DTG
110302Z SEP 90
FROM
FM SSO DIA (b)(3): 10 USC 424
TO
(b)(3): 50 USC 3024(i)

CONTROLS
TOP SECRET NOFORN NOCONTRACT
(b)(3): 50 USC 3024(i)
SECTION 01 OF 03
/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/

BODY
(b)(3): 10 USC 424; (b)(3): 50 USC 3024(i)

SUBJ: DEFENSE MORNING SUMMARY 115-90. (U)
DOI: 11 SEP 90

Non Responsive
5. **(C/NF) RWANDA: UGANDAN INVOLVEMENT.**

**(C/NF)** UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI PROBABLY KNEW MORE ABOUT PLANS FOR THE 1 OCTOBER INVASION OF RWANDA THAN HE HAS ADMITTED. UGANDAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THEY NEITHER KNEW NOR CONDONED THE INVASION OF RWANDA. DESPITE THEIR STATEMENTS OF CONDEMNATION FOR THE AGGRESSION, PROMISES TO SEAL UGANDA'S BORDER WITH RWANDA, AND PLEDGES TO ARREST ANY REBELS WHO ATTEMPT TO RETREAT INTO UGANDA, PRESIDENT MUSEVENI MAY WELL HAVE KNOWN DETAILS OF MAJ
GEN RWEGIYEMA'S INVASION PLANS. MOREOVER, UGANDA DID NOT PREVENT RWEGIYEMA FROM RETURNING TO KAMPALA TO SEEK ADDITIONAL FUNDS AND MANPOWER FOR HIS WAR EFFORT. UGANDAN GOVERNMENT DENIALS ARE FURTHER CLOUDED BY REPEATED ASSERTIONS THAT KIGALI BEARS THE BLAME FOR THE INVASION BY NOT ACCOMMODATING THE HOPES OF RWANDAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND.

CONCERNS OF MUSEVENI'S APPARENT Duplicity MAY HURT THE UGANDAN PRESIDENT'S REPUTATION AS HEAD OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND UGANDA'S LONG-TERM REGIONAL INTERESTS.
NON RESPONSIVE TO THE REQUEST