment at the crash site.
- ~~(S)~~ The Iraqis did not ever keep CAPT Speicher or use his remains to coerce dialogue with the Americans.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [redacted] led the committee for searching and reporting WMD and Speicher issues.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ Saddam Husayn did not know about the whereabouts of Speicher since, once he formed the committee, he did not meddle in what the committee was doing. [redacted] told Saddam that a US-Iraq committee needed a helicopter to go to the western Iraq crash site to look for CAPT Speicher and that is the first time Saddam heard of CAPT Speicher.

■ ~~(S)~~ The Iraqis had no idea how important Speicher was to the United States.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] of a US F-18 shot down by a "Volga or Pijora" during the first couple of days of the war. He said that this pilot was believed to be alive because someone on the ground found a parachute. [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] there was an air-to-air kill of a US F-16 during the first day of war by a MiG-29. A committee from the Directorate of Air Force Safety, led by [redacted] investigated the plane crash. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ The committee did not find the airplane, so it took the report of the radar and the pilot to be the truth.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]  
[Redacted] He had no personal knowledge of Speicher. He had heard the story of the shoot-down and crash site. [Redacted] had no knowledge of any POWs from any nation.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] two coalition aircraft were shot down in 1991 by Iraqi aircraft: one by a MiG-29 and the other by a Mirage F-1. Both flew from Habbaniyah Air Base under Air Defense Command. He did not know the details of the shoot-downs as he was in War College at the time.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ He knew about the 1995 excavation of the Speicher crash site because of what he learned from [Redacted]. He did not recall if he heard if there was a corpse in the airplane. He understood wolves or wild dogs had eaten the body.

■ ~~(S)~~ He heard there were several investigations and committees about the downed American aviator, but that the case was closed for years.

~~(S)~~ **Ba'ath Party Official**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] said an American committee came over in 1995 to look for the missing pilot. He did not know about Iraq's participation, but it was not brought up in any Ministerial meetings, and he never heard of an American pilot being held by Iraq at any of these meetings.

■ ~~(S)~~ Iraq believed the Americans knew what happened to the pilot, but was lying to embarrass Iraq before the rest of the world. He did not know why else the Americans would have brought up the case so many years after the war.

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ He heard a story almost 8 years before about a committee formed to find the American pilot. He heard they found his flight suit but no body, and that the matter was settled.

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]  
He said every time the US petitioned or queried the regime on CAPT Speicher, rumors would erupt at the ministerial level that Iraq was holding an American POW from the 1991 war. Rumors became so rampant that Saddam, on more than three occasions, formally denied the allegations in ministerial meetings.

(b)(1),1.4(c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] was a security force lieutenant colonel who served in Saddam's security force (1984-2003) and had a close personal relationship with Saddam.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ He never heard any rumors of US POWs being held by Iraq after the Gulf War.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] heard in 1998 of a downed pilot and how a combined Iraqi and US committee searched for the remains. The committees concluded the pilot was killed, having tested DNA from blood on the flight suit.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] read a letter written at the end of 2002 or in early 2003 by [Redacted] asking about the status of the investigation on the missing American pilot. [Redacted] responded that the body of the missing pilot was returned to the United States. These letters were written because American Congressmen were coming to discuss this pilot. [Redacted] read both letters.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] **Senior Ba'ath Party Member (1982-2003)**

~~(S)~~ He heard nothing of Speicher except that a committee was formed between 1995 and 1997 to look for the missing pilot, but he did not know the results of the investigation.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] believed CAPT Speicher died in 1991, right after his jet crashed. During the mid-1990s the [Redacted] came to Iraq to pick up remains that were later identified as a Saudi pilot. DNA tests conducted by the Saudi government confirmed the remains as those of the Saudi Pilot (NFI).

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] He stated that Iraq returned all American POWs and remains. He gave the Americans everything Iraq had, all the corpses and remains.

■ ~~(S)~~ The government would have surrendered any POWs; there was no purpose in keeping them.

