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PartIII - Desert Storm
Gulf War Chronology - Desert Storm
Iraqi Disposition of Forces as of 23 October 1990.
30 September
DoDJIC I&W Cell, established in early September,
operates around the clock with five analysts.
CENTCOM J2 (CENTCOM Chief of Intelligence) agrees with a DIA recommendation
to reduce coverage of Scud sites.
September
DX begins work on three dimensional models and a Hostage
Intelligence Support Package (HISP) covering some thirty locations
in Iraq.
DX-5 begins providing daily imagery derived reports on targets
identified as possible American citizen detention areas.
DX begins to develop a BDA concept of operations, having been
charged with the responsibility for all phases of imagery exploitation
in support of BDA.
DX develops a BDA workbook containing gridded target graphics,
maps, and reporting EEI's on some 309 primary and secondary targets.
DX establishes Central Tasking Cell (CTC) in the Pentagon to facilitate
tasking coordination with the ITF and DoDJIC.
September -January 1991
DIA BDA elements and CENTCOM/CENTAF conduct
18 BDA exercises in an effort to ensure the efficiency and accuracy
of BDA reporting
and dissemination.
2 October
DAT-6 levies further taskings to acquire specific details, as a result
of earlier reporting, describing the Iraqi rigging of the Kuwaiti oil fields
for demolition.
DC begins acquiring baseline imagery coverage for BDA targets.
DIA sets into motion an imagery "blitz" to determine
ground order of battle.
3 October
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to provide comprehensive Iraqi OB information
for the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO -- See maps on pages 41 and 42).
5 October
DIA implements crisis local area network (LAN), providing connectivity between
all VP Task Force cells.
10 October
DSD-3 prepares an IDB-II crisis data base (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Yemen) for the OICC to support ad hoc queries and printing reports. IDB-II
replaces older IDB-I data base.
13 October
CCF IMINT desk conducts BDA exercise.
18 October
DS ATF chairs meeting with CENTCOM representatives to discuss BDA support,
DODIIS (DoD Intelligence Information System), IDB-II support, and CENTCOM requirements.
DAT-6 sends tasking to regional assets requesting information
on the type of warheads for the CCS-2 missile.
20 October
OICC begins to transfer priority intelligence information electronically (via
e-mail) to CENTCOM.
CENTCOM puts imagery blitz on hold until further evaluation by
CENTCOM J2.
21 October
CENTCOM approves and begins imagery blitz.
22 October
DIA Director begins to host Military Intelligence Board (MIB) weekly meetings.
24 October
JS informs CCF that the SECDEF wants coverage of the 28 Scud short range ballistic
missile (SRBM) launchers at least every other day.
29 October
DSO-1 installs AIRES TELNET (Telecommunications Network) throughout DX offices
in Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard.
30 October
DS ATF demonstrates to ITF the procedures to pass daily/weekly OB messages
directly to CENTCOM using e-mail and DSNET3
(Defense Integrated Secure Network 3 -- TS/SCI level).
October
DIA sends the former DATT Baghdad to CENTCOM to be Chief of the Combat Analysis
Cell after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.
DoDJIC, DX-5, and DX-6 establish imagery analytical expertise
focused to monitor and report on all SRBM equipment and activity
in Iraq.
DX-6 initiates daily reporting on Iraqi merchant ship, SRBM, CW
and air activities in support of DoDJIC, CENTCOM and JS.
DX, DB, and JSJ begin meeting with USAF (CHECKMATE) personnel
in the Pentagon to facilitate OSP target development and to broaden
its insight on BDA.
DIA sends its Chief of All-Source Collection Requirements Division
(DC-4), a Navy captain, to be the CENTCOM JIC collection manager
in Riyadh.
DM-1 formulates plan for Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC)
concept of photo-processing in Saudi Arabia.
1 November
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide for information on Iraqi forces in the KTO with
emphasis on the RGFC, special forces, Navy, logistics, and equipment.
6 November
ITF sends first of daily and weekly OB update messages via e-mail/DSNET3 to
CENTCOM.
7 November
DAT-6 tasks assets to confirm or deny the presence of SS-12/21 missiles in
Iraq. Subsequent collection determines they are not present.
President Bush
visting US troop positions in Saudi Aradia during a November 1990 visit.
12
November
DIA sponsored MIB team conducts assessment visit to CENTCOM.
15 November
DIA develops draft concept of operations to integrate
the entire Intelligence Community in support of DESERT SHIELD
BDA.
DI-6 requests release authority for five more Coalition allies
(granted 10 Dec).
22 November
CENTCOM establishes JIC Forward.
25 November
DIA sponsored MIB team releases report on CENTCOM
visit.
30 November
DIA establishes DODIIS e-mail link between DIA and
CENTCOM.
DC-1 prepares a point paper for the Director, DIA on the diversion
of reconnaissance assets from counternarcotics to DESERT SHIELD.
