DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

50th Anniversary
An Illustrated History

Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation
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President John F. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were three of the men most responsible for the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
This year, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) celebrates the 50th anniversary of its establishment. For five decades, DIA has provided timely and objective military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and policymakers. From the Cold War to the Gulf War, from the conflict in Vietnam to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, from confronting communism to battling terrorism, the talented and dedicated professionals of DIA have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to excellence in defense of the nation.

Anniversaries are a time for reflection. As we remember the way things used to be, we think about how and why things have changed. The Defense Intelligence Agency has undergone immense change and growth over the course of its first fifty years. DIA started with 25 people in borrowed space in the Pentagon; it now has approximately 16,500 individuals deployed all over the world. This volume tells the story of how the agency grew in missions, abilities, size, and credibility, while overcoming early struggles and reorganizations, responding to Cold War threats, countering terrorism, and learning to handle the challenge of asymmetric warfare. These experiences have transformed DIA into what it has become today – the nation’s preeminent defense intelligence organization.

RONALD L. BURGESS, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
U.S. troops conduct an airdrop during Operation JUNCTION CITY, Tay Ninhs Province, South Vietnam, 1967. Documents discovered during this operation led DIA analysts to increase their estimate of the number of enemy fighters in South Vietnam.
1960s
THE EARLY YEARS

The Defense Intelligence Agency was established in 1961 to more efficiently integrate the military intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense. Until that time, each of the military services managed their own intelligence collection and analysis, and their findings, as reported to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), were duplicative and in some cases contradictory. Fed up with the redundancy and unnecessary bureaucratic competition, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered Lyman Kirkpatrick, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General, to form a Joint Study Group and conduct a study that would find a solution. On December 20, 1960, Kirkpatrick’s report, which recommended combining the Service’s intelligence apparatus into a single, unified military intelligence organization, landed on Eisenhower’s desk.

One month later, President John F. Kennedy took office and armed his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, with orders to reform the Department of Defense. McNamara, the former president of Ford Motor Company, had made his reputation finding efficient, cost-effective routes to success, and he agreed with Kirkpatrick’s proposals to streamline military intelligence. In February 1961, he ordered the JCS to devise a plan for a consolidated military intelligence organization.

After months of negotiation with the JCS, McNamara and his Deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, announced on August 1 the creation of DIA, which would begin operations October 1. They selected the Inspector General of the Air Force, Joseph F. Carroll, to lead the newly created agency. Lt Gen Carroll started DIA with 25 people assigned to borrowed office space in the cramped Pentagon. Two years later, the analysis and production components of the agency, which by that time numbered over 1,500 people, moved to Arlington Hall Station in northern Virginia.

Throughout Lt Gen Carroll’s eight year tenure (the longest of any DIA Director), the agency continued to grow, all the while taking on increasing responsibilities. DIA’s Defense Intelligence School was chartered in 1962. It combined the curriculum of the Army’s Strategic Intelligence School and the Navy’s Naval Intelligence School, and began operations on January 1, 1963. The agency’s Production Center became operational the same year. DIA also established a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate in 1964. The same year, McNamara designated a senior Defense Attaché in each U.S. Embassy to supervise all attachés assigned to that country. In 1965, he gave operational, management, and budget responsibilities for the attachés to DIA, which set up the Defense Attaché System. In 1967, the agency assumed the chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee. By 1968, 6,690 people worked for the agency, which was producing intelligence on more than 100 different nations.

DIA housed its expanding staff in a variety of rundown buildings scattered across the National Capital Region. Personnel worked at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill in Virginia, in the Cafritz Building on Fern Street in Arlington, Virginia, at the Washington Navy Yard, and in Anacostia. In 1964, Lt Gen Carroll began requesting authorization and funding from Congress to build DIA a new building that would consolidate the agency in a single location, thus facilitating interagency communication and generating efficiencies. It would be another twenty years, however, before DIA finally moved into the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base.

During the Vietnam War, DIA personnel worked with overhead reconnaissance film, light tables and other tools, including a General Electric General Purpose 635 computer, to put together lists of potential bombing targets in North Vietnam and conduct...
bomb damage assessments. The agency also began analyzing communist radio broadcasts, debriefings, interrogations and overhead imagery to determine where American POWs were being held. Meanwhile, other analysts used newer IBM 7090 computers to create Order of Battle reports on the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. Additional hot spots demanding analytical attention included the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Six Day War and the attack on the USS Liberty in 1967, North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia that same year, and the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, also in 1968.

The agency’s efforts to provide policymakers and Pentagon leaders with timely analysis were made under increasingly difficult and unsafe physical conditions; the dozens of heavy safes used to store classified documents began to buckle the floors in DIA’s Arlington Hall buildings, and in 1966, a three-alarm fire damaged “B” Building, the production and data processing center. A flood in 1969 damaged several computers and soaked many classified documents, temporarily hindering analysis and production.

Meanwhile, DIA became involved in analytical disputes with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the CIA on the number of enemy troops in South Vietnam. The agency also clashed with Secretary of Defense McNamara, who believed that DIA’s bomb damage assessments during Operation ROLLING THUNDER 1965-1968 (a three year aerial bombardment of North Vietnam designed to impede the flow of men and material into South Vietnam and convince the North Vietnamese to capitulate) were biased in favor of the MACV’s position that the attacks were having the desired effects. DIA’s reputation also suffered following the agency’s failure to predict the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1969, President Richard M. Nixon appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel to study the organization and management of the Department of Defense and recommend changes. In its report, the panel stated that DIA had too many responsibilities and too many masters; it proposed structural changes to remedy the situation. That same year, Lt Gen Carroll retired. At the dawn of the new decade, DIA’s second director, Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, USA, began to reorganize the agency. LTG Bennett and his successors would fight to strengthen the agency throughout the next difficult decade.

In 1960, Lyman Kirkpatrick’s Joint Study Group recommended the creation of a single agency for the production of defense intelligence products.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense McNamara meet with President Kennedy in the Oval Office. When DIA was founded, its primary mission was to provide finished intelligence to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
Gilpatric’s office announced the establishment of DIA on August 2, 1961.

DIA’s Production Center leadership meets in 1963 under the leadership of Brigadier General Herron Maples, USA. Maples’ son would become DIA Director in 2005.

DIA’S FIRST DIRECTOR: LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL, USAF

Joseph F. Carroll was born in Chicago in 1910 and worked his way up through the city’s stock yards to earn a law degree from Loyola University in 1940. The same year, he joined the FBI and rose to prominence during World War II solving bank robberies and kidnappings, eventually becoming the Special Assistant to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. In 1948, Hoover sent him to the new U.S. Air Force, and Carroll went on active duty at the rank of Brigadier General. He eventually rose to the post of Deputy Director General for Security, where he formulated security and counterintelligence policy for the Air Force. Brig Gen Carroll eventually received a promotion to Lieutenant General and became the USAF Inspector General, which he would later characterize as “the best job I ever had throughout my military career.”

Lt Gen Carroll came to McNamara’s attention because of his reputation as an honest broker earned during several successful leak investigations. When McNamara made it clear that he wanted Lt Gen Carroll to lead the new DIA, Carroll was reluctant because he had no experience managing an entire agency and no foreign intelligence experience. McNamara brushed aside these concerns and appointed him Director Designate, DIA in August 1961. He led DIA during its activation and subsequent foreign crises, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo. Lt Gen Carroll retired in 1969 and remains to this day DIA’s longest serving Director.

“My father…a fluent patriot, a man of power.”