■ ~~(S)~~ Heard nothing afterward about American interest or of any rumors of American POWs still in captivity.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ In mid-90s, he saw a memo requesting a committee be formed to help the Americans search for the remains of a missing pilot. He met the Iraqi Air Force [redacted] responsible for taking the Americans to the crash site and requested a debriefing, though he could no longer remember the officer's name. The Air Force general reported that the American and Iraqi committees went to the crash site and saw the remains of the plane but found no remains. [redacted] also said the search took place in the desert with no people. He believed the pilot probably died and there were many possibilities for that loss such as wolves and other animals. [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted] had no other details he could offer.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

[redacted] repeated the [redacted] story as documented in his report to [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

The MFA received a letter from the National Monitoring Directorate on 16 January 2001 indicating that the [redacted] subordinate to the special committee surveyed and inspected the western sector of Iraq from 17 to 19 December 1991. [redacted] confessed that the American administration asked him to look for the body of the pilot at the same time that his team was surveying and inspecting the desert area for tens of kilometers by foot. [redacted] concluded that the pilot was eaten by wolves.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

In 1993, the (UNSCOM 63) inspection team repeated an inspection of the western sector using helicopters equipped with modern radar to do an overview and survey and inspect the vast area within the western sector. The team's primary goal was to look for the American pilot's body, and the team did not find anything except the plane wreckage.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (e),1.4 (d)

■ ~~(S)~~ In 2001, someone from [redacted] office called him wanting information [redacted] They told him to show up for an interview at the MFA and be prepared to repeat the story for an US ABC news reporter's questions.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) While sitting in the office awaiting the interview, [redacted] observed a photo album with several pictures of the flight suit and parts of the airplane. One picture was the canopy, one of the destroyed aircraft, and one picture of a deep hole from the impact area of the crash (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) He said he had a meeting with [redacted] sometime in 1999 or 2000 in which Aziz produced a 1-inch thick photo album containing color photos of CAPT Speicher's flight suit, helmet, aircraft remains, the glass canopy, and many other photos the source was unable to see.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted] only saw the photo album one time. He originally stated that he thought the Iraqi Air Force took the pictures in the album, but after some reflection, he now thinks the Americans produced the photos. He states this because he claims the quality of the photos were too good.

□ (S) The picture of the flight suit showed ripped areas near the chest area and leg areas. He said the flight suit appeared to have been photographed outside the location but could not tell where and said it appeared to have a cloth background.

■ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) The glass canopy remained undamaged and was placed over a small hill by the Bedouin as if a landmark. He could not possibly identify where these pictures were taken and when (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [redacted] never tasked [redacted] to write a report about the 1995 walk, that BL 34 wrote the report on initiative as a part of his normal responsibilities.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted], a chemist and consultant to the Military Industrialization Corporation, said to ask [redacted] of the National Monitoring Directorate, which was part of the team that walked looking for the pilot.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted] a scientist with the National Monitoring Directorate (1995-2003), said she heard of the pilot from [redacted]. The pilot fell in the west desert, clothes were found with blood, and it was concluded that wolves or other animals had eaten the pilot.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted] a career officer assigned to the IIS M4 (Foreign Intelligence) in 1991 and was later the [redacted] said that in 1992 the UN inspectors came and they looked for the missing pilot.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[redacted] was the head of that committee. [redacted] They walked over 20 kilometers spaced about 500 meters apart for 9 hours. They found the airplane wreckage and his flight suit with blood. They took DNA and

said it was the missing pilot's blood. They thought the pilot was dead, and the file was again closed. Maybe wolves ate the body. The United States announced the pilot was dead.

- (S) He claimed he was not part of any special committee responsible for debriefing CAPT Speicher.

- (b)(1),1.4 (c) ■ (S) [redacted] the people most likely to have dealt with CAPT Speicher were the DMI and possibly the Air Force Intelligence because they are in charge of interviewing pilots.

