


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10 January 1962
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
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SOVIET BLOC: Soviet-Yugoslav-Albanian Relations

The Soviet-Albanian dispute has been characterized by Albania's increasing isolation from the Soviet Eastern European Bloc. On 30 December, the remaining Soviet diplomatic personnel in Tirana departed, leaving only the Soviet military representative of the Warsaw Pact in residence. This representative has reportedly stated that he will remain in Tirana only "until Albania withdraws from the Warsaw Pact", wording which implies a Soviet hope that Albania will voluntarily withdraw. Such a step would relieve the Soviet Union of the task of expelling Albania from the organization and thereby incurring the criticism of some segments of the Communist world, especially Communist China.

Rumors of Soviet-Yugoslav agreement to move against the Hoxha regime have been dispelled by the Yugoslav "hands-off" policy toward Albania. Moreover, Soviet-Yugoslav relations have not improved to the point where either party would consent to Belgrade's acting as Moscow's agent against the Hoxha regime.

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CONGO:

Congo Military Developments

Press reports state that the Rhodesian Federal Government ordered the expulsion of 27 alleged Katangan mercenaries shortly after their arrival at Livingstone, Southern Rhodesia, on 9 January. The men, 26 Frenchmen and one Spaniard, were among a group of 36 arriving at Brazzaville, Congo Republic, on 8 January aboard an Air France scheduled flight. According to the US Air Attache in Brazzaville, they departed the same day for Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, on a chartered DC-6. The aircraft was refused permission to land at Ndola, however, and proceeded to Livingstone. Press reports state that the nine men permitted to remain in Rhodesia included some Belgians who claimed to be en route to Katanga to repair damaged Union Miniere installations; however, the Air Attache, Brazzaville, noted that the age and appearance of the entire group indicated that they were "excellent potential mercenaries for Katanga".

In Elisabethville, the military situation continues quiet. UN Ethiopian troops were involved in another incident on 6 January, however, when they apprehended a group of Katangans, including a member of the Katangan judiciary and several doctors, who were attempting to collect evidence on the alleged murder of Union Miniere employees by Ethiopian troops during the recent fighting. The Katangans were released some six hours later through the efforts of UN political officer Urquhart, but they left with the impression that Urquhart had little influence over his military, according to the US Consul, Elisabethville.

On the political scene, meanwhile, Antoine Gizenga appears to have lost further support in Stanleyville. The defection of one faction of his Africa Solidarity Party has been announced, and the Party's Vice President says that Gizenga is no longer President. The press reports that Col Alphonse Pakassa -- heretofore Gizenga's most loyal army supporter -- may be shifting his allegiance to the Central Government.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

CAMBODIA:

Bloc Air Defense Materiel for Cambodia

According to Cambodia's Army Intelligence chief, his government has agreed to buy four heavy antiaircraft guns (possibly batteries) and two jet fighters from Czechoslovakia and will receive an additional 25 Czechoslovak medium antiaircraft guns as a gift. Cambodia will also receive a gift of 20 heavy antiaircraft guns from the USSR. The source states that the arrival of the gift weapons will not be publicized.

Comment: These quantities are substantially lower than the originally reported Czech and Soviet offers. Receipt of this materiel, which represents the first Bloc military aid to Cambodia, probably will be followed by the arrival of Bloc AAA and aircraft technicians and advisers.

(CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)

WEST NEW GUINEA: Indonesian and Dutch Developments Concerning West New Guinea

US Ambassador Jones in Indonesia reports that, in spite of press accounts to the contrary, President Sukarno's speeches in the Celebes were on the whole relatively restrained. Sukarno did, however, state publicly that Indonesia would meet the Dutch in talks only for the purpose of transferring administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia. Sukarno's efforts to blame the Dutch for the 7 January attempt on his life will inevitably have repercussions, but Ambassador Jones is not overly pessimistic on the prospects for successful talks.

At the Hague, Dutch Foreign Minister Luns has informed US Ambassador Rice that, notwithstanding the Dutch Government's public statements of willingness to talk to Indonesia without prior conditions, the Dutch, in fact, would continue to insist on self-determination for the Papuans. Luns added that he could not see any possibility of successful negotiations. Nevertheless, Ambassador Rice characterizes the present Dutch position as radically changed and foresees a Dutch-Indonesian accord if Sukarno would now display a comparable flexibility.

Comment: If Luns' hard position is maintained, there is slight chance for successful talks. There are indications, however, that Luns is no longer in complete control of this aspect of Dutch foreign relations. Sukarno's adamant position is indicative of his confidence in Indonesia's growing military strength and suggests that he may attempt to humiliate the Dutch, either militarily or at the conference table.

(SECRET LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

INDONESIA:

Soviet Military Shipments to Indonesia

The Soviet cargo ship SERGEJ KIROV last month offloaded over 1,600 tons of military arms and equipment at Indonesian ports. The cargo included 34 amphibious personnel carriers and 11 armored cars, two 57mm antitank guns, 170 12.7mm machine guns with 172,000 rounds of ammunition, 6,000 parachutes, 1,400 mine detectors, and 10 aircraft "training engines".

