

ENVELOPE

(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

HEADER

P R041704Z SEP 03
FM SSO DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424

STATE (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

INFO SAFE

CONTROLS

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

QQQQ
SECTION 1 OF 6
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
)))

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424 INTSUM 169-03/4 SEP 03

(U) THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
(b)(3):10 USC 424

WARNING

(b)(3):10 USC 424 Non Responsive

(U) **IRAQ:** WARNING ASSESSMENT

FEATURES

(b)(3):10 USC 424 Non Responsive

(U) **IRAN-IRAQ:** SCRAMBLING TO SECURE SHIA LEADERS

Non Responsive

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Non Responsive

(U) **IRAQ:** WARNING ASSESSMENT
AS OF 1700Z 3 SEP 03

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

(S) THE SUCCESSFUL EMPLOYMENT OF VEHICLE BORN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (VBIED) AGAINST THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY, UN COMPOUND AND **AYATOLLAH MOHAMMED BAQR AL-HAKIM** INDICATES AN INCREASE IN PLANNING AND EFFECTIVENESS AND MAY LEAD TO ADDITIONAL VBIED ATTACKS.

(S) SABOTAGE AND COERCION ARE INCREASINGLY SUPPLANTING DIRECT ATTACKS AS A LOW-RISK/HIGH-REWARD TACTICS. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY KIDNAPPING, MAY KEEP PROFESSIONALS OUT OF THE WORK PLACE AND UNDERMINE COALITION CREDIBILITY.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~NOFORN~~

2. (S) ON 29 AUGUST, A VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (VBIED) DETONATED JUST INSIDE THE GATE OF **IMAM ALI MOSQUE** FOLLOWING FRIDAY PRAYERS. THE **BOMBING** RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF OVER 95 IRAQIS, INCLUDING **MUHAMMAD BAQR AL-HAKIM**, SHIA CLERIC, LEADER OF THE **SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI)**, AND THE BROTHER TO GOVERNING COUNCIL MEMBER, ABDEL AZIZ AL-HAKIM.

(S) THERE ARE NO CLEAR INDICATIONS YET OF MOTIVE OR RESPONSIBILITY; HOWEVER, THE **BOMBING** AND **BAQR'S** DEATH HAS PROMPTED A FLURRY OF SPECULATIONS AMONG IRAQIS. POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE: FORMER REGIME LOYALISTS, MILITANT SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, MUQTADAH SADR FOLLOWERS, FOREIGN ISLAMIST TERRORISTS/JIHADISTS, AND UNKNOWN SHIA EXTREMIST GROUP OR INDIVIDUALS.

(S) **BAQR AL-HAKIM'S** DEATH PROMPTED THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL TO CONVENE AN EMERGENCY SESSION 30 AUGUST, WHERE IT URGED COALITION TO TAKE STEPS TO INCREASE SECURITY, INCLUDING ... IMPLEMENTING SECURITY PLAN AGREED UPON WITH GC ... RESTRUCTURING ALL UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES ... CREATING THE REMAINING OFFICES AND INSTITUTIONS AFFILIATED WITH INTERIOR MINISTRY, SUCH AS CRIME PREVENTION ... CALLING ON COALITION FORCES TO DETAIN CRIMINALS FREED BY THE FORMER REGIME.

(b)(1);Sec. 1.4(c)

5. (S) OUTLOOK: ANTI-COALITION ATTACKS WILL EXPAND IN EFFICACY, SCOPE AND PROPAGANDA IMPACT. ANTI-COALITION GROUPS WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO ATTACK NON-COALITION 'SOFT' TARGETS SUCH AS KEY IRAQI LEADERS, ESPECIALLY SHIA, TO FOMENT UNREST. IN SPITE OF IMPROVEMENTS, TENSIONS WILL REMAIN OVER LACK OF ELECTRICITY, SECURITY, AND BASIC SERVICES, MAKING THE POPULATION SUSCEPTIBLE TO ANTI-COALITION THEMES. DESPITE THE INCREASE IN NASCENT CIVIC STRUCTURES, A TOO RAPID COALITION

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

WITHDRAWAL COULD DESTABILIZE THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A HOSTILE GOVERNMENT. ALTERNATIVELY, A PROTRACTED COALITION PRESENCE IN **IRAQ** WILL FUEL SUSPICIONS ABOUT US AMBITIONS IN THE REGION AND COULD INCREASE THE THREAT TO COALITION PERSONNEL.

~~(DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, DECLASSIFY ON X1)~~

Non Responsive

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~