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Statement for the Record

Before the House Armed Services Committee
Hearing on the 9/11 Commission Recommendations

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I, too, welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be part of this important process.

Let me begin by providing you some background on the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Defense Intelligence Agency was established in 1961 by Department of Defense Directive and later included in an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. We were designated a Combat Support Agency in 1986 by the Goldwater Nichols Act.

As Director of DIA I work for the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I am the primary advisor to the Secretary of Defense on military intelligence matters. My agency provides intelligence down to the military maneuver unit. DIA is a designated member of the national intelligence community. In this role I respond to tasking from the Director of Central Intelligence and provide collection capabilities, military intelligence analysis and assessments. I also report to the Director of Central Intelligence as the Program Manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program, a subcomponent under the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Program. I respond to requirements established by the DCI as the Intelligence Community's Technical and Defense HUMINT Collector, under his intelligence collection authority. Finally, I am the

DCI's Executive Agent for a number of centers such as the POW/MIA Center, Underground Facilities Center and National Media Exploitation Center. I live comfortably in two interlocking worlds, defense and the intelligence community.

As Director of Defense Intelligence Agency I represent 7,500 men and women, military and civilian, around the world. As the Program Manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program, I represent an additional 11,000 civilian and active duty military members and 4,200 reservists in the Service Intelligence Centers and Joint Intelligence Centers attached to the Combatant Commanders'. We are tasked with discovering information and creating knowledge that provides warning, identifies both threats and opportunities, and delivers overwhelming advantage to our warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security decision makers.

It's a big job. And today, this mission is being executed with great dedication by our intelligence professionals, working long hours often operating in austere conditions, in harm's way. It's important to recognize their accomplishments and sacrifice at the outset of today's discussion. It's also important to recognize the breadth of their efforts. Their efforts extend from collecting data and determining the strategy of our adversaries for US

policy makers and defense planners to providing timely and detailed intelligence to support of our warfighters on the battlefield. I am committed to doing everything possible to improve their capabilities and opportunities for mission success.

Dr. Cambone has spoken to the 9/11 Commission Report from the policy perspective. From the execution perspective, I welcome the opportunities inherent in the recommendations of the Commission Report to improve our intelligence capabilities. The dilemma will be found in implementing fundamental changes while simultaneously accomplishing assigned missions in today's hostile, exceptionally complex and fast-paced environment. Clearly there will be challenges along with the opportunities.

The first key opportunity is to assert the primacy of "all-source" intelligence. By "all-source" I mean, intelligence and information derived from all our collection assets, military forces, law enforcement agencies and unclassified sources. The benefits to be derived by bringing all of these sources together for analytic discovery apply equally to dealing with the threat of international terrorism, or enduring military issues like North Korean capabilities and intentions, or insurgency in Afghanistan. To put the "all" into "all-source analysis," collected data must be made broadly available, analysts must drive collection, collectors must join with analysts

to create a new intelligence operations paradigm, and analytic professionalism and tradecraft must be enhanced. Today's "some source" environment must be changed. Achieving true "all source" analysis will fundamentally change our Nation's and our Department's intelligence capabilities.

The second key opportunity is to aggressively act on recommendations in Section 13.3 of the 9/11 Commission Report concerning "Unity of Effort in Sharing Information." Information is the raw material of the intelligence business.

I strongly concur with the Commission's finding that we have immense amounts of information that are not available for analytical scrutiny.

Unquestionably, we must extract additional value from what is currently available, harvest and exploit new and non-traditional sources of data, and prepare ourselves to optimize data from future sensors and access opportunities. We must reengineer existing information management approaches, so that instead of analysts complaining about "drowning in data," they look upon the volume and diversity of data available to them as their "best friend." We must move expeditiously to adopt "need to share," rather than "need to know" criteria, institute process and policy changes required to make information broadly available while properly protecting

sources, and incorporate best practices from the commercial sector. We in DIA are instituting commercial practices, organizing our data so that modern commercial techniques can be applied by analysts, tagging data such that these tools can operate effectively, and working to achieve the “trusted information network” referenced in the report. But, rather than apply these capabilities within one Agency, the true power of these recommendations comes with implementing the changes across government departments and agencies, beginning with those entities that collect information relevant to national security.

For example, a smart network employing modern information management techniques would recognize a company commander from the 4th Infantry Division when he logs on. It would know his intelligence needs and his approximate operating location based upon the types of questions he’d asked in the past. It could be pre-programmed to sort and store data. Upon log-on, the network would save valuable time and communications bandwidth by presenting that data and accompanying analysis, rather than requiring him to initiate a search. It would know that he has a Secret clearance and would separate the sources from the content of the information so that he could have maximum access to data at the Secret classification level. And if he wanted to know what is literally over the next hill, he would

get what he needs regardless of what exotic collector may have been employed to get that data. Just as importantly, if that company commander who is not an intelligence collector by definition but in possession of potentially relevant information – enemy documents, interrogation, visual observation, and so on. That data could immediately be loaded on the network where it could be acted upon, related to other data, and subjected to analytic scrutiny. In an integrated endeavor, the operator can switch from customer to provider in an instant, even on the battlefield. That is precisely where we need to be.

The power of all-source primacy supported by unity of effort in the information arena is transformational and I am convinced these fundamental changes can be implemented while fighting a war. These changes would enhance military effectiveness, improve operational capabilities and save lives.

If we achieved all-source primacy and truly integrate data from all available sources, we would address other issues as well. These changes would promote competitive analysis, since the data would be subject to a variety of analytical viewpoints and be the basis of an active dialogue. Often discussed “cultural” issues and resistance to sharing would be swept away. These new approaches would bridge existing divides between

foreign, military and domestic intelligence. These approaches permit decentralized execution, reducing the physical vulnerabilities of concentrating our capabilities in potentially targeted locations, while retaining maximum flexibility to surge and reprioritize our efforts as is so often needed in military intelligence. The opportunities presented by the Commission's recommendations in these areas are fundamental and far-reaching.

As is said often in military circles, the "devil is in the details." That said, I look forward to working with this Committee to seize the opportunities presented by the Commission and improve our capabilities for the warfighter, the planners, defense and national-security policy-makers, and, most-importantly, the citizens of the United States.