– James Carroll, An American Requiem
The Cafritz Building on Fern Street in Arlington, Virginia initially housed DIA's imagery processing and production functions. Space for the new facilities was at a premium; DIA shared the Cafritz Building with a brewery.

The U.S. Army Signal Communications Agency vacated space in “B” Building at Arlington Hall Station in 1963 to make space for DIA’s Production Center and Automated Data Processing Center.

DIA’s “Activation Plan” was drafted by the agency’s Director Designate, Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll, USAF.
DIA’s IIR Photo Processing Section and the Aerial Photo Information Reference Facility were located inside the Cafritz Building.

Geographic Area Specialists in the Aerial Photo Information Section worked in the Cafritz Building.

The Defense Intelligence School was chartered in 1962 and initially located in substandard facilities in the Anacostia section of Washington, D.C.
The U-2 aircraft played a pivotal intelligence role beginning in the 1950s. While many missions were flown by CIA pilots, others were undertaken by U.S. Air Force pilots under Strategic Air Command (SAC). DIA validated and approved many U-2 missions up through the 1990s. The U-2 provided DIA’s analysts with overhead photographs depicting military bases, troop movements, border crossings, missile development and testing facilities, and other clandestine military activities.

DIA’s facilities were widely scattered. This photographic laboratory was located in Vint Hill, Virginia, forty miles from the Pentagon.
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962

Combining information derived from overhead reconnaissance photographs with statements from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, DIA analysts in September 1962 suspected that the Soviet Union had put nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. DIA Director Lt Gen Carroll set up a special Cuban Situation Room so the agency could monitor events in Cuba around the clock, and began lobbying for U-2 flights over the western half of the island, where his analysts believed the missiles were located. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara agreed, and when DIA and CIA photo-interpreters at the National Photographic Interpretation Center examined film from an October 14 U-2 mission, they saw ballistic missile carriers, support trucks, and equipment, and later, the missiles themselves, confirming their suspicions. Lt Gen Carroll was informed, and he and his assistant John Hughes briefed Secretary of Defense McNamara early on October 16th. Over the next several days, analysts throughout the Intelligence Community located more missiles at other locations on the island, and DIA supplied nearly constant intelligence support to McNamara and the Joint Chiefs. President Kennedy was faced with a difficult situation; the United States could not tolerate the presence of Soviet missiles so close to its borders – somehow the Soviets had to be persuaded to remove the missiles. President Kennedy managed to avoid a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union by placing a blockade around the island. Soviet vessels approached the blockade, but ultimately decided not to challenge the U.S. Two weeks after the U.S. discovered the missiles, President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev reached an agreement that included the removal of the missiles from Cuba.

Using overhead reconnaissance photography, DIA’s John Hughes, Special Assistant to DIA Director Lt Gen Carroll, conducts a televised briefing on the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, February 6, 1963. McNamara asked Hughes to give the briefing in order to quell rumors that the Soviets still had nuclear missiles in Cuba. Hughes later received a personal note of thanks from President Kennedy.
This photo was the first one identified by photo-interpreters at the National Photographic Interpretation Center as revealing the presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. It was taken on October 14, 1962 by a U-2 flight ordered by President Kennedy because DIA analysts believed that Soviet nuclear missiles might be in Cuba. Missile trailers are visible on the bottom-right.

Low-level photos such as this one flown by a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft allowed DIA analysts to track the progress of construction at the missile sites.

President Kennedy meets with the U-2 pilots who flew over Cuba during the crisis in 1962. SAC Commander General Curtis LeMay is on Kennedy’s right.
A U.S. airman obtains photo information from the pilot of an F-100 after his return from an airstrike in Vietnam in 1965. DIA’s analysts sometimes had to rely on after-action reports from combat pilots for raw intelligence. The method was notoriously unreliable.

A U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress delivers a payload of bombs over Vietnam in 1966. DIA supported these strategic bombing missions, code named ARC LIGHT, by providing target lists to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who selected the targets for each individual mission from this list and ordered Strategic Air Command to conduct the attacks.

Lieutenant General William Momyer, 7th Air Force Commander (left), and Admiral Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (far right), discuss a photo of Haiphong Harbor with the RF-4C Phantom Reconnaissance crew that flew the mission in 1967. Haiphong Harbor was targeted and bombed for the first time that year. Photographs such as this one of Haiphong eventually reached DIA, where analysts would examine them for shipping activity, prepare strategic bombing target packages, and use them to conduct bomb damage assessments.
American soldiers check a house for enemy soldiers and weapons outside of Qui Nhon in 1966. Intelligence analysis conducted by DIA and MACV personnel indicated that North Vietnamese Army regulars were massing in the area.

The USS Pueblo, photographed in 1967. On January 20, 1968, the Pueblo, a technical research ship with orders to conduct surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Strait and gather signal and electronic intelligence from North Korea, was surrounded by North Korean sub chasers and torpedo boats, boarded, and captured while in international waters. Two crew members were killed while trying to delay the boarding process so that classified documents and sensitive equipment could be destroyed. North Korea released the Pueblo’s crew after 11 months of captivity that included harsh interrogation and mistreatment, but never released the Pueblo, which remains in North Korea. Prior to the Pueblo’s ill-fated mission, DIA validated the ship’s collection requirements and conducted a risk assessment which concluded that the danger from North Korean forces was minimal. The assessment was a black eye for an agency already struggling to meet the demands of the Vietnam War.

A variety of reconnaissance cameras are displayed on the tarmac of a U.S. Air Force base. During the Vietnam War, DIA’s analysts used overhead photography taken with equipment like this to draw up target lists and determine damage estimates.

U.S. aircraft bomb Phuc Yen airfield in North Vietnam in 1967. DIA analysts sometimes used photographs such as this one to conduct bomb damage assessments during the air war in Vietnam.
DIA’s facilities remained scattered in the 1970s. Pomponio Plaza in northern Virginia housed elements of the Directorate for Plans, the Directorate for Collection, and the Directorate for Estimates.
YEARS OF TRANSITION

During the 1970s, DIA struggled to survive in an inhospitable environment of Congressional criticism, investigations, and a mandated downsizing of 30 percent. Meanwhile, the agency’s leaders quietly took steps to strengthen DIA and make it more efficient through a series of reorganizations. Lt Gen Carroll’s successor, DIA Director Lieutenant General Donald Bennett, USA, reduced the number of elements reporting to him and his staff from 19 to 8 by combining related offices within DIA. He also revised the attaché system and established the Directorate for Estimates. Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, USA, who served as DIA Director from 1974 to 1975, established the J-2 Support Office to better serve the intelligence needs of the JCS. LTG Graham also created the position of Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) and hired several intelligence experts to serve in these positions. The DIOs were the Director’s substantive experts on various foreign intelligence issues, and gave DIA an influential voice in the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates, a process previously dominated by the CIA. LTG Graham also implemented the “delegated production” concept to offset heavy production requirements, tasking the military services and Unified and Specified Commands with the creation of specific intelligence products. Under Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, USA, DIA’s charter was revised to recognize DIA as the primary intelligence authority in military inputs to national-level products, a step that gave the agency more control over finished military intelligence.

In the first half of the decade, the war in Southeast Asia, including the invasions of Laos and Cambodia, remained a significant challenge for analysts. In 1970, U.S. Special Forces attempted to rescue American POWs held at a camp in Son Tay, North Vietnam. DIA coordinated intelligence production during the planning stages of the operation and provided finished intelligence analysis to the JCS. Hours before the start of the operation, LTG Bennett warned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that new intelligence indicated that the North Vietnamese might have moved the prisoners. The Chairman decided to proceed with the raid anyway. The operators located no prisoners, but the operation was a masterpiece of planning and execution. Although many observers deemed the mission an intelligence failure, the intelligence process in support of the operation actually functioned remarkably well. The operation, despite its failure to rescue any prisoners, is now considered an excellent example of intelligence planning in support of special operations.