November
DX joins the ad hoc Command, Control, and Communications
(C3) Fusion Cell in an effort to assist the DoDJIC in identifying
the Iraqi C3 network in the KTO.
JS sends his deputy (an Army colonel) to be the CENTCOM JIC Commander,
after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.
6 December
NMIST deploys to US Special Operations Central Command
(SOCCENT).
7 December
Special DIA ad hoc group meets to determine Iraqi
BW threat and intelligence gaps.
9-12 December
DM-1 team travels to Beale AFB, CA to review progress
of deployable photo processing/data base preparations.
10 December
DIA establishes BDA Cell to provide third-phase BDA
assessment.
DIA and CIA establish Iraqi Interagency Biological Warfare Working
Group (IIBWWG).
DC-1 passes tasking to CENTCOM asking them to look for SA-2s in
southern Kuwait.
Defense Intelligence College (DIC) hosts a "Conference on
the Gulf Crisis" at the request of VP and the JCS. Analysts
working in support of DESERT SHIELD attend the in-depth discussions
by experts and academicians.
12 December
OSC-CI (Directorate for Counterintelligence) hosts a conference at Clarendon
for counterintelligence experts supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD. Twenty-six
specialists attend from DIA, CENTCOM, and the Services.
13 December
DAT-6 publishes message guidance to collectors on IIR releasability to the
Coalition members.
17 December
NMIST deploys to US Army Central Command (ARCENT).
IIBWWG submits interim report to Deputy Director, DIA.
18 December
DM-1 briefs MIB on imagery capabilities.
21 December
DAT-6 sends out a worldwide tasking message that provides detailed EEIs and
solicits operational information in the event of a terrorist attack.
DX and DB complete AIF scrub after completing the update of approximately
142,000 order of battle and facility transactions.
26 December
DIA deploys personnel to CENTCOM JIC in Riyadh. DIA eventually deploys a total
of 100 personnel to the JIC Forward.
USDAOs in Yemen and Jordan reduce the size of their staffs because
of increased regional tensions. For the same reason, USDAO Khartoum,
Sudan later temporarily closes.
28 December
OB Scrub Cell from DB and DX completes input of new records, updates
AIF, and stands down.
29 December
DIA establishes Joint Intelligence Production Center, or "Desert JIPC" in
Riyadh. DIA sends an Army colonel from DX to set up and run this organization.
1991
2-5 January
DIA prepares scenario for Exercise DESERT LIGHTNING.
3 January
Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) arrive at DIA for DESERT SHIELD duty.
One hundred thirtyseven reservists are incorporated into the Task Force.
5 January
DM-1 begins coordination of imagery movement from Riyadh to Washington via
DCS, reproduction at DIA, and dissemination to non-theater commands.
8 January
USDAOs in Bangladesh and Pakistan reduce the size of their staffs at each embassy
because of an increase in regional tensions.
9 January
JIPC integrates UK/CA/AS analysts.
10 January
NMIST deploys to VII Corps.
11 January
OICC ships last of 14 Operational Support Packages to CENTCOM.
DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM. Daily
updates provided via e-mail/DSNET3.
12 January
American Embassy Baghdad closes as the last six US officials, other Western
diplomats, and private citizens depart Iraq for Frankfurt aboard a chartered
Iraqi Airlines Boeing 727.
ITF modifies rotation back to three teams, six days on, three
days off, 12-hour shifts.
15 January
UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes.
DIA augments J2 BDA briefing team with analysts and intelligence
technicians.
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to seek host nation reaction to the
possible initiation of hostilities by the Coalition forces.
16 January
DIA establishes a Scud Cell at the DoDJIC in the Pentagon.
DESERT STORM
17 January
Operation DESERT STORM begins (D-Day). Coalition air campaign commences.
DIA sends out the first of over 3,200 verbal BDA/I&W reports
via the DoDJIC "hot ring" to CENTCOM/CENTAF.
Backing up verbal BDA reports, DX inputs first of over 2,000 AIRES
imagery analysis reports and over 222 first and second phase BDA
summaries during the course of the war.
DI-6 approves BDA release to UK/CA/AS.
OSC-2 counterintelligence analysts begin I&W watch for terrorist
threats to US Forces.
18 January
Iraq fires first Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
DI-3 coordinates DESERT STORM briefings to the full House and
Senate.
Aerial refueling of U.S. Navy aircraft
by a U.S. Air Force tanker.
BDA 24-hour and 12-hour message
initiated.
VP establishes net assessment and BDA teams.
DAT-6 tasks assets for information on Scud strikes against Israel.
DC-1 receives report from CENTCOM JRC that reconnaissance over
Western Iraq located 10 Scud launchers. All 10 launchers are reported
destroyed.
20 January
CENTCOM JIC begins daily production of first-phase
BDA reporting via e-mail. OICC downloads reporting and passes
to various cells for analysis/comparison.
DAT-6 tasks assets to acquire BDA data on targets in Kuwait through
the use of sources in the Kuwaiti resistance.
