Doc in Consultation w/State;
State no objection to release of their equities (see memo dtd 14JUL15)
# 0193-2013
(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

COGARD (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i) WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

COUNTRY: (U) RUSSIA (RS).

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 NORTHERN CAUCASUS - HUMANITARIAN WORKER KIDNAP INCIDENT UPDATE 17 JAN 01(U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL.

/----------------/
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
/----------------/

DOI: (U) 20010116.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

SUMMARY: LEFT AMERICAN WHO ESCAPED SCENE DURING KIDNAPPING OF HUMANITARIAN WORKER KENNY ((GLUCK))
PROVIDED INFORMATION ON INCIDENT TO AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN INVESTIGATORS.

TEXT:

1. (b)(1), (1.4 (c)) The American working with who escaped from the 9 January ambush in Chechnya (cite (b)(3) USC 424 IIR (b)(3) USC 424) returned to Moscow from Nazran on Saturday evening, 13 January. He provided information to American and Russian authorities investigating the incident, in which Kenny ((Gluck)) of (b)(1), (1.4 (c))

3. (c) Previous kidnapping incident. On 8 December, a month before the Gluck kidnapping, an ACF convoy had been involved in a similar ambush at Staryy Atagi in which three Chechen nationals were captured, robbed and released after a short time. The attackers used a brown or tan Ziguli in that incident.

4. (c) Documentation. (b)(1), (1.4 (c)) reiterated MSF’s assertion (previously reported) that the convoy was traveling with proper permission and documents. Russian authorities had received advance notice of the group’s travel plans and had provided a “route pass (marshrutnyy propusk)” which the convoy had to present at each of three or four control points in order to proceed on 9 January.

5. (c) Enroute. On 9 January, the three-vehicle (one ACF, two MSF) convoy trailed some distance behind a small Russian military convoy. On TV news accounts we’ve seen in Moscow, MSF vehicles are marked with bright signs. (b)(1), (1.4 (c)) said their vehicles had magnetic signs, which had been removed when the convoy entered Chechnya. Sometime after passing the Kavkaz-1 control point, the Russian military convoy was ambushed. Hearing explosions and small-arms fire, occupants of the MSF/ACF humanitarian convoy took an alternate route to Staryy Atagi for their meeting with the hospital director, known to (b)(1), (1.4 (c))

(b)(1), (1.4 (c))
6. (c) DEPARTURE AND AMBUSH. CONCERNED FOR THE CONVOY'S SAFETY, [b](1), 4(c) PROVIDED A GAZELLE VAN TO SERVE AS LEAD VEHICLE FOR THE GROUP. DEPARTING THE HOSPITAL AREA, [b](1), 4(c) DRIVER NOTICED A TAN OR BROWN VEHICLE, SIMILAR TO THE ONE USED IN THE 8 DECEMBER INCIDENT, FOLLOWING THE CONVOY AT SOME DISTANCE. AS THE FOUR-VEHICLE CONVOY ARRIVED AT A "T" INTERSECTION, [b](1), 4(c) IN THE SECOND CAR OBSERVED A VEHICLE STOPPED IN THEIR LANE, FACING THE CONVOY. THE GAZELLE PASSED THE STOPPED VEHICLE ON THE LEFT AND TURNED RIGHT (PER THE PLANNED ROUTE) AT THE INTERSECTION, WHEREUON THREE ARMED MEN EMERGED FROM THE VEHICLE. [b](1), 4(c) DRIVER AND THE REST OF THE CONVOY STOPPED, UNTIL FOLLED HIS DRIVER TO "GET OUT OF HERE." HIS DRIVER BACKED INTO THE THIRD CAR (AN MSF VEHICLE), CAUSING SOME DAMAGE, AND DROVE OFF THE ROAD SURFACE TO THE RIGHT OF THE AMBUSH VEHICLE. THE ATTACKERS FIRED ON THE ESCAPING VEHICLE, AND [b](1), 4(c) FROM FLYING GLASS. HE MENTIONED BOTH SINGLE SHOTS AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND THINKS THE ATTACKERS WERE TRYING TO BLOW TIRES AND DISABLE HIS CAR RATHER THAN KILL THE OCCUPANTS. [b](1), 4(c) CAR TURNED LEFT, OPPOSITE THE DIRECTION OF THE GAZELLE LEAD CAR AND THE PLANNED ROUTE, AND ESCAPED THE SCENE.

7. (c) RUSSIAN MILITARY QUESTIONING. DRIVING "ON THREE WHEELS" TO THE NEXT VILLAGE, [b](1), 4(c) AND HIS DRIVER SOUGHT HELP FROM THE LOCAL MVD - WHO PROMPTLY TURNED THEM OVER TO THE RUSSIAN MILITARY. [b](1), 4(c) WAS QUESTIONED BY A COLONEL SUBORDINATE TO AND IN TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH GENERAL-LIEUTENANT IVAN I. ((BABICHEV)), MILITARY COMMANDANT FOR CHECHNYA. BABICHEV DEMANDED TO KNOW WHO GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE GROUP'S TRAVEL, BUT THE COLONEL DID NOT REVEAL THAT THE GENERAL'S OWN SEAL AND SIGNATURE APPEARED ON ONE OF [b](1), 4(c) DOCUMENTS. THE MOD OFFICERS KEPT OVERNIGHT "FOR SAFETY." DESCRIBED THE RUSSIAN MOD OFFICERS AND THEIR INTERVIEW IN UNCOMPLIMENTARY TERMS. HE REFUSED TO SIGN ANY STATEMENTS, USING HIS NON-NATIVE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AS AN EXPLANATION. LATER THE NEXT DAY (ABOUT 1700 ON 10 JANUARY) THE MOD ELEMENT RELEASED HIM TO THE INGUSH MVD FOR ESCORT TO AN MVD POST IN INGUSHETIA. [b](1), 4(c) HAD A MORE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF
THE INGUSH UBOP (ANTI-ORGANIZED-CRIME) OFFICERS WHO DEBRIEFED HIM THERE.

8. [REDACTED] SAID HIS ATTACKERS WERE ARMED WITH “SHOULDER WEAPONS.” HE SAID THEY WORE BLACK FACE MASKS AND NEW-LOOKING, POSSIBLY SUMMER-WEIGHT CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS SIMILAR TO THOSE WORN BY ATTACKERS IN THE 8 DECEMBER INCIDENT. THEY WORE THE UNIFORMS NEATLY AND “LOOKED LIKE OMON”. [REDACTED]

COMMENTS:

1. [REDACTED] THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION ABOUT A CRIME AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS. REQUESTS FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE CLASSIFIED U.S. GOVERNMENT CHANNELS REQUIRE APPROVAL OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY MOSCOW.

2. [REDACTED] REPORT TRANSMISSION WAS DELAYED UNTIL RELEASE OF MR. ([GLUCK]) TO PROTECT INFORMATION OBTAINED BY INVESTIGATORS.