In December 1971, DIA began chairing the Defense Department’s Intelligence Task Force, which was responsible for coordinating worldwide POW/MIA intelligence efforts. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 hampered U.S. intelligence collection on POWs and MIAs. Throughout the 1970s, the main source of information was refugee reports, which grew increasingly unreliable as time went on. The agency continued to devote resources to the issue, however, and over the next two decades, the POW/MIA mission remained in the spotlight.

Following the establishment of the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Saigon in 1973, nearly 100 DIA military and civilian personnel, including intelligence analysts, administrative assistants, and clerks, deployed to staff the office’s Intelligence Branch. This was the first large-scale deployment of DIA personnel to a combat zone, but it ultimately resulted in the death of five agency employees. On April 4, 1975, as South Vietnam collapsed at the end of the war, five women who worked for the agency were killed in a plane crash during Operation BABYLIFT, an effort to evacuate hundreds of Vietnamese orphans from Saigon.

The following month, the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia seized the U.S. container vessel SS Mayaguez, prompting President Gerald R. Ford to order a joint rescue operation. DIA coordinated
intelligence collection and analysis in Washington, D.C. with intelligence operations conducted by the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and gave specific targeting objectives to the Air Force and Navy reconnaissance units involved in the operation. For the rescue mission, the agency accurately calculated the number of Khmer forces on the island of Kaoh Tang, where it was believed the crew of the Mayaguez had been taken, but mission planners never received this information due to excessive compartmentalization of intelligence. The Khmer Rouge returned the ship’s crew in the middle of the rescue effort, but the operation cost U.S. forces 41 casualties in part because assault planners were unaware of the true number of Khmer forces on Kaoh Tang Island.

Throughout the decade, DIA also supported the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by providing information on Soviet military capabilities to arms control negotiators. In 1972, President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, limiting the number of strategic missiles and allowing each country to use national technical means (satellite reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and what would become known as Measurement and Signature Intelligence, or MASINT) to verify treaty compliance. DIA’s third director, Vice Admiral Vincent de Poix, USN, believed strongly in technological solutions as a means to support intelligence collection and analysis for these tasks, but had to fight for the necessary funds during a period of tightening defense budgets.

In 1975, a DIA Defense Intelligence Officer published an important paper entitled Détente and Soviet Strategy. Its conclusions stirred a controversy in the Intelligence Community because it stated that the Soviets intended to use Détente as a way to gain military dominance over the U.S., a conclusion at odds with CIA and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The paper represented an important milestone for DIA in that it showcased the agency’s developing analytical maturity and signaled a new willingness to challenge Intelligence Community consensus on key intelligence issues. Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, DIA’s main analytical efforts continued to focus on Soviet military capabilities and intentions, and the agency monitored the Soviet Union’s growing relationships with an increasing number of third world nations such as Angola, Ghana, Mali and Yemen. An additional analytical challenge developed from the death of China’s long term leader Mao Zedong in 1976 and the two-year power struggle that followed.

The decade ended with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the seizure of 53 U.S. embassy personnel as hostages. Events in
Iran surprised the entire Intelligence Community, including DIA, and prompted considerable public criticism. Defending the agency, DIA’s leaders argued that personnel and budget cuts earlier in the decade had limited the agency’s ability to collect and produce timely and effective intelligence on certain regions of the world. As the nation grappled with the situation in Iran, a new intelligence problem developed when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979. Over the course of the next decade, the agency monitored the subsequent war in Afghanistan, a conflict that would ultimately have a significant impact on the Cold War.

U.S. Special Forces were assigned to the Son Tay mission in 1970. They used intelligence developed by DIA to plan the raid.

In 1970, the U.S. military attempted to rescue American POWs held at a camp in Son Tay, North Vietnam. DIA coordinated intelligence production during the planning stages of the operation and provided finished intelligence analysis to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This model of Son Tay Prison Camp was constructed from overhead reconnaissance photos.
President Nixon meets with his staff to discuss the outcome of the Son Tay raid in November 1970. From left to right: Lieutenant General John Vogt, USAF, Director of the Joint Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons, USA, Deputy Commander of the raid’s Joint Task Force, Brigadier General Leroy Manor, USAF, the raid’s Joint Task Force Commander, President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger.
USAF B-52 Stratofortresses take off from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, for bombing missions over Vietnam during Operation LINEBACKER II. As in the earlier ARC LIGHT missions, DIA provided the JCS with a large list of target options. The JCS then chose specific targets and notified Strategic Air Command.

Bombs are lined up in preparation for Operation LINEBACKER II in 1972.
"I have always believed that an attaché, to be professionally credible, must also be able to talk intelligently about his profession, that is, the profession of arms."

- Vernon Walters

VERNON WALTERS, AN ATTACHÉ AT THE CENTER OF HISTORY

Vernon Walters was born January 3, 1917. Between the ages of six and sixteen, he lived in Britain and France, and was educated at Stonyhurst College in Lancashire, England. Walters joined the Army in 1941, serving with distinction in Africa and Italy.

Walters had a natural gift for foreign languages, and was fluent in Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, French, German, and later, Chinese and Russian. He served as an aide and interpreter for Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, and for Vice President Richard Nixon. In the 1960s, Walters served as the Defense Attaché to Italy, Brazil, and France. Walters’ appointment to Brazil was met with alarm by leftists in Brazil, who were convinced that he was there to overthrow President João Goulart. Those suspicions seemed to be confirmed when the Brazilian military conducted a coup d’état in 1964, but even though Walters was close to many of the officers involved, there is no evidence of his involvement.

Before becoming Defense Attaché in France in 1967, Walters arranged an assignment to Vietnam in order to improve his relationship with French officers, nearly all of whom had served there between 1945 and 1954. In Paris, he played a key role in the secret diplomacy to end the Vietnam War, smuggling National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger into France for his negotiations with North Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho.

In the subsequent years, Walters advanced to a number of high profile positions. In 1972, he became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Richard Helms, and later became Acting Director of Central Intelligence. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan made him Roving Ambassador. In 1985, Walters became Ambassador to the United Nations, and from 1989-1991, he served as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he represented the United States during the unification of East and West Germany. Walters, an extraordinary attaché and diplomat, died in 2002.
Locating American prisoners of war and missing in action became a central mission for DIA in the Vietnam War. As the war drew to a close, the repatriation effort became even more imperative. Here, an American POW is returned by his Vietnamese captors.

Former American POWs cheer as their aircraft lifts off from Hanoi on its way to the U.S. in 1973. For two decades, DIA was at the center of the Vietnam POW/MIA effort.

Former POWs salute the colors before boarding the C-141 Starlifter that will take them to the U.S. in February 1973.
The Defense Attaché Office in Saigon established its compound in the old MACV Headquarters on Tan Son Nhut Airbase after the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1973.

Colonel William LeGro, USA, commanded the DAO’s Intelligence Branch.
After the U.S. learned of the SS Mayaguez’s capture, the JCS asked DIA to coordinate the intelligence effort to locate the ship and its crew. Shortly after DIA tasked U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) with collection requirements, a PACOM reconnaissance aircraft located the Mayaguez and took this photo. Khmer Rouge boats can be seen alongside the vessel.