Comment: The cargo carried on this ship, which is only one of 17 to 20 Soviet vessels calling at Indonesian ports in the past six months, provides an indication of the large quantities of military materiel currently being received. In addition, 10 TU-16 jet medium bombers were flown to Indonesia during the period July-October 1961, four Soviet submarines are currently en route, and MIG-19 fighters have been reported in eastern Java. Indonesia's ability to absorb this materiel has been enhanced by the substantial training program included under the 1960-1961 arms agreement.

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DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC:

Friction between President Balaguer and other
Members of Council of State

The US Charge in the Dominican Republic reports that members of the new Council of State are threatening to resign en masse if President Balaguer does not resolve three basic complaints: continued interference in political matters by the military, especially Secretary of State for Armed Forces Gen Rodriguez Echavarria; continuation by Balaguer of his "give away" of Trujillo assets without the approval of the Council; and continued delay in setting a firm date for Balaguer's withdrawal and replacement by the Vice President of the Council. The Council believes he should resign next week.


Comment: There is certain to be mutual suspicion between the council members and the military at this time. Some individuals in the military are also dissatisfied with Gen Rodriguez' high-handed methods, and a few officers have threatened to resign if the situation does not change. Most of the military, the members of the council, and the opposition are believed eager to work together toward the restoration of stability in the country, but the actions of a few individuals may create frictions. Resignation of the Council of State could lead to a complete breakdown in public order and provide extremists, particularly Castroites, an opportunity to improve their position.
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SUPPLEMENT

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

At its regular meeting on 9 Jan 62, the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) concluded:



D. INDONESIA

President Sukarno will continue to threaten and plan military action against West New Guinea while pressing for a negotiated political solution. Meanwhile, Indonesia's present military capability will restrict operations to larger scale infiltration attempts which may result in isolated clashes with the Dutch.



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SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION ARCTIC TRAINING OPERATIONS

Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA) units are expected to engage in their annual Arctic training program during the coming winter months. Although so far this year bomber operations in the Arctic area have consisted primarily of round-robin flights from 50th and 5th Long Range Air Army areas, recent visits by LRA support-type aircraft to Arctic deployment bases indicate that preparations are under way for seasonal use of these airfields by medium and heavy bombers.

Winter exercises in the Arctic regions have constituted a major part of LRA training operations since 1956. Despite yearly variations in the size and scope of the effort, steady progress toward effective use of Arctic staging bases by LRA strike elements has been shown. Last winter's operations, which were the most extensive ever noted, demonstrated a capability to service a continuous flow of aircraft at all of the major Arctic staging bases for a period of over four months and to handle sizable numbers of bombers at one time. Between mid-December 60 and late April 1961, approximately 250 bomber deployments to Arctic bases were made -- more than twice the number noted during the previous winter. Of these deployments, about a third were made by BISON's or BEAR's, a significant increase in heavy bomber participation over previous years. The ability of Soviet LRA to commit large numbers of heavy bombers to simultaneous Arctic deployment was established last March when 31 BISON's and BEAR's -- an unprecedented number -- were located concurrently at Tiksi and Anadyr.


As in earlier years, the four major Soviet Arctic staging bases (Olenya, Tiksi, Schmidt and Anadyr) were the focal points of the 1960-1961 LRA deployments. Other Arctic bases, however, were used to a greater extent than ever before, including first-time bomber use of three airfields (Nagurskaya, Ostrov Green Bell and Chekurovka). Most or all of the bases previously associated with LRA deployments will probably again figure in this year's operations. In addition, first-time bomber landings may be noted at Aspidnaya, a newly developed base located approximately mid-way between Tiksi and Schmidt.

Although last year's Arctic exercises reflected a greater degree of flexibility in the use of both aircraft and bases than was apparent in earlier years, established training patterns were generally followed. BADGER's from 50th Air Army units in western

USSR deployed in successive groups of eight or fewer aircraft to various bases in the western and central Arctic areas, usually landing at several airfields before returning home, while BADGER's from 5th Air Army units in the Far East, ordinarily operating in smaller groups, deployed to bases in the eastern Arctic. BADGER's from 43rd Air Army units in southwestern USSR have never played a significant role in winter Arctic training exercises; 43rd Air Army BEAR's, however, along with heavy bombers from both of the other Long Range Air Armies, regularly participate in Arctic deployments.

The size and scope of this year's LRA Arctic operations are not yet apparent. While the conventional deployment cycle may be repeated again in 1962, the fact that such movements have not yet begun suggests that they may be less extensive than in 1960-1961. Soviet communications security measures which were noticeably more stringent during last year's exercise are expected to be at least as effective this year and, in many instances, may deny us precise information on aircraft numbers, types, routes and operations.

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