NORIEGA FEELING THAT HE HAD BEEN DELIVERED A DEPARTURE ULTIMATUM. IF NORIEGA ANNOUNCES A DATE FOR HIS RETIREMENT HE WOULD EXPECT AS PART OF THE RELATED AGREEMENT THAT THE U.S. WOULD IMMEDIATELY EASE UP ON THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES. NORIEGA DID NOT TELL [b(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) THAT HE WOULD STEP DOWN IN MAY.

KOZAK HAD SPelled OUT FOR NORIEGA THE U.S. ANALYSIS THAT NORIEGA'S OPTIONS WERE NARROWING. KOZAK ALSO UNDERSCORED [b(1);1.4 (c);1.4 (d) THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE FDP AND INSURE THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE FDP WITHIN PANAMA'S DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

- KOZAK HAD LAID OUT PARAMETERS OF THE PROBLEM TO NORIEGA AND HAD INVITED NORIEGA TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC POINTS MENTIONED.
- THIS HIGH LEVEL MISSION HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT NORIEGA'S REQUEST AND IT HAD BEEN CONFIRMED THAT NORIEGA WANTED TO DISCUSS HIS DEPARTURE.
Told Kozak that some means was needed to establish bonafides in the contact between the U.S. and Noriega.

General Noriega was not going to set a date for his departure without some flexibility on the part of the U.S.

Kozak emphasized that a serious response was needed from Noriega. The U.S. did not deliver an ultimatum but had expected a Noriega response, which was never received.

The offer of the delegation is still on the table but as time passes Noriega's options continue to narrow.

Noriega did have the feeling or perception that he had been given an ultimatum. The delegation was too rigid, not very friendly, and that the U.S. delegation's proposal had been an ultimatum where "yes" was the only option given. Characterized it as a "take it or take it" proposal. Admitted that Noriega had asked for a high ranking emissary or delegation, hopefully one that might speak Spanish, and that Das Walker had not been a good choice. President Delvalle in Florida.

The U.S. delegation was something that had occurred some two weeks ago—no longer important. What was important now was the current contact.

It would now be Noriega's turn to present a counteroffer.
Saying was that Noriega would not agree to leave until the U.S. let up on the pressure, then Noriega was mistaken; that the U.S. was not about to ease up without an agreement on a date for Noriega's departure, stating that if Noriega announced a date he would want as part of the agreement that the U.S. ease up immediately on the economic sanctions—a sign of good will. Noriega would never accept a situation where despite his announced departure date, the U.S. would keep applying the pressure until that day he left—"just in case." If Noriega right now were to announce a June 88 departure date, he would expect the economic pressures loosened now, not on June 1. Emphasize choice of examples; that the date had no real significance.

Noriega had told the Venezuelan ex-President that he would step down from power in May. Characterized Carlos Andres Perez as an overactive individual, an old friend of Omar Torrijos, who was trying to help, but who on the other hand was also in the middle of a presidential campaign in Venezuela. Suggested that Carlos Andres Perez wanted to be the Americans about Panama, "I fixed the

Comment: 1. 