


# The Four Thrusts

Meet Asymmetric Threat

Attack Database

Achieve Interoperability


Revitalize Work Force






## Comments From The Director Defense Intelligence Agency

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has published Joint Vision 2020, which builds on the conceptual template established by JV2010 and lays out the goal for America's armed forces. That goal—creating a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—demands that the defense intelligence community meets the challenges of the future by focusing on the fundamentals of intelligence. The leadership of the defense intelligence community, including the service intelligence chiefs, unified command J2s, and Joint Staff J2, have agreed on the priorities that will enable us to operate successfully in the JV2020 environment. We call these priority areas *The Four Thrusts*. This pamphlet presents the “way ahead” for the defense intelligence community by providing a concise explanation of each of the Four Thrusts. These synopses will detail how the Intelligence Community will tackle the tough issues raised in each thrust area. I encourage each of you to evaluate our “way ahead” and to strengthen our approach with your feedback. This exchange of ideas will ensure that we continue to provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to our customers — most importantly the warfighter.




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
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# Shaping to Meet the Asymmetric Threat

U.S. Marine Corps, Chair

## Asymmetry in Warfare

One of the key challenges of this thrust is to identify and define the challenge. Asymmetry — or the lack of symmetry — in reference to warfare is the use of power in unanticipated or non-traditional ways. For decades, the United States maintained a traditional mindset on the nature of its foe, developing “force multipliers” for ensuring the advantage over projected threats. This strategy led to the emergence and recognition of the United States as an overwhelming conventional military power. To challenge this resultant tenable power, state and non-state actors developed means for avoiding traditional confrontations with the United States. The intent of these “asymmetric” means is to project unexpected or unbalanced capability for reducing the conventional military superiority of the United States, render it irrelevant, or exploit perceived weaknesses. The asymmetric thrust challenges us not only to identify unanticipated threats, but also to develop a new mindset for assessing potential asymmetric threats and developing effective measures for combating them. The Asymmetric Threat Senior Steering Group, chaired by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, is developing a community approach to address the disparate nature of the asymmetric threat.

## Asymmetric Approaches

The variables involved in identifying an asymmetric threat make this problem extremely complex. Since the adversary, objectives, targets, means of attack, and context are all situation dependent, the challenge is like “wrestling with Jell-O.” It is difficult to pin it down. To simplify its understanding, the intelligence and operational communities have defined asymmetric approaches to focus on strategic, operational and tactical targets. **Strategic asymmetries** attempt to preclude, deter, or degrade our ability to use military force by focusing on such things as our national will, public opinion, our national infrastructure, the highest-level civilian-military command and control, our overseas deployment flow, and our domestic mobilization capability. As an example, think back to DESERT STORM, when the Iraqi regime claimed that allied forces were bombing “baby milk factories” rather than military targets, thereby trying to sway U.S. public opinion through manipulation of the media.




*“One of the key challenges of this thrust is to identify and define the challenge...it is like ‘wrestling with Jell-O.’ It is difficult to pin it down.”*

*“The intelligence and operational communities have defined asymmetric approaches to focus on strategic, operational and tactical targets.”*

**Operational asymmetries** would work against our preferred warfighting concepts, as described in Joint Vision 2020, by attempting to undermine our ability to execute one or more key elements (dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, full dimensional protection) of our operational plan. Examples might include chemical and biological warfare capabilities or computer network attacks that would render us ineffective. **Tactical asymmetries** focus on U.S. and allied forces already engaged in theater, such as attacks similar to the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, Serb forces implemented asymmetric warfare by widespread use of denial and deception measures in attempting to shoot down NATO aircraft and protect their deployed forces from NATO air attack. They also tried to sway international opinion by exaggerating or even fabricating collateral damage incidents.

### **The Challenge**

The Intelligence Community’s overarching challenge in shaping to meet this emerging threat is to develop an approach to the problem within the current system and its capabilities. There has not been a coherent plan for



addressing the disparate nature of the asymmetric threat. Our strategy has been more reactive — allocating resources to meet individual, immediate issues. Whether it was drugs in the late 1980s, terrorism in the early 1990s, or information warfare most recently, new organizations, new products, and new systems were created to deal with the current mission. This approach is no longer expedient. The coordinated strategy of this thrust includes building the right skills mix, collection and analytic methods, and organizational linkages to deal with the intangible and “soft” data that characterize asymmetric issues. Resources will be allocated more effectively within this coherent approach.





## Attacking the Database Problem

U.S. Pacific Command J2, Chair

Databases serve as key resources in military intelligence, playing in the success or failure of military operations. Although considered less than glamorous, database work is important and database knowledge is the very foundation of our all-source analysis. The senior steering group (SSG) appointed to deal with the strategic challenges associated with databases is chaired by the J2, U.S. Pacific Command. The group is engaged in phased efforts to improve the collective ability of defense intelligence to support a broad range of modern military operations.