Marines board the SS Mayaguez during the re-taking of the vessel.
OPERATION BABYLIFT AND THE CRASH OF C-5 FLIGHT 68-218

In April 1975, as the government of South Vietnam collapsed in the face of a massive North Vietnamese offensive, President Gerald Ford ordered the evacuation of Vietnamese orphans from Saigon. The U.S. Defense Attaché in Vietnam, Major General Homer Smith, USA, was in charge of the evacuation. The first available plane was a C-5A Galaxy transport that arrived in Saigon the morning of April 4. Ground crews loaded the small children and a staff of volunteers and nurses, among them, 36 female members of the Defense Attaché Office staff. MG Smith ordered the staff members aboard the flight in order to quietly begin their evacuation and to help serve as escorts for the orphans. At least five of them were DIA employees. At just after 5 p.m., the last of the 314 passengers were aboard and the transport took off.

Twelve minutes later, the locks on the rear cargo door of the C-5 failed, and the aft pressure door, part of the loading ramp, and the cargo door blew off, severely damaging the flight controls in the tail. The pilots attempted an emergency landing at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, but the plane crashed in a marsh two miles short of the runway. The impact crushed the cargo deck, where almost all of the orphans were kept. 138 people died in the crash, including 78 children and 35 DAO personnel. Five DIA employees, Celeste Brown, Vivienne Clark, Dorothy Curtiss, Joan Pray, and Doris Watkins, were killed in the crash. It was the single largest loss of life in DIA’s history until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
"The fourth day of April 1975. I’ll never forget it. It was the longest day of my life…I recall my [Executive Officer]…coming in and saying ‘Boss, we have a disaster. The C-5 just crashed out toward the airbase.’ And you could look out and you could see the smoke coming…We set up a morgue over at the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital and brought bodies over there. We had a few survivors. They were taken to the hospital. It was a shattering, shattering experience."

– Major General Homer Smith, USA, U.S. Defense Attaché, Saigon
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger worked closely with Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, USA. Schlesinger left office in November 1975 because of disagreements with President Ford, members of Congress and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger over the defense budget and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, prompting LTG Graham to resign his position as well.

Arlington Hall Station continued to be the focal point for DIA’s analysis and production functions in the 1970s. The dilapidated conditions at Arlington Hall were a constant source of problems.

DIA’s computing technology improved over the course of the decade, with data punch cards (top) being replaced in some cases by desktop computers with floppy disk drives (bottom) by the end of the 1970s.
President Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972 in Moscow. The agreements created new intelligence requirements and put major production pressure on DIA’s already overstrained analysts.

DIA photo-interpreters assigned to the National Photographic Interpretation Center worked in Building 213 in the Washington Navy Yard, which also was home to portions of DIA’s Directorate for Research from the 1970s to the 1990s.
The Soviets parade SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles in Red Square in the mid-1970s. These missiles were the centerpiece of the Soviet nuclear threat for much of the decade.

A Soviet Tu-22M/Backfire bomber, the focus of a major intelligence debate late in the Cold War, is intercepted by a U.S. Air Force F-16. The Soviets first fielded the Backfire in 1972. U.S. intelligence agencies disagreed on its mission and the distance it was capable of flying. DIA believed that the Backfire could attack the U.S. by using in-flight refueling. But the CIA disagreed, sparking a heated debate between the two agencies. The Soviets, meanwhile, insisted that the Backfire had been designed as a theater-level weapon and not, as DIA argued, a strategic weapon. Late in the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets agreed to remove the refueling nozzle.
The COBRA DANE radar on Shemya Island (top), the RC-135 COBRA BALL aircraft (bottom), and other MASINT platforms played a key role in determining Soviet ballistic missile capabilities. In the event of an actual attack against the U.S., COBRA DANE could also provide the U.S. with strategic warning. Both are still in operation today.

(Below) Radar operators work inside the COBRA DANE facility in 1977, the year it came on-line.
On December 20, 1989 President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. troops into Panama and began Operation JUST CAUSE.
By the time DIA celebrated its 25th Anniversary in 1986, the agency had matured to the point that it was able to have a much more influential voice within the Intelligence Community and among military and political leaders. Several events during the first half of the decade contributed to this transformation. In 1981, President Ronald W. Reagan began a sustained buildup in the Department of Defense, and DIA benefitted from an infusion of resources and personnel. Its analysis also received greater visibility after the Senate endorsed the concept of competitive analysis and Reagan ordered DIA to produce a regular publication to provide the President with policy-relevant military intelligence.

In early 1981, DIA's John Hughes briefed Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on the growth of the Soviet military. Weinberger shared the briefing with Defense Ministers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and they convinced him to declassify and release the information so that the general public would better understand the need for a military buildup and modernization. Weinberger in turn ordered DIA Director Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe, USAF, to produce an authoritative, unclassified document describing Soviet military capabilities and doctrine in exacting detail. Tighe placed his Vice Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence, Dennis Nagy, in charge of the project. Key members of Nagy’s team included Soviet analyst Dr. David W. Phillips and Defense Intelligence Officer A. Denis Clift. The first edition of *Soviet Military Power* was published in September 1981. Within a year, 250,000 copies had been printed and distributed. It was republished in 1983 and every year thereafter until 1991.

The same year the first edition of *Soviet Military Power* appeared, and after almost 20 years of effort, DIA received Congressional authorization and funding for a new building. The support of Senator Barry Goldwater was critical to the release of the building funds. In 1981, ground was broken for DIA’s new home at Bolling Air Force Base. The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) was designed to accommodate 2,739 personnel in 845,900 square feet of space. A small contingent of DIA personnel moved into the new building in October 1983, and by April 1984, the agency was settled into its new home and able to enjoy the substantial benefits of centralization, including increased efficiencies and intradepartmental cooperation.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration moved aggressively to confront the spread of communist influence in Central America. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had taken control of Nicaragua in 1979, and by 1983, Marxist rebels in El Salvador threatened to topple the government there. That year, the Joint Staff instructed Tighe’s successor, DIA Director Lieutenant General James Williams, USA, to establish an intelligence center to provide tactical and operational support to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. embassies in Central America, and U.S. allies in the region. The result was the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT), the nation’s first national-level intelligence fusion center. It was made up primarily of DIA personnel, but also included many analysts from across the Intelligence Community. CAJIT provided allied commanders with finished intelligence on enemy planning, force structure, order of battle, target locations, and capabilities, all of which helped to stabilize the situation in El Salvador until a political settlement ended the war in 1992.

In April 1983, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. Later that year, Islamic terrorists killed 241 American servicemen when they bombed the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. In September 1984, terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Beirut, killing two employees from the Defense Attaché Office and many others. Following these attacks, DIA set up a counterterrorism office designed to provide intelligence on terrorism to the U.S. military. In June 1985, Hezbollah
members hijacked TWA Flight 847, and in October, members of the Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro; in both cases, DIA’s counterterrorism office supported the military’s response with important tactical intelligence.

In 1986, Libyan-backed terrorists bombed a Berlin discotheque frequented by American military personnel, killing three people, including two U.S. soldiers, and wounding 230. In retaliation, the U.S. military launched Operation EL DORADO CANYON, a series of airstrikes against Libya. DIA helped plan the airstrikes by providing target lists and locating and identifying Libyan air defenses. DIA’s support to counterterrorism operations like these proved crucial, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger later presented DIA’s Director, Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, USAF, with the agency’s first Joint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support rendered during the military’s counterterrorism operations in 1985 and 1986.