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [redacted] was told by the [redacted] of a Coalition aircraft that had been shot down. An Iraqi civilian saw the pilot's parachute and a search was made for the pilot. Before he left his post in the DMI in 1991 [redacted] told her the pilot had never been recovered, nor was the crash site found.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted] **IIS Officer**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [redacted] was a career IIS officer assigned to the M4 (Foreign Intelligence Service 1973-98), [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- (S) DMI is responsible to look for downed pilots along with the MFA.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- (S) [redacted] heard in the late 1990s that a committee came here from the United States to Iraq to look for the pilot. They found the wreckage but not the pilot.

(b)(1),1.4 (b),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

- (S) The [redacted] were here looking for weapons, and they found the wreckage and told the DMI. The MFA would have the results from the investigation. The source said he knew that the [redacted] was very concerned about the Americans coming to Iraq to look for the pilot and he had negotiated with the United States for its trip to Iraq. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

- (S) He heard no rumors of an American pilot or POW after the war.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

**IIS Officer**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [redacted] was a career IIS Officer (1987-2003) who served as [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) He said [redacted] talked to him about this matter. [redacted] told him Iraq was looking for this pilot when the UN Team had come over for an inspection. He did not know if any other Iraqis or Americans went back out to look for the missing pilot. He thought they found the wreckage and human bones.

■ (S) He heard no rumors but said [redacted] had said in a conference that there is a missing pilot and that the Americans were still looking for him. Iraq is finished and declared the matter settled. This was announced either in the newspaper or on television.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

■ (S) He said Saddam never mentioned the pilot. Some years ago, he heard there was a missing pilot who was shot down in the western desert northwest of Ar-Ramadi. The Americans came and searched the area with the Red Cross and United Nations. They found the wreckage but no body. [redacted] was responsible for this and said the Americans were pleased. He heard no rumors of an American pilot but was aware of the discovery and return of the body of a Saudi pilot, and he was aware of the Iranian pilot being held.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

■ (S) He knew of the Iranian pilot who was captured before the declaration of war with Iran and who had been held for many years before being returned. He said the Iranian was mentioned in the news and in speeches so that Iran would know Iraq had him, but he never saw him.

**IIS Officer**

(b)(1),(b)(5),1.4 (c)

(S) [redacted] was a career officer of the IIS and [redacted] He said no POWs were held by the IIS after 1991. He also stated Qusay did not order the transfer of any prisoners from the DMI to IIS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) He was interrogated several times by virtue of him being [REDACTED] when CAPT Speicher was shot down and by being [REDACTED] the organization that held the Iranian pilot and would have been most likely to hold a another long-term foreign prisoner. He provided the most complete insight into Iraq's initial interest in CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [REDACTED] was not aware of CAPT Speicher at the time of his shoot-down, claiming he only learned his name after the war. At the end of 1991, he heard of some foreign diplomat who had asked either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] about CAPT Speicher. [REDACTED] emphasized he did not know anything about Speicher but would tell interviewers anything he knew if he did. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [REDACTED] was in Basra in the opening days of the war. He learned of a shoot-down and ejection of the plane's pilot from [REDACTED] at approximately 0400Z or 0500Z (0700 or 0800 Baghdad time) on the morning of 17 January 2001 during a situation report delivered to [REDACTED] via phone in the first hours of the coalition air campaign. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (U) ISG COMMENT: Iraq is Zulu +3 in January. The original debriefing notes added +4 instead of +3 because DST was in effect at the time of the debriefing. CAPT Speicher was shot down at approximately 0300 Baghdad time.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) (S) [REDACTED] indicated an Iraqi civilian reportedly observed seeing a parachute in the sky after a coalition aircraft reportedly was shot down. On 18 May 2003, [REDACTED] clarified that the search never revealed the person(s) that claimed to have seen a parachute. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [REDACTED] what [REDACTED] was doing to locate the pilot. [REDACTED] indicated he had dispatched a search team to capture the pilot for interrogation. [REDACTED] reported that he had dispatched [REDACTED] from the Office of Communications at DMI headquarters in Baghdad, to lead the search. They were ordered to the vicinity where the parachute was seen, to question civilians and to alert military units in the area.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [REDACTED] clarified that an urban as well as suburban search was conducted. The source freely mentioned that the search served two primary purposes: 1) to get the pilot and his information, and 2) to use the incident as propaganda to encourage air defense units. [REDACTED] mentioned that Saddam had, and wanted to amplify anything to his benefit. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (S) He claimed he was not notified by [REDACTED] about the specific location of the shoot-down, having only been advised that it was near Baghdad.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [REDACTED] repeatedly stated that [REDACTED] was the focal point of the search, and the primary interrogator of any/all captured pilots. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