### The Accidental Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade

To grasp the scope of the database challenge, it serves to look at a recent real-life situation. The Chinese Embassy mistake was the result of a series of errors. First, the land navigation technique used by an intelligence officer to locate the *intended* target — the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement — was flawed. (The actual target was 300 meters away.) Second, none of the Intelligence Community databases consulted to determine what “no-strike” facilities (embassies, hospitals, churches) were in the vicinity identified any issues. Moreover, all of these databases, when the Chinese Embassy was included at all, showed it in its pre-1996 location, across the river. Despite the fact that U.S. officials had visited the Embassy on a number of occasions in recent years, the new location was never entered into intelligence databases, nor sub-


siquently government maps derived from the data. Third, no one with “on-the-ground” experience was consulted before this target was validated.

### DATABASE FIXES

#### Data Currency

First, databases must be current to be useful. Database maintenance cannot be relegated to a low priority as has been done in the past. The Database SSG has spearheaded an all-out, defense intelligence community federated effort to identify and update those areas deemed high priority by the CINCs. The system is focusing on both targets and no-strike lists — the latter an area not traditionally included in our database structures but one that has become increasingly important in an era of urban warfare.

*“Our long term goal is to transition to a ‘knowledge base’ — which will incorporate virtually all of our intelligence holdings. This knowledge base will be much more visually oriented — like a video game — as opposed to our current spreadsheet-type environment.”*



*“Key to the entire Database Thrust is its linkage to the Interoperability Thrust. Even the best, most up-to-date database is useless if it cannot be accessed by those who need it — the warfighters.”*

## Data Input

Second, changes must be made in the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for inputting data. Data validation has been over-emphasized, resulting in lengthy delays in updating databases. Wouldn't it have been helpful to have had an entry in the Modernized Integrated Database that cited Defense Attaché or Embassy reporting on the post-1996 location of the Chinese Embassy? This would have alerted us to the fact that an embassy was in the general vicinity of our intended target. Additional assets such as Defense Attachés must be allowed to input directly into databases to leverage our limited resources. Database records should be tagged by source or by level of confidence, thus allowing analysts and operators to make some judgment on the validity of a particular record. In the near future, technology will be available allowing attachés or TDY personnel to remotely input information to the database complete with Global Positioning

System coordinates. In the short term, our mindsets and TTP must change.

## Database Concept


Another goal for the Database SSG is changing the entire concept of a database. Currently we rely on a fairly static, traditional database structure with fixed categories and countries, which is not easy to use for either the analyst or the customer. Our long term goal is to transition to a web-enabled “knowledge base” — which will incorporate virtually all of our intelligence holdings. This knowledge base will be much more visually oriented — like a video game — as opposed to our current spreadsheet-type environment.

## The Challenge

Key to the entire Database Thrust is its linkage to the Interoperability Thrust. Even the best, most up-to-date database is useless if it cannot be accessed by those who need it — the warfighters. These two thrusts must be closely aligned in order to allow our database and our future knowledge base to be used on the collateral level Global Command and Control System, where it will provide the key threat data for the common operating picture.

*All of the above can be summarized as C<sup>3</sup>IQ: Current, Correct, Collateral, Interoperable, Quickly!*

ATTACK





# Achieving Integration and Interoperability for the Common Operating Picture

U.S. Central Command J2, Chair



## Battlespace Visualization

We have all seen the Tom Clancy-style movies where an intelligence analyst or a military operator brings up a screen, points and clicks a few times, and magically produces a real-time picture of the “battlefield.” Whether zeroing in on a terrorist training camp or following a fugitive running across Washington rooftops, these movies paint a high-tech picture of our capabilities that currently does not exist.

## The Challenge

However, our military’s operational plan for the future, Joint Vision 2020, envisions just this kind of “battlespace visualization,” and an intelligence senior steering group, chaired by the U. S. Central Command J-2, is leading the way in its realization. Imagine that you are in charge of evacuating 500 Americans from an African country in turmoil. You are offshore on a U.S. Navy ship but can call up a near-real time picture of the capital on your computer screen. You can see where rebel and government forces are fighting. Double click on the rebel forces, and you see an assessment of their troop strength, capabilities, and objectives. You zero in on the nearby military base, double click on the anti-aircraft artillery next to the runway, and bring up a text box that indicates what type it is, where it came from, and what condition it is assessed to be in. You maneuver around the city with a joystick as if you were playing a video game, looking

for sites that will accommodate the helicopters that will land near the U.S. Embassy to evacuate the staff.

This battlespace visualization capability, which will provide a “common operating picture (COP),” will no doubt be hard to achieve. One of the biggest obstacles we must overcome is our shortfalls in interoperability.