Throughout the decade, the Soviet Union continued to be a major focus of DIA’s analytical efforts. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, and DIA was involved both in determining the number and lethality of the Soviet missiles and in monitoring treaty compliance. During the late 1980s, in the midst of the negotiations leading up to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, DIA provided negotiators with detailed descriptions of the size and capabilities of Soviet long-range strategic weapon systems.
Hostilities in the Persian Gulf also drew the agency’s attention. In 1987, seven years into a bloody conflict between Iran and Iraq, Kuwait asked the U.S. to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from Iranian attacks. In response, the U.S. initiated Operation EARNEST WILL (July 1987–September 1988). DIA provided targeting data on Iranian surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile batteries, oil platforms, and naval installations.

As the decade wound down in November 1989, DIA’s analysts were surprised when East German officials suddenly allowed East Germans to pass through the Berlin Wall into West Berlin. The event epitomized the huge changes taking place in communist Eastern Europe, and heralded massive changes within DIA itself. It was the beginning of a new era and a new set of mission priorities for DIA.

An RH-53D helicopter lifts off during Operation EAGLE CLAW on April 24, 1980.
Defense Attaché Colonel Thomas Schaefer, USAF, (right) and Assistant Air Attaché Lieutenant Colonel David Roeder, USAF, arrive at Andrews Air Force Base on January 27, 1981, after being held hostage for 444 days by Iran. Schaefer was the most senior serviceman taken hostage.

On October 23, 1983, Islamic terrorists bombed the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. servicemen. Below, a Marine is rescued from the rubble. Prior to the attack, DIA sent the Marine battalion stationed in Beirut large amounts of intelligence on terrorist threats in the region, but it was poorly refined and too much for the Marines to effectively process.
A DIA intelligence specialist from the Defense Attaché Office in Beirut, Lebanon revisits the U.S. Embassy after it was bombed by terrorists on April 18, 1983. The bombing killed 63 people, including 17 Americans, and wounded many others, including this intelligence specialist.

DIA broke ground on the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) in April 1981. By 1982, it was well on its way to completion.

The DIAC became operational in 1984.
JOHN HUGHES: AN INTELLIGENCE STALWART

John Hughes spent a thirty-three year career in DIA as a well-known analyst, collection manager, and senior executive. He joined DIA in 1962, months after the agency’s founding, and almost immediately found himself thrust into the most dramatic events of the Cold War. In October 1962, working as Special Assistant to DIA Director Joseph Carroll, Hughes broke the news to his boss that the U.S. had discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The next day, the two men briefed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on the discovery. Every morning, Hughes drove to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, D.C., where he received photography that he used to brief the DIA Director, the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. In February 1963, President Kennedy requested that a televised briefing on the crisis be made to the nation, and Secretary of Defense McNamara turned to Hughes, an enormously talented briefer, for the presentation.

Over the succeeding decades, his meticulous documentations of briefings on foreign military forces and capabilities were recognized and valued by U.S. and foreign leaders alike. In the 1970s, Hughes was also DIA’s Deputy Director for Collection, a position that put him in the front line of the agency’s efforts to understand Soviet and Chinese military capabilities. Hughes also improved DIA’s management of the military intelligence collection apparatus worldwide, changes which made innovative intelligence analysis possible and garnered the attention of policymakers at the highest level. When Hughes retired in 1984, President Reagan presented him with the National Security Medal in a Cabinet Room ceremony in the White House in recognition of his contributions.

While Hughes’ critics thought him alarmist and sometimes disparaged him as “That Briefer,” his legacy is an important one. He balanced the secretive world of intelligence collection with the valuable objective of sharing information with Congress, U.S. allies, and the general public. Hughes also did not fear innovation, and encouraged new collection techniques involving MASINT and other high-tech disciplines. He was an important contributor in the agency’s earliest days, and remained so until the end of his career.

Dear Mr. Hughes,

I thought you did an excellent job on television explaining our surveillance in Cuba. I understand it was done on short notice. I want you to know how much I appreciate your efforts.

With Best Wishes,

John Kennedy
President Reagan receives the 1983 edition of *Soviet Military Power* (SMP) from Secretary of Defense Weinberger in the Oval Office. SMP was the result of an unprecedented declassification effort spearheaded by DIA.

President Reagan presented Hughes with the National Security Medal in a White House ceremony in 1984.

The 1988 issue of *Soviet Military Power* was the first to feature a photo on the cover. Its editors attempted to answer criticism of the publication by adding as many photos as possible of the Soviet military equipment it described. The increasing openness of the Soviet Union meant that more photographs were available to be used in later volumes of the series.
DIA Director Lieutenant General James Williams, USA, escorts Lieutenant General El Orabi, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces, who visited DIA at Bolling Air Force Base on August 9, 1984. In 1981, the U.S. military began participating with Egypt in Operation BRIGHT STAR, a massive military exercise in Egypt supported by intelligence from DIA.

DIA played an important role monitoring civil wars in Central America during the 1980s. This overhead reconnaissance photograph shows a Sandinista military garrison at Tempesque, Nicaragua in 1985.
A U.S. Air Force flight crew preps an F-111 before Operation EL DORADO CANYON in 1986. DIA supported the operation by providing target lists and identifying Libyan air defenses.

DIA also retained a presence in the Pentagon after the DIAC opened. The hub of its activity was in the National Military Intelligence Center.

Microprocessing and data storage improvements in the 1980s allowed DIA to move beyond the old punch card system and expand its database capabilities.
DIA analysts provided targeting recommendations during Operation EL DORADO CANYON, including targets in and around Tripoli, Benina, and Benghazi.

The most serious concern faced by DIA personnel in the 1980s was the ongoing modernization of the Soviet strategic nuclear force. The Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarine (left) and Tu-160/Blackjack bomber (right) were significant force upgrades during this decade.
The SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft played a role in collection missions tasked by DIA between 1968 and 1989. It flew missions over North Vietnam in the 1970s and provided coverage of the Soviet Union in the 1980s before falling victim to budget cuts later in the decade.

In 1986, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger awarded DIA its first Joint Meritorious Unit Citation for its support to counterterrorism operations from June 1985 to June 1986.
GORDON NEGUS: ANALYST AND MENTOR

Born in 1934 in Syracuse, New York, Gordon F. Negus joined DIA in 1967 as the Branch Chief for Soviet Command and Control in the Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Thanks to Negus’ efforts in the 1970s, DIA managed to uncover hundreds of previously unknown communications sites and launch control facilities in the Soviet Union, which were then added to the U.S. target lists in case war broke out.

His work garnered the attention of DIA Director Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, who made Negus the agency’s first Defense Intelligence Officer for Strategic Weapons and Strategic Arms Limitation, the Defense Department’s top intelligence analyst responsible for arms control negotiations and verification. Negus also helped shape many of the agency’s analytical opinions of the decade, which allowed DIA to become a source of competitive analysis for the Central Intelligence Agency and ultimately had a salutary effect on both organizations.

It was in the 1980s, however, when Negus truly left his mark. As the Deputy Director for Research, Negus and his staff produced a landmark study that illustrated in concrete terms the criteria necessary to deny the Soviet Union their objectives in a war with the U.S. and thereby defeat them. The study fundamentally altered the development of U.S. nuclear war doctrine. Throughout the 1980s, Negus served in various DIA positions, including Assistant Deputy Director for Basic Intelligence and Vice Deputy Director for Production. In 1986, Negus became Executive Director of DIA, one of the three members of the command element responsible for daily DIA operations and for long-term planning and strategic resources management.

Negus was also a gifted mentor for many young analysts. Throughout his career, he created an environment in which analysts could think creatively and constantly pushed them into uncharted analytical territory. “What don’t we know?” he often asked. Indeed, his lasting legacy may very well be the cadre of talented analysts he nurtured and developed, many of whom went on to hold leadership positions in DIA. He retired in 1990 and died in 2007.