the reporting chain as follows: [redacted] reported to Central Military Control, and spoke to either a) [redacted] b) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted] also mentioned that [redacted] could/would communicate directly with [redacted] without his knowledge. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [redacted] received regular updates from [redacted] during the first week of the air war regarding failed efforts to locate the pilot. [redacted] also requested regular updates from [redacted] during the 7 days. He considered the constant inquiries from [redacted] as an indication of keen high-level interest in conducting interrogations of the pilot as soon as possible to obtain intelligence on future planned strikes and war plans related to the air campaign. After the initial 7 days, all inquiries from [redacted] ceased, and the search effort was abandoned. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [redacted] then passed news of the downed pilot to [redacted] who, in turn, notified the [redacted]. The Minister reportedly notified President Saddam Husayn. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) Communication was sporadic during the war and when established, a status check of the search always was asked. [redacted] mentioned that the search for Speicher lasted only 7 days due to the breakdown of communications between Basra and Baghdad.

■ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ (S) In an interview on 17 and 18 May 2003, [redacted] met a British colonel POW in Basra who flew an A-10. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (U) ISG COMMENTS: The British did not fly the A-10 or OV-10 aircraft.

□ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

■ (S) [redacted] recalls that Saddam ordered TV ads broadcast (and possibly print ads) that announced a reward for anyone that had Speicher or information related to Speicher.



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

 IIS Officer

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~  was a career IIS officer (1979-2003) assigned to the M4 (Foreign Intelligence 1991) and later the  (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)


■ ~~(S)~~ In 1999,  became  President Bush and the Americans began asking questions about the missing pilot. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ He began a file on the information he learned and the telephone calls he made. He talked with the Director of M5 (Counterintelligence) and learned it had a file containing information about the missing pilot. He asked M5 for the file and made copies of that information to put in the file he had started. The following information was in the M5 file.

■ ~~(S)~~ Iraq shot down an American plane, and the United States did not announce the plane was shot down. The Iraqi pilot who shot down the American plane called the Iraqi Air Force, but the Air force could not find the wreckage from the information provided, so did not believe him.


■ (U) US Secretary of Defense Cheney announced several shoot-downs of coalition aircraft the day after the air campaign began and stated that CAPT Speicher was KIA.

□ ~~(S)~~ At the end of the 1991 war, the United States got all of its prisoners, and then the United States said that there was one more. Iraq stated that there was no more.

□ ~~(S)~~ 

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ ~~(S)~~  Iraq did not have the capability to test for DNA, but that Iraq was told the DNA from the blood belonged to the missing pilot.

■ ~~(S)~~ In 1995, the United States opened the file again, stating that the pilot was not dead. "This did not make sense because the blood was from the pilot; that is what we were told." Iraq thought the United States was looking for an excuse to attack Iraq again, and their response was cold.

■ ~~(S)~~ The Bush administration then came in and began working on the case. There was communication going on between the Foreign Ministry of Iraq and the United States. The US State Department put out a 15-page pamphlet saying that the pilot was not killed, but Iraq said otherwise.



(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

- (S) In 2001, [redacted] and high-ranking officials from the United States wanted to meet with Saddam to get the truth. Iraq said that the United States was welcome to come over and look at the wreckage and anything else. The Presidential office for Saddam told the United States that it would not give an appointment for the Americans to meet with Saddam, so no Americans came over, although they were welcome to do so.