## Common Operating Picture

For years, intelligence systems have worked separately from operator systems. Because of classification levels, the intelligence officer has operated in an environment laced with sensitive compartmented informa-

*“For years...intelligence personnel operated behind the ‘green door,’ their systems and applications not linked to operational systems... In order to contribute our crucial intelligence piece to the common operating picture (COP), our products and services must plug and play in the overall, operator-owned architecture. This Global Command and Control System Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I<sup>3</sup>)...will provide intelligence, imagery, and video data to the COP.”*

*“The Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture collaborative environment is providing analysts and customers the capability to meet in virtual workspaces and to share information on targeting, collection management, and intelligence analysis.”*

tion, while the operator has worked at the collateral level. Intelligence systems and applications have not been as closely linked to operational systems as they should.

Those days are over. In order to contribute our crucial intelligence piece to the COP, our products and services must “plug and play” in the overall, operator-owned architecture — the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The intelligence segment that we are currently developing for it is called Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (I<sup>3</sup>). GCCS-I<sup>3</sup> will provide intelligence, imagery, and video data into the COP. Data from our Modernized Integrated Database, as well as from other DoD Intelligence Production Program-managed databases, will flow into GCCS-I<sup>3</sup>.

### **Integration and Interoperability**

How are we to provide this data to GCCS and the warfighter at the collateral level? The solution must begin with the analyst — writing and developing information at the lowest classification level. Current technical means for dealing with multiple security

domains involve a human being in the loop who ensures that our automated tools do not accidentally release information in the wrong domain. One promising technology for streamlining this process is “meta-data” tagging, or appending data that describes the data. This allows for creating documents and database records with “invisible” tags that describe, among other things, the classification level for facilitating automated dissemination/updates to the appropriate security domain.

The Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) also plays an integral role in the area of interoperability. JIVA is intended to enhance analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence to our customers by introducing leading-edge technology to the analytic community — a part of the solution to our intelligence interoperability problem. We have not been fully successful with interoperability amongst ourselves, much less with our customers. But JIVA is also playing an integral role in enhancing interoperability with the warfighter and other customers. The JIVA collaborative environment is providing analysts and customers the capability to meet in virtual workspaces and to share information on targeting, collection management, and intelligence analysis. With JIVA’s deployment of the first segment of the Enterprise Architecture, users will access its capabilities via a web-browser-enabled workstation. Together with robust communications, this capability will enhance intelligence support to and interoperability with our customers.





## Revitalizing and Reshaping the Work Force

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, Chair

Today's defense intelligence community is composed of some of the brightest, best educated, and most highly skilled military and civilian personnel that have ever served our nation. In meeting the challenges of a changing world order, this work force must remain agile and knowledgeable, and represent the diversity that will ensure success in our intelligence mission. The Senior Steering Group for Revitalizing and Reshaping the Work Force, chaired by Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, is spearheading efforts in this arena.

### The Challenge

Based on the lessons of DESERT STORM, the previous decade saw a focus on information *movement* — ensuring and maintaining the infrastructure, computer support, and systems necessary for accomplishing the mission and delivering intelligence to the customer. We may have been *too* successful, providing our customers with too much information to digest. The thrust to reshape the work force is in part an effort to rebalance our focus from a heavy emphasis on information movement to satisfying our customer needs for information *interpretation*. What they need from us is fine-

*“The thrust to reshape the work force is in part an effort to rebalance our focus from a heavy emphasis on information movement to satisfying our customer needs for information interpretation.”*

grained, high quality, tailored intelligence analysis that provides a detailed picture of foreign capabilities and, more importantly, is predictive. This requires a cadre of highly trained intelligence analysts with the help of all types of specialized support personnel. Unfortunately, the majority of our largely fixed budget is already being spent on personnel costs, so we are not in a position to bring on more people. We will have to make better use of the human resources we have, by shaping a work force to meet future challenges and by improving our proficiency and efficiency.

### Steps in Ensuring a Work Force to Meet Tomorrow's Challenges

**Recruitment** of skilled personnel is essential. Efforts are underway to develop a common, Intelligence Community (IC)-wide, state-of-the art Internet website to attract new personnel. This website will allow human resource managers to share the employment applications of qualified individuals. In addition, a database on Intelink will contain listings of developmental opportunities and agency vacancies to assist employees in determining what new jobs are available across the defense intelligence community.

**Promoting diversity** within the IC population is key to providing timely, accurate intelligence on a wide variety of potential threats. The American population



*“We must capitalize on this unique national population by staffing our agencies with personnel and leaders of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds who can provide deeper insight into the rest of the world.”*

is naturally diverse — a rich collection of international customs, traditions, and cultures. We must capitalize on this unique national population by staffing our agencies with personnel and leaders of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds who can provide deeper insight into the rest of the world.