“[Negus] is the single person most responsible for the maturing of the Defense Intelligence Agency as a military intelligence analysis capability for the U.S.”

— Former DIA Deputy Director Mike Munson
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 surprised U.S. intelligence analysts.
OPERATION URGENT FURY

In October 1983, hard-line communists overthrew Grenada’s socialist government and began strengthening that nation’s ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. President Reagan, believing that hundreds of U.S. medical students on the island were in jeopardy, authorized a U.S.-led military invasion of Grenada to rescue the students and end communist influence on the island. DIA provided the bulk of the intelligence work in support of the operation, code-named URGENT FURY. The agency formed an intelligence task force that provided operational planners with information on the size, composition and location of Grenadian military forces and their Cuban allies as well as the geographic features of the island, including landing beaches and enemy strong points. During combat operations, they helped identify emerging targets for U.S. forces. The agency also put together foreign materiel exploitation teams to collect captured Soviet equipment and official documents. When analyzed, these materials revealed expanding Soviet influence in Grenada’s political, military, and economic affairs. Operation URGENT FURY provided DIA with many important lessons regarding the process of directly supporting military operations.
Documents captured by U.S. forces during Operation URGENT FURY were exploited by DIA intelligence analysts and revealed the extent of communist penetration in Grenada.

The Cubans provided the Grenadian government with military equipment before the U.S. invasion, including this antiquated Soviet An-2/Colt aircraft seized at Pearls Airport (left) and this Soviet ZU-23 anti-aircraft weapon (right).

Expanding Operational Support
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

Passed by Congress in late 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act designated DIA a Combat Support Agency. The legislation gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to review DIA’s support to military operations, and ultimately made DIA responsible for establishing a joint military intelligence doctrine. In response, DIA Director Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, USAF, set up the Command Support and Plans Directorate (CSP), which was responsible for coordinating support to the Combatant Commands and creating the new joint intelligence doctrine. Looking for ways to increase cooperative intelligence efforts between agency and field commands, DIA established the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) as well as National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMISTs). NMISTs were small teams that deployed to the field with secure communication equipment and provided commanders in the field with direct links to DIA’s analysts and intelligence specialists at the OICC and throughout the agency. The first test of the new organization would come in Panama in 1989.
Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona (far left) and Representative William Flynt Nichols of Alabama (left) co-sponsored the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Goldwater-Nichols designated DIA a Combat Support Agency and gave it certain responsibilities for supporting military operations.
OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In December 1989, President George H. W. Bush sent U.S. troops into Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE. The purpose of the operation was to seize and remove from power dictator General Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in the U.S. for drug trafficking. Operation JUST CAUSE provided DIA with the opportunity to test its new organizations and doctrine. Planners in SOUTHCOM relied heavily on DIA’s newly created OICC and NMISTS, which successfully provided commanders in the field with direct and timely intelligence support. DIA also participated in several joint intelligence efforts in support of the operation, including the Joint Intelligence Fusion Cell, which helped track and seize Noriega.

Before hostilities in Panama, a DIA intelligence specialist routinely obtained information on General Noriega’s whereabouts by chatting with the guards at the front gate of Fort Amador, a Panamanian base frequented by Noriega.

Expanding Operational Support
THE POW/MIA MISSION

In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration placed a high priority on resolving POW/MIA issues lingering from the Vietnam War, and DIA's Office of POW/MIA Affairs expanded five-fold during this period. The office was responsible for investigating all live sighting reports that might involve missing U.S. servicemen. Many witnesses making these reports delivered inaccurate or deliberately misleading information, while other well-intentioned people were simply mistaken, all of which created many problems for the office. DIA Director Lt Gen Perroots asked his Director of Attachés and Operations, Major General Charles Scanlon, USA, to develop a fresh concept for the proactive collection of POW/MIA information. In response, DIA established a special program to collect intelligence on POWs and MIAs. A team of trained personnel deployed to Southeast Asia to gather information and patiently interviewed thousands of refugees. In 1991, DIA sent a representative to Hanoi to comb through Vietnamese archival records in search for information. The work was in some cases highly controversial, but many cases were eventually resolved. In 1993, the POW/MIA mission was transferred to the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) in the Pentagon.
In the opening stages of Operation DESERT STORM, DIA provided U.S. Central Command with much of the operational intelligence that allowed Coalition airpower to destroy Iraqi airbases, radar, and air defense sites.
DIA underwent significant organizational and technological changes during the 1990s. These were driven principally by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact early in the decade. By 1990, DIA and the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community were well aware of the weakening Soviet threat, and throughout 1991 published dozens of intelligence reports tracking the decline of the U.S.S.R. When the final collapse came in December 1991, few in the IC were surprised. With the end of the decades-long Cold War came significant cuts in the defense budget, which impacted DIA along with the rest of DoD. DIA analysts refocused their efforts on potential terrorist threats and arms proliferation issues. They focused on countries such as Libya, which had stepped up its production of chemical weapons, and Syria, which was believed to support terrorism. North Korea’s and Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons were also of interest to agency analysts. DIA also continued to monitor a slowly resurgent China’s expanding military capabilities.


In 1992, they were reconstituted as National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) with representatives from CIA and NSA. DIA sent NISTs to Kenya, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Hungary, Rwanda, and elsewhere during the 1990s.

In the midst of these operations, DIA underwent two significant agency-wide reorganizations meant to streamline operations and increase efficiency. The first of these occurred prior to Operation DESERT STORM and was led by DIA Director Lieutenant General Harry Soyster, USA. He eliminated the Executive Director’s position, civilianized the Deputy Director’s position, and created a new position for a civilian Chief of Staff. Dennis Nagy, who had been the Executive Director, became the Deputy Director, and A. Denis Clift, who had served as the Deputy Director for External Relations since 1985, became the Chief of Staff. This reorganization also reduced the number of directorates from eight to six and renamed three of them.

DIA’s next Director, Lieutenant General James Clapper, Jr., USAF, conducted another reorganization in 1993. Lt Gen Clapper restructured DIA’s analysts along functional lines, placing analysts of weapons systems together and grouping defense economics analysts from various regions, breaking up existing regional organizations. Five DIA directorates and their subordinate elements were consolidated into three centers: the National Military Intelligence Production Center, with John Berbrich as the Director; the National Military Intelligence Collection Center, with Major General John Leide, USA, as the Director; and the National Military Intelligence Systems Center, with Martin Hurwitz as Director.
Lt Gen Clapper was a strong supporter of workforce diversity. By the mid-1990s, DIA’s workforce had changed to more accurately reflect the diversity of American society. By that point, women comprised 37.5 percent of the workforce, and minorities 19.2 percent. At the same time, the number of women and minorities in senior positions increased significantly. By the end of the decade, DIA had a female Chief of Staff (Barbara Duckworth) and many other women in leadership positions, including Caryn Wagner as the Director of Military Intelligence and Christine McKeown as the Director of Plans, Programs, and Operations.

Despite the resource drawdown, the agency continued to acquire more missions. Under DIA Director Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan, USAF, DIA was designated as the Intelligence Community’s Executive Agent for Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), an enormously complex field dealing with technically derived data other than imagery or signals intelligence. In September 1996, during the tenure of DIA Director Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, USA, the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) became fully operational, consolidating the efforts of the military services and streamlining the agency’s ability to identify and collect human intelligence. This organization proved its worth during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in the Balkans.

At the start of NATO military operations in Bosnia in late 1995, the Defense HUMINT Service set up an office to coordinate the intelligence requirements passed down to DHS collectors. Their mission was to gather information that would help protect the U.S. forces there and to support the mission of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). At the time, this was the largest deployment of Defense HUMINT elements since Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. DIA’s Directorate of Human Intelligence (DH) would continue to deploy personnel to the Balkans during the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations.