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

**IIS officer (1982-2003)**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(S) Stated around 1996, he heard there was a fallen pilot in Iraq. [redacted] was negotiating with the Americans about the pilot. He did not know if anyone looked for the pilot or anything else.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

**Knowledge of the CAPT Speicher Crash Site**

(S) The following are extracts of interviews with HVD's assessed to have pertinent knowledge or the placement and access concerning the Speicher crash site.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [redacted] stated that the Qatari hunter never talked to him about the crash site then qualified "maybe" they spoke about it but he was not sure.

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) [redacted] we should speak with [redacted] to find if any airplane parts were taken from the crash and that Hussam Mohammed Amin would know information about the airplane and the flight suit.

(b)(1)

[redacted]

**Army and SRG General Officer (1974-2003)**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(S) He was assigned to the RG Headquarters in 1995, but he never heard anything of the SRG being involved in the 1995 Red Cross visit.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ He stated that an F-16 was the air-to-air kill on the first day of war and it was made by a MiG-29.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted] there was a committee from the Directorate of Air Force Safety, led by [Redacted] to investigate the plane crash. The committee did not find the airplane, so they took the report of the radar and the pilot to be the truth. A joint investigative committee was formed in 1995 with ICRC, Iraqi, Saudi, and US members.

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

[Redacted] **SRG, RG and SSO Officer**

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

### Non-Detainee Knowledge of CAPT Speicher

~~(C)~~ Approximately 50 non-detained Iraqis were interviewed between April 2003 and March 2004 concerning their knowledge of CAPT Speicher.

~~(C)~~ Some of these personnel, like some of the HVDs, had access to Saddam Husayn or were in key positions within the regime that might have reasonably allowed them access to information on CAPT Speicher between 1991 and 2003 as part of their official duties.

~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(C)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

Pages 51 thru 57 will not be released with the document

















(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ He never heard Saddam comment on the Speicher case but said he was not close to Saddam's circles. As far as he knew, all the POWs were repatriated.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)


~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]



(b)(1),1.4 (c)

**Former Political Prisoner**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted] did not see or hear of any Americans in any of the prisons in which he was incarcerated. He was imprisoned with a Kurdish Christian named [redacted] Iraqi Air Force pilot named [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted] At one point in captivity, Saddam was about to execute [redacted] The pilot feigned mental illness, and the execution was postponed.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted] was unaware of any American POWs being held in the Iraqi prison system after the 1991 Gulf War.

**Iraqi Air Force Major**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted] was held a prisoner from 1998 to 2003 for anti-Saddam statements. He saw no Americans while he was a prisoner in Ibn Sina. He said there were no Americans held prisoner there. He said, "I was the only pilot. I am the only pilot in Iraq they say was insane."

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~ He was incarcerated for 3 months, along with the Iraqi Air Force major, and the former political prisoner. He said no prisoners were kept in any of the palaces during his time there.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

■ [Redacted]  
■ [Redacted]

**IIS Counterintelligence Officer**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

He gave a general idea of where this facility could be found, calling it Prison #1 (in the New Baghdad area near the freeway) and saying it was well known.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

■ ~~(S)~~ He was not aware of any Israeli prisoners, pilots, or spies, captured and held by the IIS in 1991, or between 1991 and 2003.

■ ~~(S)~~ He was not aware of any prisoners who were captured and died in captivity, or may have been executed.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted] never heard of CAPT Speicher and was not aware of the food-handling procedures for special prisoners.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ Both the [Redacted] were unaware of CAPT Speicher being held in captivity. They checked with other former prisoners who are members of the League and failed to find anyone who was aware of CAPT Speicher being held a prisoner by the regime.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)




### Knowledge of the CAPT Speicher Crash Site

~~(S)~~ This section contains extracts of pertinent knowledge by non-detained Iraqis with placement and access to the Speicher crash site.