DIA is making many long-term investments in **education and training**. One initiative is to provide greater education and training opportunities to the DoD IC work force through the Joint Intelligence Virtual University (JIVU), an interactive, on-line learning environment that connects students, instructors and subject matter experts. Also, the General Intelligence Training Council has worked with the Unified CINCs to identify, update and prioritize unified command training requirements and to address shortfalls. Plans for leveraging Joint Military Intelligence Collection (JMIC) programs for the benefit of all including offering “scholarships” to prospective and current employees as a recruitment or

retention incentive. Finally, the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center is undergoing a comprehensive review of its curriculum and is in the process of obtaining accreditation.


## **Career Development**

An important aspect of retention of a highly trained work force is career development. The Intelligence Community Assignment Program, now recognized as the primary program for fostering “jointness” and teamwork, will be expanded by encouraging such exchanges at lower grade levels as well. DIA civilians are encouraged to consider rotational assignments to the commands and services. It is imperative that personnel broaden their perspectives.

Success in reshaping the work force is critical because it underpins the previous three thrusts. Attacking the database problem, ensuring interoperability, or shaping to meet the asymmetric threat cannot be done unless we have a skilled, trained and educated, and diverse work force postured to accomplish our mission.

*“Success in reshaping the work force underpins the other three thrusts.”*

**REVITALIZE**



## The Plan

In September 1999, the DIA Director as *de facto* Director of Military Intelligence, in consultation with the service intelligence chiefs and command J2s, identified the four most pressing challenges military intelligence would face in the coming decade. These four “thrusts” are outlined in this pamphlet. The plan of attack included the formation of a small senior steering group for each thrust, chaired by a different member of the defense intelligence community. Each senior steering group formulated plans of action to meet the overarching goals of the Four Thrusts, gaining endorsement by the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) before moving forward. Substantial progress has been made in each of the thrusts.

- Several ongoing initiatives will increase intelligence capabilities to better anticipate and prepare U.S. forces for the complex challenges that *asymmetric threats* pose.
- Changes to the *database* have improved content and utility.
- A series of proof-of-concept evaluations and exercises has been designed to enhance intelligence *integration and interoperability*.
- Community-wide actions are underway that will lead to a *revitalized work force* prepared to take on the challenges of the 21st century.

These thrusts are interconnected and progress is synchronized to build on the progress of each; together, they will lead to a defense intelligence community well positioned to support the military today and tomorrow.

## Military Intelligence Board/ Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference

Provides Guidance From a Broad Community  
Perspective

Receives Reports From Steering Groups  
Provides Cross Group Integration



### Senior Steering Groups

DR/DIA Designated chairmen  
Charter, Review and Validate Action Plans and Results  
Provide Oversight and Guidance  
DIA S&T Advisory Board represented on each

#### Asymmetric Threat



Chair-USMC  
Coast Guard  
SOCOM  
SPACECOM  
STRATCOM  
DIA/DP  
JFCOM  
DIA STAB Rep  
SOUTHCOM

#### Interoperability



Chair-CENTCOM  
Navy  
JFCOM  
NIMA  
DISA  
DIA/DS  
NSA  
DIA STAB Rep

#### Database



Chair-PACOM  
Air Force  
TRANSCOM  
NIMA  
JCS J-2  
DIA/DI  
DIA STAB Rep

#### Work Force



Chair-ARMY  
EUCOM  
NSA  
CMS  
DIA/DA  
DIA STAB Rep  
ASD/C3I  
Reserves  
JCS J2

## Working Groups...and You!

(Intelligence Community and Customers)

Provide Feedback to the SSG and MIB/SMIOC





## MEET

- ▲ Forward Attack on the Threat in Support of Homeland Defense
- ▲ Reduce National ISR Vulnerabilities



## ASYMMETRIC THREAT

- ▲ Revise I&W and Threat Level Methodologies
- ▲ Develop a Concept of Operations to Meet the Asymmetric Threat



## ATTACK

- ▲ Establish Clear Priorities for Database Focus (Countries, Categories)
- ▲ Revise Doctrine and TTP to Make Database Improvements Work



## DATABASE

- ▲ Create a Knowledge Base That Can Be Displayed at All Levels (SCI, Collateral, Coalition)
- ▲ Current Intelligence Reporting Updates the Database... Directly
- ▲ Leverage Current and Planned Tools Including Geospatial Displays

# ACHIEVE



- ▲ Ensure Intelligence Products and Services “Plug and Play” Directly on GCCS
- ▲ Develop Intelligence Systems and Tools to Interoperate With GCCS-I<sup>3</sup> at Multiple Levels

# INTEROPERABILITY




- ▲ Leverage JIVA to Accomplish Intelligence Support to the Common Operating Picture (COP)
- ▲ Streamline Accreditation of Systems

# REVITALIZE



- ▲ Reshape Work Force to Meet Future Challenges

# WORK FORCE



- ▲ Revitalize Proficiency and Efficiency

