


~~TOP SECRET~~

75.7

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL~~

2 March 1962
DIA Intelligence Summary 51-82

3 X 3



RETURN TO

201297

ATTENTION. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS

LIBRARY COPY

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5300.10
DOES NOT APPLY

COPY NO. 180

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

The Defense Intelligence Summary is produced by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain items may be designated specifically for limited distribution. Other items may be disseminated further; but only on a need to know basis.

W A R N I N G

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



~~TOP SECRET~~

2 March 1962

Blocked portions are
non responsive

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Summary

INDEX AND PRECIS

BURMA :

p. 1

BERLIN :

p. 1A

USSR :

p. 2

SOUTH AFRICA :

p. 3

SOUTH VIET-NAM :

p. 4

INDONESIA :

p. 5

INDONESIA :

President Sukarno is again seeking to curb the influence of Gen Nasution by removing him as Army Chief of Staff.

p. 6

SUPPLEMENT :

p. (1)

TOP SECRET DINAR

BURMA:

Army Takes Over in Burma

General Ne Win, Chief of Staff, Burma Defense Forces, announced on 2 March that the Army had taken control of the "deteriorating situation" in the country. According to the US Embassy, access to Rangoon was sealed off by military forces on the night of 1-2 March, but by early morning the capital city appeared to be quiet.

The status of Prime Minister U Nu and his Cabinet is unclear, although the Finance Minister and the Minister for Trade Development reportedly were arrested.

Comment: Ne Win previously took control of the Burmese Government in October 1958 to head off political and economic chaos. He allowed parliamentary elections which returned Prime Minister U Nu to power in April 1960. However, Ne Win indicated that he would step in again if conditions deteriorated.

A combination of recent events may have led Ne Win to reassert military control over the country. These include continued factionalism in the ruling Union Party, U Nu's lack of administrative know-how, endemic lawlessness in many parts of the country, and economic strife over the government's decision to nationalize imports. In addition, Ne Win, who is considered to be anti-Communist, probably was alarmed at U Nu's willingness to accept large-scale economic assistance from Communist China. He also may oppose the reactivation of the Soviet economic aid program for Burma, which reportedly was agreed to on 19 February.

The extent of the Army's takeover is uncertain. The possibility exists that, rather than deposing U Nu and the Parliament, Ne Win will be content to retain U Nu after the General's views are effected in policies and personnel makeup of the government.
(TOP SECRET DINAR)

BERLIN:

Developments in the Berlin Situation

The Soviets have again filed plans with the Berlin Air Safety Center for transport flights in the air corridors. On 2 March, two aircraft are scheduled to fly the northern corridor at 4,500 and 6,500 feet. Flights on 1 March took place as announced.

In another development in the Berlin situation, the East German Government announced on 2 March that Maj Gen Watson, US Commandant in Berlin, is barred from entry into the eastern sector. The action, according to the East German news agency, is in retaliation for a US ban on the Soviet Commandant entering the US sector, and was imposed at the request of Soviet officials. The Soviet Commandant and political advisor were prohibited from entering the American sector as of 27 December, after Gen Watson was turned back from the Friedrichstrasse crossing point when he refused to accede to the Soviet demand that accompanying civilian advisors show identification. The East German announcement represents another instance in which the Ulbricht regime is asserting its "sovereignty" over East Berlin and being permitted to exercise nominal authority in a Soviet responsibility in quadripartite functions.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

TOP SECRET DINAR

USSR:

Soviet Space Failures

Recent articles in the US press concerning the Soviet space program warrant special comment. One asserted that U-2 photography proved the Soviets have had as many failures as successes in their space program, while another claimed that the Soviets lost many lives prior to orbiting the first astronaut.

Tyura Tam was first photographed by a U-2 in August 1957. This photography showed craters some 60 feet in diameter in the vicinity of the launching facilities -- craters which could have resulted from booster failures. Subsequent U-2 photography does not indicate that the Soviets had a great number of failures in their space program. Knowledge of Soviet space failures, including the major portion of intelligence relative to the Soviet space program, is derived primarily from sources other than U-2 photography.

The Soviets have conducted 26, possibly 27, space operations, all from the Tyura Tam range-head. At least twelve of these failed. Intelligence does not indicate that any of these failures involved the loss of human life.

Although there is no firm evidence that "human lives were lost" in the Soviet space program, analysis of bio-telemetry from a vertically fired rocketed experiment launched from Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR) on 13 August 1958 suggests a primate died in a test. In the KYMTR experiment, two mammals were launched -- one was small, possibly a dog; the second, a primate, was larger, weighing 50 to 150 pounds. Based on the respiration and heart rate information contained in the intercepted bio-telemetry, the primate did not survive the experiment. Because of the weight span the possibility that the primate was a man cannot be completely excluded.

(TOP SECRET DINAR)

TOP SECRET DINAR

SOUTH AFRICA:

Renewal of US-South African Missile Tracking Station Agreement Still in Question

The South African Government has raised the price for extending the US missile tracking station agreement which expires 31 March. In a conversation with the US Ambassador, South African Foreign Secretary Jooste indicated that the purchase of SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles -- to which the US has agreed in principle -- would hardly make a dent in requirements. He complained that the US has been almost completely unresponsive in meeting the South African Defense Department's request to purchase a long list of military equipment, even though South Africa has responded favorably to many requests from the US.

The Ambassador believes South Africa's position is hardening as an outgrowth of exasperation over turndowns, indecision, or lack of US response to requests for military hardware -- which Jooste claimed is essential for defense against Communist-supported forces from abroad. The South Africans are believed to be anxious to complete the missile tracking agreement before it expires, but successful negotiations for a new agreement will depend upon the extent to which South African complaints receive US attention.