(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S//NF)~~



~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1),1.4 (c)




(b)(1),1.4 (c)




~~(S)~~

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)



pages 63 and 64 will not be release with this document







## Other Issues

### *Iraqi POW-Handling Process*

(U) IC understanding of Iraq's POW-handling process was confirmed.

- ~~(S)~~ The DMI was responsible for the handling of coalition POWs during the Gulf War. A joint DMI-IIS committee was formed to interrogate the POWs when Saddam became unhappy with DMI interrogation results. Coalition POWs were held by the IIS at Hakemiyah until the facility was bombed by coalition forces. They were then moved to Abu Ghurayb.
  - ~~(S)~~ The IIS was also responsible for the Iranian pilot who was held for 18 years by the regime as evidence of Iran having started the Iran-Iraq War. His captivity was relatively well known within certain government circles in Iraq.

### *Iraq Returned all Coalition POWs or KIA Remains*

~~(S)~~ Four Iraqis interviewed had direct knowledge of the disposition of the coalition POWs after the war, and all four stated that every coalition POW or their known remains were returned to coalition forces in accordance with the cease-fire agreement. Three of these Iraqis claimed that Saddam was too frightened of US retaliation to consider keeping back a single POW.

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

□ ~~(S)~~

### *Special Prisoners*

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- ~~(S)~~ [redacted] who was responsible for foreigners held by Iraq, was unaware of any covert prison system or covert prisoners.
- ~~(S)~~ HVD and non-detained Iraqis stated that some prisoners receive different treatment; however, none expressed or admitted knowledge of secret or covert prisons.
- (U) Special prisoners, such as Saddam's relatives or important persons imprisoned for brief periods for disciplinary reasons, received deferential treatment.
- ~~(S)~~ The Iranian pilot was considered a special prisoner because of his value to the regime in negotiating the release of thousands of Iraqis held by the Iranian government. He was kept in a safehouse and away from the general prison populations.

### ***Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard, and Special Security Organization Relationship and Involvement***

~~(S)~~ According to HVD and non-detainee reporting, no relationship existed between the SRG, RG, or SSO except they all received orders from Qusay Husayn and had their own responsibilities for the security of Saddam. The SRG and RG received their orders through the Ammana al-Ser, and the SSO received its orders through the SSO HQ. The SSO did not issue orders or coordinate with the SRG at any level below Qusay, who was the only focal point of the SSO, the SRG, and the RG. All three organizations were kept separate to prevent subversive coordination.

~~(S)~~ According to HVDs who were in command of the SRG, RG, and SSO, none of these organizations had anything to do with the POW-handling process or coalition POWs during or after the war except for a few cases of initial capture and interrogation.

## **BEDOUIIN OPERATIONS**

### **Background**

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

Bedouin nomads transit the Speicher crash site area, a winter grazing range, during the rainy season from approximately November to February.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

- ~~(S)~~ By April 2004, the security situation had deteriorated to the point that the alleged eyewitnesses were unwilling to be seen cooperating with the United States, even on a humanitarian issue.
- ~~(S)~~ Secondhand information led to the exhuming of some remains in May 2004. They were later confirmed as not being those of CAPT Speicher but of a young female.

pages 67,68,69 not responsive to the request







■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

**Additional Visits to the Bedouin near the Speicher Crash Site**

■ ~~(S)~~ On 30 January 2004, Team Speicher returned to the crash site to [Redacted]  
(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ ~~(S)~~ A walk-down was conducted, but nothing of interest was found.

□ ~~(S)~~ Some Bedouin driving near the crash site were contacted. They were Shia from Samarra and had been coming to the area for only the last 3 years. They were passing through looking for grass and claimed no knowledge of the crash.

□ ~~(S)~~ Two large Bedouin encampments, all part of one family, to the north were visited but claimed to know nothing and promised to pass the word among the Bedouin of US interest.

■ ~~(S)~~ On 14 February 2004, Team Speicher returned to the crash site, but the closest Bedouin camp was found 20 miles north. These were of the Shammari tribal confederation and also claimed to know nothing but promised to pass the word of US interest among the Bedouin.

