


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


*Abu Musab al-Zarqawi  
and  
Al-Qaida in Iraq*

*The Overall Classification of this Briefing is*  
~~**SECRET//NOFORN**~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# Abu Musab al-Zarqawi



(b)(1);1.4 (a);1.4  
(c)

- **Background**

- In Afghanistan/Pakistan late 1980s/early 1990s
- Detained in Jordan in mid-1990s
- Returned to Afghanistan/Pakistan, ran training camp
- Late 2001 fled to Iran, established base in N. Iraq
- Traveled throughout region in 2002/2003, in Iraq since mid-2003

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi  
(aka Ahmed Fadhil al-Khalaliyah)


Nationality: Jordanian  
of Palestinian descent

DOB: 30 Oct 1966

- **Pre-OIF involvement in several terrorist operations**


- Millennium plot in Jordan, Dec 1999 and assassination of USAID official in Jordan, Oct 2002
- Toxins network/operations in Europe/Middle East

# *Al-Zarqawi Merger With al-Qaida*




- **Al-Zarqawi is the key face of jihad in Iraq**
  - Executed more high-profile attacks in Iraq than Usama Bin Ladin has worldwide
  - Capability and intent to conduct operations outside of Iraq
- **Publicly pledged allegiance to Bin Ladin in October 2004**
  - Changed group name to al-Qaida in Iraq
  - Formal alignment with bin Ladin will augment capabilities of jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan
  - Increases likelihood transnational operations will be conducted by veterans of Iraq jihad
- **Iraq jihad will continue after al-Zarqawi is captured/killed**
  - Network has proven adaptability and resiliency
  - External support nodes will remain critical

# *Al-Qaida in Iraq: Goals and Strategy*



- **Al-Zarqawi strategy detailed in letter to Bin Ladin in Jan 2004**
  - Window of opportunity for jihad battle
  - Inciting war with Shia key to prolonging instability, motivating Iraqi and foreign Sunni extremists
- **Iraq elections have not altered al-Qaida goals, strategy, target set**
  - Al-Zarqawi views Iraqi Government as a US proxy, “apostate regime”
  - Targets include MNF-I, Iraqi Government, Shia, secular Kurdish leaders, elements supporting reconstruction efforts, and international organizations
  - Focusing attacks against Iraqi Government/security forces and MNF-I to hinder stability
- **Propaganda is window into jihadist goals**
  - Al-Zarqawi stated jihad in Iraq will continue until Islamic state established
  - Bin Ladin reference to Iraq as a “decisive war”

# *Al-Qaida in Iraq: Outlook for 2005*



- **Resilient despite major set-backs**
  - More than 50 significant al-Zarqawi associates killed/captured since 2003
  - Loss of al-Fallujah as main operating base in late 2004
  - Coalition actions force network to continuously adapt
  
- **Continued high operational/propaganda tempo**
  - 2005 pace of attacks, propaganda higher than 2004 averages
  - Percentage of jihadist attacks small, but have disproportionate effect
  
- **Five key strengths**
  - Percentage of acquiescence/support from local populace, mergers with Iraqi extremist groups ensure freedom of movement
  - Mix of centralized/decentralized C2 fosters efficient, flexible attack plans
  - Propaganda garners sustained external support
  - Logistical pipelines replenish losses
  - Operatives able to quickly assume new responsibilities after key personnel losses
  
- **Al-Zarqawi as key driver of plots outside Iraq**
  - Support for multiple operations – Europe, Jordan, Lebanon, and Arabian Peninsula, including possible CONUS attack