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FROM
FM SSO DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO
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BODY
SUBJ: DIA COMMONWEALTH INTSUMMIDDLE EAST/AFRICA 574-90/8 NOV 90
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(U) THE ITEMS CONTAINED IN THIS INTSUM HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
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Non Responsive (C) RWANDA: REBELS ATTACKED. (C) AS OF 1800Z 7 NOV 90 1. (C) GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE STAGED A COMEBACK AFTER LOSING THE NORTHERN BORDER STATION AT GATUNA OVER THE WEEKEND OF 3 NOVEMBER. 2. (C) THEY ATTACKED RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) POSITIONS AROUND GATUNA, PUSHING THE REBELS TO WITHIN 6 KM OF THE UGANDAN BORDER, AND CAPTURED 1U REBELS DURING OPERATIONS IN THE 2,600-SQUARE-KM AKEGERA NATIONAL PARK. LEADING THE RPF COMBATANTS SINCE THE DEATHS OF MAJ GEN FRED RWIGYEMA AND MAJ BAINGANA IS MAJ PAUL KAGAMI. HE WAS WITH THE RPF DURING ITS RECENT CONVENTIONAL WARFARE DEFEATS AND HAS DECIDED TO ATTEMPT A GUERRILLA WAR. 3. (C) COMMENT: KAGAMI'S EXPERIENCES IN THE BUSH WAR OF THE 1980'S IN SUPPORT OF UGANDA'S PRESIDENT MUSEVENI, AS WELL AS THE RPF'S LATEST SETBACKS, MAY HAVE INFLUENCED HIS DECISION TO TRY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. DESPITE THE RPF'S ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT SMALL-UNIT UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT'S MOP-UP OPERATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE SUCCESSFUL UNLESS THE REBELS RECEIVE REINFORCEMENTS SOON. (DECL OADR) (D) ADMIN (OVERALL REGRADE IS DECL GADR) #2309	
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(b)(3):10 USC 424

page 81