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220204Z MAR 91

**FROM**

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

**TO**

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(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

**CONTROLS**

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(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SERIAL: DODID 80-14A

**BODY**

SUBJ: **RWANDA**: CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS. (U)

DOI: 21 MAR 91 (AS OF 1721 EST)

TEXT: 1. (~~C/NF~~) REBEL AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INITIALED A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

2. (~~C/NF~~) THE ACCORD WAS REACHED IN ZAIRIAN-SPONSORED TALKS BETWEEN THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AND THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT DURING THE SECOND WEEK IN MARCH. THE AGREEMENT WAS INITIALED ON THE 19TH, AND IF IT IS RATIFIED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WILL BE SIGNED ON THE 29TH IN KINSHASA. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IS TO BE MONITORED BY A PEACEKEEPING FORCE SPONSORED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. HOW THE FORCE WILL BE FUNDED OR WHO WILL PARTICIPATE ARE UNDETERMINED.

3. (~~C/NF~~) DESPITE THE PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THE RPF HAS FORMALLY REJECTED PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S OFFER ON THE 14TH TO GRANT AMNESTY TO THOSE REBELS WHO ABANDON THEIR WEAPONS AND CROSS INTO **RWANDA** AT DESIGNATED POINTS. THE RPF CALLED THE OFFER A "TROJAN HORSE FOR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER," BUT IT NONETHELESS REITERATED ITS COMMITMENT TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND TO A CEASE-FIRE. APPARENTLY, HABYARIMANA'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TIMED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RECENT REPORTS OF LOW MORALE WITHIN THE RPF. RPF RECRUITMENT EFFORTS HAVE STALLED, ACCORDING TO KIGALI SOURCES, AND ?OUNG RWANDAN REFUGEES ARE FLEEING CAMPS IN TANZANIA TO AVOID BEING IMPRESSED INTO THE RPF. (b)(1);1.4 (c)

(b)(1);1.4 (c) RPF DESERTION RATES HAVE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY AND THAT RPF TROOPS ARE FIGHTING AMONG THEMSELVES AS SOME ELEMENTS TRY TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE AND PREVENT DESERTIONS.

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4. (~~C/NF~~) ON THE 16TH AND 17TH, RPF FORCES REPORTEDLY FIRED ON A RED CROSS UNIT AT THE DESIGNATED REBEL REENTRY STATION IN ORDER TO PREVENT OTHER RPF TROOPS FROM SURRENDERING. ALTHOUGH RPF PERSONNEL HAVE THUS FAR FAILED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE AMNESTY, RWANDAN OFFICIALS ARE STILL HOPEFUL. THEY ARE CONSIDERING EXTENDING THE AMNESTY PERIOD BEYOND THE 29TH IF REBELS BEGIN TO TRICKLE ACROSS THE BORDER FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT'S FORMAL SIGNING.

5. (~~C/NF~~) COMMENT: THIS CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, UNLIKE THE ONE IN FEWRUARY, MAY ACTUALLY BE RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE FORMAL, RATHER THAN AD HOC, AND BOTH PARTIES, RATHER THAN JUST ONE, WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS. AT THIS POINT, EACH SIDE IS POLITICALLY COMMITTED TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND COULD UNDERMINE ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION IF IT EITHER REPUDIATES OR VIOLATES THE AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, IF THE RPF HAS BECOME FACTIONALIZED AND IS EXPERIENCING MORALE AND DESERTION PROBLEMS, A CEASE-FIRE AT THIS TIME COULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE REBEL LEADERSHIP. HOWEVER, RIFTS WITHIN THE RPF COULD ALSO MEAN THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL EVENTUALLY COLLAPSE, PARTICULARLY IF A HARDCORE FACTION EXISTS AND DECIDES TO BREAK WITH THE LEADERSHIP.

**ADMIN**

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