Terrorism continued to be a significant global problem, and DIA evolved in critical ways to understand it and to provide improved warning and analysis capability. In 1996, after the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, the agency
created the Office for Counterterrorism Analysis, with a Terrorism Assessments Division and a Terrorism Warning Division. Two DIA terrorism analysts were among the first to identify and focus on the newly developed group known as al-Qaida.

The agency also witnessed significant technological innovations throughout the decade. A database known as the System for the Analyst’s File Environment (SAFE) made its debut in 1990, making intelligence more readily accessible to analysts who needed it.

In 1992, thanks in part to earlier work by DIA’s Deputy Director for Joint Staff Support, Rear Admiral Ted Sheafer, USN, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) began to come on-line, replacing the Defense Integrated Secure Network (DISNET). Intelink, a secure intranet used by the Intelligence Community, became operational in 1994, and by 1995, DIA employees were gaining access to the Internet, which improved their ability to conduct all-source intelligence research.

JOAN DEMPSEY, INTELLIGENCE TRAILBLAZER

Joan Dempsey is a key figure in the history of women at the Defense Intelligence Agency and in the Intelligence Community. Her career in intelligence began as a cryptologic technician on active duty with the U.S. Navy, followed by 25 years as a Naval Reserve intelligence officer. She came to DIA in 1984 and specialized in technical intelligence collection. In 1987, she advanced to serve on the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) staff. The GDIP is an intelligence funding program covering DIA, the Army, Navy, Air Force, U.S. Special Operations Command, and in the 1990s, a portion of the U.S. Combatant Commands managed by the DIA Director.

Dempsey played an important role in managing intelligence downsizing after the conclusion of the Cold War. DIA Director Lt Gen Clapper made her Director of the new Military Intelligence Staff in 1992, which gave her oversight of the GDIP and Military Intelligence Board, and put her at the center of nearly every important programming and budgeting decision in the immediate post-Cold War transition years. In 1995, Dempsey became the first woman to lead DIA’s National Military Intelligence Production Center, today’s Directorate for Analysis. In May 1998, President William J. Clinton nominated her for the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, where she served until 2003, when President George W. Bush appointed her as the Executive Director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Dempsey also mentored many women who would go on to successful careers in DIA.
Throughout the summer of 1990, DIA tracked the developing crisis between Kuwait and Iraq, and on August 2, 1990, the crisis became acute when Iraq invaded its southern neighbor. When the U.S. committed forces to protect Saudi Arabia and eventually liberate Kuwait, DIA expanded the OICC and prepared NMISTs for deployment. At the same time, the DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support, Admiral John Michael (Mike) McConnell, USN, set up the Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force within DIA. The first NMIST arrived in the Persian Gulf on August 8, 1990 alongside the first allotment of U.S. forces to the region, and NMISTs quickly deployed with U.S. Central Command Service components and the XVIII Airborne Corps. Some 100 analysts also deployed to the Middle East to support combat operations. Finally, DIA had an 11-man all-source intelligence production team assigned to U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. All told, within DIA, more than 2,000 men and women were committed in support of the operation.

As Operation DESERT SHIELD turned to Operation DESERT STORM, the JCS assigned DIA the role of reviewing the military intelligence produced by over 30 intelligence entities both in-theater and in Washington, D.C. DIA’s responsibilities included order of battle preparation, targeting, imagery exploitation, and battle damage estimates. DIA also supported operations against Iraqi Scud missiles by using national-level assets such as satellites to provide launch warning and support Scud hunting operations, but the mobility of the Scuds’ transporter erector launchers (TEls) made them difficult targets. Later in 1991, DIA received a Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its support of military operations prior to and during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona, USAF (right), DIA’s Deputy Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, served as the personal interpreter for General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

DIA analysts conducted battle damage assessments on Iraqi targets using overhead imagery and other methods.
General Schwarzkopf presents the Defense Distinguished Service Medal to Brigadier General John E. Leide, USA, Director for Intelligence, J-2, Central Command, during a ceremony held in Saudi Arabia in April 1991. In 1989, Leide was the Defense Attaché in Beijing during the Tiananmen Square incident, and he would later go on to earn a second star and direct DIA’s National Military Intelligence Collection Center.

A U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter flies over an Iraqi mobile Scud launcher after Operation DESERT STORM. During hostilities, DIA attempted to track mobile Iraqi Scud launchers like this one, with limited success.
A sand table depicting Iraqi defenses in Kuwait was found in the Al Jahra School gymnasium at the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM in February 1991.

Coalition combat forces were well aware of Iraqi military capabilities in part because DIA analysts had detailed information about their Soviet-origin equipment, such as this Mi-24/Hind-D assault helicopter.

DIA Director Lieutenant General Harry Soyster, USA, looks on as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell places the streamer for DIA’s second Joint Meritorious Unit Award. DIA received this award in 1991 for its performance during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
AFMIC AND MSIC JOIN DIA

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), now the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), both of which were under the authority of the Army for decades, became field production elements of DIA in January 1992. NCMI’s mission includes monitoring foreign environmental health and infectious disease risks, foreign biotechnology development, and other issues that could potentially impact U.S. military operations and the health of U.S. troops around the world. MSIC personnel provide intelligence on shorter range missile technologies such as surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and anti-satellite weapons.

DIA Director Lieutenant General James Clapper, Jr., USAF, hosted several visitors from Capitol Hill during 1994 and 1995, including Maryland Congressman Steny Hoyer and Virginia Senator John Warner.
From 1992 to 1993, during Operation RESTORE HOPE, DIA supported U.S. efforts to capture Somali warlords preventing Somalis from receiving international assistance.
DIA deployed a National Intelligence Support Team to Bosnia to assist U.S. and NATO efforts to stop the genocidal war raging there. The NISTs brought sophisticated, secure communications equipment to the Combatant Commands to support rapid turnaround intelligence requirements from the field.

A NIST supported Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, which airlifted food and medical supplies into the former Yugoslavia from 1993 to 1996.
In 1997, DIA deployed a NIST to support a possible Zairian Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, code named Operation GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL.

The terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia spurred organizational changes in DIA that placed more emphasis on transnational threats and global terrorism.
A. Denis Clift (left), President of the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), today’s National Intelligence University (NIU), escorts General Dennis Reimer, USA, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, to the DIAC in late February 1996. In the 1990s, Clift spearheaded the drive to make the JMIC a fully accredited bachelor’s degree granting institution. It had been granting master’s degrees since the 1980s.

DIA has provided indications and warning on the border between North and South Korea since the 1960s, but by the early 1990s, its analysts were becoming increasingly concerned about North Korea’s secretive nuclear activities. The North’s military intentions and capabilities remain a focus of DIA’s work.

DIA formed a MASINT Division in 1985. Sanderson (at center in the photo) joined the division as Chief of the Electro-optics and Directed Energy Branch, and later held a number of influential technical and scientific intelligence positions both in DIA and the Intelligence Community during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1999, the Director of Central Intelligence ordered the creation of a Central MASINT Organization (CMO) under DIA, and Sanderson was made its Executive Director. CMO was an unprecedented organization, designed to unite the disparate MASINT sub-disciplines under a single management umbrella, and Sanderson drove much of this effort for the next nine years. In 2000, she became the Director of the CMO, and was responsible for managing the efficient use of MASINT throughout the IC. Sanderson would lead the MASINT world to improvements in ballistic missile technical collection, “operationalizing” its sub-disciplines (that is, making the traditionally strategic discipline capable of collecting operational and tactical intelligence), and expanding its exchange program with key U.S. allies.