(SECRET)

TOP SECRET DINAR

SOUTH VIET-NAM: Army Command Changes Indicated

In the aftermath of the 27 February attack on the presidential palace in Saigon, President Diem reportedly has decided on top-level command changes in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. According to a fairly reliable source with contacts in the President's Office, Maj Gen Duong Van "Big" Minh, Commanding General, Army Field Command, is to replace Lt Gen Le Van Ty, Chief of the Joint General Staff, and Brig Gen Nguyen Khanh, Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff, would exchange assignments with Maj Gen Tran Van Don, CG, I Corps.

Comment: Appointment of "Big" Minh as Chief of the General Staff in the Army would probably lead to improved morale and more effective Army operations in view of Minh's competence and vigor. The assignment of Khanh to I Corps, at a considerable distance from Saigon, would detach him as confidante to Diem on military matters.

Although Minh has often voiced criticism of Diem's inclination to bypass the military chain of command, his appointment at this time would reflect Diem's desire to broaden his support in the Armed Forces.
(CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)

INDONESIA:

Soviet Arms Deliveries

Admiral Chernopai, chief of the Soviet military mission to Indonesia, reportedly has said that six MIG-21 jet fighters equipped with rockets, will be delivered to Indonesia by mid-1962. This allegation, following closely the arrival of an undetermined number of MIG-19 jet fighter aircraft, of which at least three have been assembled, show that Soviet arms shipments are continuing and suggest Indonesian Air Vice Marshal Dani's recent trip to Moscow may have succeeded in expediting Soviet arms deliveries.

Progress apparently is also being made in the establishment of surface-to-air missile sites at Indonesian Air Force (AURI) bases. A 28 February deadline reportedly was set for completion of one such project at Kalidjati, an AURI training base 60 miles southeast of Djakarta.

Completion of a six-month training program in the USSR for Indonesian MIG-21 instructor pilots and technicians, scheduled to begin in mid-February, apparently is to coincide with delivery of the MIG-21s. Indonesian/USSR arms agreements call for delivery of 20 MIG-21s equipped with air-to-air missiles during 1962 and delivery of ten additional TU-16 medium jet bombers for the Air Force. A cruiser, destroyers, escort vessels, subchasers and guided missile-equipped motor torpedo boats are programmed for the Navy, and additional equipment for the Army includes enough surface-to-air missiles to equip three antiaircraft battalions. To carry out necessary training in the operation of the surface-to-air missiles, some 800 Soviet instructors reportedly will be needed in Indonesia.

(b)(3):50 USC 403

~~(TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN)~~

INDONESIA: President Sukarno May Instigate Indonesian Army Command Charges

Twice within recent weeks President Sukarno has offered the position of Army Chief of Staff to Vice Chief of Staff Lt General Gatot Subroto with a view to separating the positions of Army Chief of Staff and Minister of National Security, now concurrently held by Nasution. Sukarno probably will eventually insist on Nasution's relinquishment of the Army Chief of Staff position. A large group of middle-level Army officers favor the appointment of Subroto for the top Army position for one year, after which, by agreement, he would relinquish the position to Deputy Army Chief of Staff Major General Jani. Jani's supporters regard him as a professional with less inclination than Nasution to use his position for political gains, and hope to guide his leadership toward a more active crusade against the Indonesian Communist Party.

Comment: Nasution still retains strong backing among Army elements, but their loyalty and support has been somewhat diluted by his equivocation with Sukarno and his reluctance to oppose openly recent Sukarno actions against anti-Communist elements. The Army, whether under Subroto or Jani, can be expected to continue its campaign against the Communists; however, without Nasution its power and influence may be weakened.

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

Next two pgs. are non responsive

TOP SECRET DINAR

SUPPLEMENT

SOVIET MISSILE TEST RANGE ACTIVITY FOR FEBRUARY 1962

Soviet missile test range activity during February 1962 was relatively low. There were no firings on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range (TMTR). A possible new 700 NM aerodynamic cruise missile appeared on the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR).

The last ICBM launch occurred on 25 January 1962. To date a cumulative total of 90 ICBM firings have been detected. Of these, 63 were successful, 15 failed. The results of 12 are unresolved.

Preparations for a space event on the TMTR continued. Such an operation could occur early in March 1962.

Ten missiles were fired on the KYMTR in February, including one 2,000 NM IRBM, three 1,100 NM MRBMs (two of which were fired within a 30 minute period), one 350 NM aerodynamic cruise missile, and four 100 NM SRBMs. One possible 700 NM aerodynamic cruise missile, a type not observed previously, was fired.

There was no activity on the Sary Shagan Anti-missile Test Complex (SSATC) during the month. The last valid operation observed on the SSATC was on 30 December 1961.

Two operational launches of 350 NM air-to-surface missiles, from Long Range Aviation TU-95 turboprop heavy bombers, occurred on the Vladimirovka-Dzhaman Sor Test Range (VDSTR) of the Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons and Research Complex (VAWARC). This was the initial participation of Dolon-based TU-95 aircraft in an air-to-surface missile operation. No launchings on other components of the VAWARC were observed; however preparations appear to be under way for an early test of an aerodynamic cruise vehicle on the Vladimirovka-Lake Balkhash Test Range (VLBTR).
(TOP SECRET DINAR)

TOP SECRET

**ATTENTION: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
CODE WORD MATERIAL**

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET