c

R 111523Z DEC 01		
	FM DIA (b)(2) WASHINGTON DC	
	R 111452Z DEC 01	
	FM (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC	
	TO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC	
	(b)(2)	
	RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC// (b)(2),(b)(3):10	
	RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL USC 424	
	(b)(2)	
	RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FI (b)(2)	
	RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FI	
	(b)(2)	
	RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA/(b)(2)	
	STATE OF A CONTROL	
	(b)(2)	
	DIJEAUA/CIA WACIIDC(II-)(O)	
	RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC (b)(2)	
	BT	
	$\frac{\text{CONFIDENTIAL}}{\text{(b)(2)}}$	
	SECTION 01 OF 02	
-		
CEDIAL (II)/b)(2) /b)(2)·10 LISC		
SERIAL: (U)(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC		
COUNTRY: (U) COLOMBIA (CO); VENEZUELA (VE). SUBJ: (b)(2),(b)(3):10 ARAUCA BORDER REGION SEES		
CORDIAL, BUT UNSUBSTANTIAL LOCAL RELATIONS BETWEEN		
COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN MILITARIES; ALLEGED VENEZUELAN		
	SUPPORT TO FARC/ELN, FACILITATING CANO LIMON PIPELINE	
	ATTACKS (U)	
	IPSP: (U) (b)(2)	
	WARNING AN THE ICAN DEPONDENCE NOT PRIALLY	
	WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY	
	EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED	
	CONFIDENTIAL.	
	DEDARAM OF DEFENSE	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE		
TOOL (IN 20011201		
	DOI: (U) 20011204. (b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424	
	REQS.	
	SOURCES: A. (C)	
	(b)(2)	

-CONFIDENTIAL//X1

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

B. (C)

C. (U)

SUMMARY: (C) CORDIAL LOCAL RELATIONS BETWEEN COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN MILITARY IN ARAUCA CONTRAST COLMIL DISTRUST OF VENEZUELAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 18TH BRIGADE CONVINCED VENEZUELA SUPPORTS FARC AND ELN, FACILITATES AND TAKES ADVANTAGE OF GUERRILLA PIPELINE ATTACKS. TEXT: 1. (C) DESPITE LITTLE NATIONAL-LEVEL COOPERATION AND MUCH SUSPICION, CORDIAL BUT RELATIVELY UNSUBSTANTIAL RELATIONS EXIST BETWEEN LOCAL COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN MILITARY FORCES SITUATED ALONG THE RIO ARAUCA, WHICH COMPRISES THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER ON ARAUCA'S NORTHERN PERIPHERY. (b)(2)

CHARACTERIZED LOCAL, CROSS-BORDER
RELATIONS BETWEEN COLMIL AND VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES AS
EXCELLENT, CORDIAL, AND POSITIVE. HE CONTRASTED THIS
WITH NATIONAL-LEVEL RELATIONS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MUCH
LESS POSITIVE DUE PRINCIPALLY TO VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT
HUGO ((CHAVEZ))(b)(2)

ALSO STATED THAT LOCAL RELATIONS ARE GOOD,
DESPITE VERY LITTLE COOPERATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.
LOCAL RELATIONS EXIST AT NUMEROUS POINTS ALONG THE ARAUCA
RIVER, WHEREVER 18TH BRIGADE SOLDIERS ARE STATIONED, BUT
PARTICULARLY AT ARAUCA AND SARAVENA

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION OCCURS, (b)(2)

VENEZUELANS GENERALLY AVOID PROVIDING SUBSTANTIVE
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE, COMBINED PLANNING AND
OPERATIONS. OR MORE REGULARIZED LIAISON.

2. (b)(2)

REPORTED LITTLE COOPERATION WITH THE

VENEZUELAN RIVERINE UNIT SITUATED ACROSS THE RIVER FROM ARAUCA. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS PRIMARILY TO THE LATTER'S LACK OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY, POSSESSING ONLY FOUR SMALL BOATS. (b)(2) EXPLAINED THAT HIS BASE'S MAIN BUILDINGS WERE NEWLY REBUILT AFTER BEING DESTROYED IN 2000 DURING A FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA (FARC) INSURGENT GAS CYLINDER ATTACK LAUNCHED FROM ACROSS THE RIVER ON THE VENEZUELAN SIDE OF THE BORDER; IN SPITE

(b)(2)

CONFIDENTIAL//XI

(b)(2)

CONFIDENTIAL//X1

OF THIS, HE INDICATED NO ENHANCED COOPERATION WITH THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY TO INCREASE PATROLS OF THE AREA OR OTHERWISE TAKE ACTION TO THWART ANY SIMILAR FUTURE (b)(2)

CONFIDENT	FIAL
SERIAL: (U	(b)(2),(b)(3):10
	(II) COLOMBIA

COUNTRY: (U) COLOMBIA (CO); VENEZUELA (VE).

SUBJ: (b)(2),(b)(3):10 ARAUCA BORDER REGION SEES

CORDIAL, BUT UNSUBSTANTIAL LOCAL RELATIONS BETWEEN

COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN MILITARIES; ALLEGED VENEZUELAN SUPPORT TO FARC/ELN, FACILITATING CANO LIMON PIPELINE

ATTACKS (LD

ATTACKS. (b)(1)

3. (6) FELT ONE REASON FOR THE VENEZUELANS' CORDIAL BUT HOLLOW DISPOSITION LAY WITH A "SECRET" VENEZUELAN

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO HELP ENSURE THAT VENEZUELAN MILITARY PERSONNEL "FOLLOWED THE CHAVEZ PARTY LINE, (NFI)", THUS HINDERING THE VENEZUELAN COMMANDERS FLEXIBILITY. THEY ALSO ARE CONVINCED CHAVEZ SUPPORTS THE FARC AND ELN IN COLOMBIA. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN

THE CANO LIMON OIL PIPELINE IS ATTACKED AND ITS FLOW
TEMPORARILY DISRUPTED, THE OIL FIELD PRESSURE INCREASES

AND ALLOWS VENEZUELAN OIL PUMPS TO EXTRACT SURGING OIL MORE OUICKLY ON THEIR SIDE. (b)(1)

(b)(1) CLAIMED TO HAVE "REPORTS" THAT SUGGESTED WITH THE INCREASED OIL REVENUE GENERATED AS A RESULT, VENEZUELA/CHAVEZ REPAY THE FARC AND ELN FOR THEIR ATTACKS, PRIMARILY IN THE FORM OF ARMS. (b)(1)

ALSO CONFIRMED THAT VENEZUELA IS CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF INCREASING THE DIAMETER OF ITS PIPELINES, BEGUN IN JANUARY WHEN A SURGE IN PIPELINE ATTACKS BEGUN, IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THEIR THROUGH-PUT CAPACITY TO BETTER TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CANO LIMON PIPELINE ATTACKS.

COMMENTS: 1. (C)(b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(2)