**OTHER OPERATIONS**

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) ■ ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

Pages 71,72 not responsive to the request







(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) On 28 September 2003, former Iraqi Air Force officers [redacted] were brought together with DS-2314 to determine if [redacted] had picked up CAPT Speicher as he maintained or some other POW. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted] retired from the Air Force in 1986. He was [redacted] He was dismissed on 1 February 1991 for failing to obey Qusay when ordered to execute a Kuwaiti pilot.

(b)(1),(k)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted] served in the Gulf War as a member of a committee charged with investigating downed coalition aircraft while active combat operations were under way. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (d)

■ (S) [redacted] believed that [redacted] had mistaken the capture of [redacted] for that of CAPT Speicher. [redacted] stated the Iraqis captured an American pilot near Yusifiyah and that the SSO conducted the initial capture before handing the pilot over to the Iraqi Air Force. (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [redacted] strongly disputed [redacted] story that he, Qusay, and [redacted] covertly observed the crash site in 1995. He said the helicopters regularly patrolled the area against smugglers and bandits. There were also vehicle checkpoints established at all ingress/egress routes and no vehicles containing Qusay and others were ever identified by his security personnel.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(S) **Speicher Crash Site Visit**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

■ (S) [redacted] officers and indicated the spot where he and Qusay supposedly observed the 1995 [redacted] crash site excavation for 10 to 15 minutes. The alleged observation point was a small rise about 1,300 meters east of the wreckage. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

□ (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

- (S) [redacted] said they met a guard, but that they made no contact with the Iraqi commander or the [redacted] team.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

- (S) [redacted] was unable to identify where the tent camps were located or their disposition. The tent camps would have been easily identifiable in this flat to gently rolling desert terrain.

(b)(1),(b)(4),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

**(S) [redacted] Crash Site Visit**

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

- (S) On 30 September 2003, [redacted] was flown to the crash site of [redacted]

- (S) Long-time local residents stated no airplanes crashed in their area in 1991 and that no pilot had landed in or near the field previously identified by US records. [redacted] also stated in his debrief that he landed near a four-lane highway and several large storage tanks, none of which were observed in the area. This evidence indicates official records of [redacted] crash site coordinates are incorrect.

(b)(6)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

**(S) [redacted] Yusifiyah Visit**

(b)(6)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

- (S) One 20-year resident said IIS and security forces captured a pilot during the Gulf War, but that the people could not get near him. He said the pilot was captured near the Saddam Bridge on the Euphrates River about 15 minutes away.

### Major General Doctor Kamal Husayn Abdullah

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted] identified [redacted] reportedly brought CAPT Speicher to the hospital.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted] He now operates a private clinic and serves as a part-time medical instructor at several civilian hospitals, including one for specialized surgery formerly known as Adnan Kharallah. He does not practice medicine at this hospital.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted] During the Gulf War in 1991, [redacted] He treated four coalition POWs captured in Kuwait.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c) [redacted] In 1998, [redacted] was working at Hamed Shahab Military Hospital in Baghdad. He did not treat any POWs while at this hospital. He did not know of [redacted]

[redacted] In 2003, he was shown a photograph of CAPT Speicher and said he did not recognize him but that he would have remembered him if he had treated him since CAPT Speicher had a distinctive face (“very French”).

### Hit Investigation

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [redacted] witnesses reported seeing CAPT Speicher in the town of Hit located about 150 kilometers west of Baghdad and about 80 kilometers northeast of CAPT Speicher’s F/A-18 crash site.

(b)(1),1.4(c) ■ (S) A [redacted] eyewitness alleged CAPT Speicher was captured by members of the Al-Buassaf tribe near the village of Maskhan, in the province of Ramadi (Anbar), and taken to Hit Ba'ath Party Headquarters and then to the General Security Service HQ in Hit. [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4(c) ■ (S) Another [redacted] report indicated an eyewitness stated a pilot was paraded through the town of Hit in front of citizens and tribal sheikhs; he was jeered at and beaten. He stated CAPT Speicher died of a heart attack following severe beatings. The body was fed to wolves and bears by [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c) [redacted] allegedly showed the town members Speicher's torn clothes.

(S) One of the alleged eyewitnesses was shown eight photos of US naval aviators. He did not choose CAPT Speicher's photo.

(S) On 22 August 2003, the DGS Headquarters was exploited to locate and recover any files that would identify Hit facilities where CAPT Speicher was held and whether he died in captivity or was transferred to another location.

■ (S) A card catalog file index was found but was not removed because of its size.

■ (S) Several record books that appeared to have an index that matched the card catalog file index were found in the microfiche room where the DGS was in the process of filming the records for fiche storage and retrieval. One roll of 35-mm film and two microfiche were recovered along with the record books.

■ (S) A search of the administration building resulted in the recovery of numerous documents and record books that may aid in identifying DGS officers.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c) (S) [redacted] turned himself into US authorities and was serving as a cooperative HUMINT source for the Army.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c)

□ (S) [redacted] emphatically that he never encountered a coalition pilot at any time during the 1991 Gulf War.

□ (S) He stated he was in Basra with [redacted] during the first weeks of the Gulf War.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c)

■ (S) [redacted] (b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c)

□ (S) [redacted] stated he and [redacted] were in Kuwait and Basra during the Gulf War in 1991.

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4(c)

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] stated he had no knowledge of CAPT Speicher being captured alive, the whereabouts of CAPT Speicher's remains, or of the events that supposedly took place in Hit.

### Camp Speicher I-Beam

~~(S)~~ On 8 September 2004, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 64th Corps Support Group (CSG), reported to the US Army CID about an I-beam in an open carport at US Camp Speicher in Tikrit. The carport was adjacent to the headquarters building, and the beam had the initials "M.S.S" and the date "9-15 1994" written on it. The initials were extremely similar to those found in Hakemiyah Prison on 7 July 2003, images of which had been subsequently published by the media and on the Internet.

~~(S)~~ The US Army CID examined the beam, conducted two sweeps of the carport and adjacent house for additional markings, and interviewed numerous soldiers. The building where the initials were found was identified as an administrative building associated with the Tikrit Air Force Academy. At the time the initials were found, the carport had been used as a vehicle maintenance facility by the HHC, 64th CSG, for almost a year and was open to general traffic.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

~~(S)~~

[redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(6),1.4 (c)

### Special Republican Guard and CAPT Speicher

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) The [redacted] and the proximity of an SRG camp south of the Air Academy where the initials were discovered (now Camp Speicher) suggested the SRG, and specifically the 2nd Company of the 1st Regiment, may have held or transported CAPT Speicher.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) Several former SRG officers, [redacted] to Qusay Husayn were interviewed. Except for minor differences in details, their responses confirmed the mission, organization, leadership, and responsibilities of the SRG. None of these former officers had any knowledge of CAPT Speicher being held or transported by the SRG at any time between 1991 and 2003.

### Operation HORNED VIPER

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted]

### Other Reporting

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c) (S) [redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]


(b)(1),1.4 (e)

~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

***Aircraft Parts Found at Al-Asad Air Base***

~~(S)~~ The US Army 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment near al-Asad Air Base reported an Australian special forces team recovered or observed an F/A-18 nosecone in the May 2003 time frame. The nosecone turned out to be an F-14 canopy.

(b)(1),1.4(c)



***Burned Flight Helmet***

☞ US forces discovered a pilot’s burned helmet in a house 4 kilometers east of Ar-Ramadi. The helmet turned out to be a French-type 316 manufactured by Ulmer Aeronautique.

**WAY AHEAD**

☞ Due to the security situation, ISG Team Speicher returned from Iraq and reintegrated with the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell. Should the security situation improve, or significant intelligence leads develop, the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell will redeploy an appropriately sized Speicher team back to Iraq. Nevertheless, the ISG has a point-of-contact in Baghdad for the CAPT Speicher case assisting with IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell information requirements.