21 January
DIA establishes a POW/MIA Operations Center to track
Coalition POW/MIAs and captured journalists, and to provide information
to US rescue forces.
DIA publishes first glossy BDA daily publication.
DC-1 receives request from JRC Forward to clarify the architecture
and connectivity between theater surveillance systems.
22 January
DIA expands BDA Cell. ITF I&W Cell displaces Counternarcotics
Facility.
DIA dedicates additional assets to the Scud problem as Iraqi Scud
attacks on Israel continue.
23 January
DSD produces IDB II five-country data base for CENTCOM.
DC-1 reports that the President and CJCS have ordered airborne
reconnaissance platform JSTARS to perform dedicated reconnaissance
on Scud launch areas in western Iraq.
24 January
DI-4 arranges weekly briefing for attaches in Washington,
DC.
DAT disseminates guidelines to worldwide collectors on forwarding
IIRs and HUMINT operational traffic as a result of JCS-imposed
restrictions on routine messages.
25 January
DIA sends requirement through DC-1 to CENTCOM for
coverage over western Iraq.
26 January
DIA receives details from the Kuwaiti military resistance
on the facilities that control the oil flow to the sea terminals
(after Iraq released millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf).
Using this information, two F-111 aircraft attack the Al Ahmadi
oil manifolds the next day and stop the flow of oil into the
Gulf.
27 January
DAT-6 tasks collectors to acquire information on all
underground facilities in Iraq, plus information on Iran's role
in the conflict given the Iraqi air force flights to Iran.
28 January
CENTCOM requests an SA-2 OB from DC-1.
29 January
DIA begins baseline MSS production every night.
31 January
DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report on the extent
of the Persian Gulf oil spill.
1-28 February
DIA elements visit Turkey.
5 February
DC-1 replies to CENTCOM request for information about
MTI (moving target indicator) and JSTARS.
5-12 February
DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for
CENTCOM (replaced 11 January copy due to problems with updates.
6 February
DI-1 establishes Monday and Friday J2 briefs for senior
OSD principals.
7 February
DC-1 keeps JCS/JRC informed of SNAPSHOT platform via
verbal mission assessment briefing.
10 February
BDA footage begins to arrive daily from the Joint
Camera Shop at the Pentagon. In-house distribution made for DB-6
and BDA Cells.
12 February
DIA forwards studies on breaching the Iraqi defensive
barriers in southern Kuwait to CENTCOM.
DIA establishes a formal C3 Cell in the DoDJIC with CIA participation
in an effort to improve targeting of Iraqi C3.
DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report the attitudes of their host
countries concerning the US bombing of Iraq.
13 February
DIA BDA analysts determine that Iraq is dispersing
aircraft to historical sites to reduce likelihood of destruction
by air attacks.
14 February
DIA establishes Multispectral Imagery Fusion Cell
to support the Scud Cell in the DoDJIC.
15 February
DC-1 responds to JS tasker with information brief
on various imagery platforms.
19 February
DAT-6 tasks worldwide collectors to provide information
on any Iraqi terrorist action against the Coalition forces.
DS produces IDB II data base for CENTCOM to replace corrupted
23 January version.
Historical monuments, like the ancient temple
depicted in this DIA Public Affairs drawing, were not targeted
despite the placement
of military equipment nearby.
20 February
DC-1 reports on airborne
reconnaissance surge capability for the ground war.
21 February
DIA ground forces assessment production begins.
DIA moves MSS production to NMIC.
DIA Document Exploitation (DOCEX) personnel depart for Saudi Arabia.
22 February
DAT-6 tasks assets in Western Europe, Middle East,
Far East, and the Soviet Union, requesting their views and national
interests in the Iraqi post-war period.
24 February
Operation DESERT SABRE (G-Day), the Coalition ground
campaign begins.
DIA begins production of two MSSs per day.
26 February
DIA Director curtails MIB meetings to biweekly.
DIA sends a reserve augmentee who is a trained interrogator and
Arab linguist to Turkey to assist the Turkish Government in debriefing
Iraqi military defectors.
Destroyed Iraqi armored vehicles
Burning oil wells in Kuwait
27 February
DOCEX team deploys to Kuwait.
28 February
Coalition forces/Iraqi cease-fire.
At cessation of hostilities, ITF consists of 634 personnel, with
394 working in the Pentagon and 240 working in the OICC at the
DIAC. Of the 394 at the Pentagon, 42 work in the ITF headquarters,
277 in the DoDJIC, 40 in the BDA Cell, 17 in the C3 Cell, and 18
in general support.
DIA sends out last Scud Cell report.
DIA sends out last daily BDA report.
DIA cancels twice daily MSS.
NMIST deploys to SOCCENT Forward, Kuwait City.
2 March
USDAO London debriefs a recently released CBS crew after
its return from Iraq. Information from the CBS crew confirmed
the identification of some of the US and UK POWs still in Iraq.
3 March
Iraq accepts cease-fire terms at Safwan Airfield.
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