BARBARA SANDERSON: A MASINT PIONEER

Barbara Sanderson, who joined DIA in 1985, was a central figure in the development of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) from an assortment of seemingly esoteric, decentralized, and poorly understood collection and analysis techniques to a well-developed intelligence discipline. MASINT actually consists of six sub-disciplines: geophysical intelligence, electro-optical intelligence, radar intelligence, radio frequency intelligence, nuclear radiation intelligence, and materials intelligence. As these sub-disciplines developed during the Cold War, they did so with little central direction or planning.
DIA Deputy Director Jeremy Clark and Deputy Director for Information Systems and Services Letitia Long accompany Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, USA (second left) and his aide on a visit to DIA’s U-2 Processing Center in 1996. Long would go on to become DIA’s Deputy Director and eventually the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the first female head of a U.S. intelligence agency.

DIA’s Operational Intelligence Crisis Center, opened in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, retained its core function of providing intelligence support in crisis situations in the 1990s.
DIA Director Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, USA (left), hosted the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet on the DCI’s visit to the DIAC in August 1997.

Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, USN (left), assumed command of DIA from LTG Hughes in July 1999.
DIA Director LTG Hughes (right) with Secretary of Defense William Cohen at the Pentagon in 1999.
On October 12, 2000, al-Qaida terrorists bombed the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen. In response, DIA placed even more emphasis on its counterterrorism mission, organizing the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center.
In the 21st Century, the U.S. was finally forced to confront the threat presented by global terrorism head-on. On October 12, 2000, al-Qaida suicide bombers attacked the destroyer USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39. In response, DIA set up the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), which was designed to provide improved warning of terrorist attacks against deployed U.S. forces and perform intelligence analysis on trans-regional terrorism issues. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaida terrorists flew two commercial jets into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, killing 2,752 people, and crashed another into the Pentagon, killing 184. Seven DIA employees died in their offices during the attack on the Pentagon. A fourth hijacked aircraft crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, killing all aboard. Months after this attack, DIA established the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), which is responsible for indications and warning of terrorist attacks, intelligence support to counterterrorism operations, and intelligence support to DoD policymakers.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, which began in October 2001, was the U.S. military response to the September 11th attacks. The purpose of the operation was to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, capture or kill the planners of the attack, and eliminate terrorist camps in the country. In support of the operation, DIA Director Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, USN, convened a meeting of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) to organize better intelligence support for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), accelerated the standup of JITF-CT, and increased the mobilization of Reserve units to provide more personnel in support of intelligence operations. Hundreds of DIA personnel eventually deployed to Afghanistan to provide in-theater analytical support, assist with document exploitation and prisoner interrogations, and provide direct support to military operations. As part of the broader Global War on Terrorism, DIA also supported military operations in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and other regions of the globe.

In March 2003, in response to the perceived threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. DIA personnel provided intelligence support to combat operations in the planning and opening stages of the war, then deployed by the hundreds to Baghdad and other areas of Iraq to provide intelligence support. In May 2003, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone and DIA Director Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, USN, announced the establishment of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), an interdepartmental, international organization headed by DIA that was charged with searching for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The ISG’s first Director was Major General Keith Dayton, USA, who had previously directed DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service. Eventually, the ISG transitioned to the new mission of providing intelligence support to Coalition military forces conducting counterinsurgency operations.

During this same period, DIA initiated a series of significant organizational changes aimed at improving collection and analysis; developing, refining, and regularizing the deployment process for agency employees; and improving the agency’s ability to support and collaborate with the Combatant Commands. In one of the most significant developments, the Defense Warning Office (DWO) was created in October 2002 at the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The DWO was established to focus on mid- to long-term future threats. It provides DoD leadership with intelligence that can
mitigate surprise, shape strategic outcomes, secure defense strategy objectives, and guide the development of future defense capabilities. In May 2005, DIA Director Vice Admiral Jacoby combined DIA’s Directorate for Intelligence (J-2) with its Directorate for Analysis (DI), merging many current intelligence functions and bringing analysts in DI into a closer relationship with those supporting the Joint Staff. In April 2006, DIA Director Lieutenant General Michael Maples, USA, established the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) to better integrate all aspects of operational intelligence support with the Combatant Commands. The next year, the DJIOC’s mission was expanded. DJIOC became the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) and established a relationship with the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C), further leveraging national resources against operational demands. At the same time, DIA began assuming management authority over intelligence budgets in the Combatant Commands, a bureaucratic move that had the practical effect of integrating Combatant Command intelligence personnel with DIA, thereby making DIA more responsive to the Combatant Command’s requirements. In 2008 DIA consolidated its HUMINT and counterintelligence functions with those of DoD’s Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) to establish...
the Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DCHC). In 2009, DIA established the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force to coordinate military intelligence activities in the region and ensure a more focused response to intelligence requirements. DIA supported several large humanitarian operations during the first decade of the 21st century. When a devastating tsunami hit Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and other nations bordering the Indian Ocean in December 2004, several directorates allocated personnel to work around the clock in support of the response efforts of the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Transportation Command. AFMIC assessed the environmental health risks in areas impacted by the tsunami and conducted a survey of medical facilities. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans less than a year later, DIA analysts deployed to the area to assess the damage to infrastructures and the danger posed by hazardous material spills. When a devastating earthquake hit Haiti in January 2010, the response from the National Center for Medical Intelligence was immediate, providing SOUTHCOM, the U.S. government, and non-governmental organizations with valuable information on how to stave off potential epidemics. Meanwhile, the DIOCC supported SOUTHCOM’s mission to stabilize Haiti as quickly as possible.

Vice President Richard B. Cheney visited the DIAC on March 14, 2001. Vice President Cheney received briefings on the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), the Automated Data Processing Center, and the deployment of National Intelligence Support Teams. Vice President Cheney then spoke to the DIAC workforce in the Tighe Auditorium and thanked them for their “often unheralded work.”

The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole sits atop the Norwegian commercial lift ship MV Blue Marlin as it begins its journey to the U.S. for repairs.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: “IT WAS LIKE WALKING INTO HELL”

On September 11, 2001, a mild, sunny morning in New York City and Washington, D.C., al-Qaeda terrorists launched an unprecedented attack against the United States. That morning, they hijacked four passenger airliners. Two slammed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third struck the Pentagon in northern Virginia, and the fourth crashed in a field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks killed more than 3,000 people, and the strike at the Pentagon was a defining event for DIA.

American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, hit the west wall of the Pentagon on the first floor at 9:37 a.m. It proceeded diagonally through the building, setting off a chain of explosions as it ripped through the interior walls. All 64 people aboard the plane died; 125 people inside the Pentagon were killed, and over 100 were hospitalized. Flight 77 crashed through office spaces occupied by 70 DIA employees, killing seven of them, all of whom worked for DIA’s Program and Budget Office: Rosa Maria Chapa, Sandra Foster, Robert Hymel, Shelley Marshall, Patricia Mickley, Charles Sabin, and Karl Teepe died in the attack.

In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, DIA employees helped relocate young children, some of whom were still in their cribs after a rushed evacuation of the building, to a safer location. Others searched the burning office spaces for their friends and colleagues. “It was like walking into hell,” recalled one witness. With smoke pouring into his office, DIA Director Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, USN helped orchestrate the agency’s response from the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC). VADM Wilson had to balance the difficult tasks of providing intelligence to national leadership and accounting for all DIA employees. Across the Potomac River at the DIAC, DIA employees could see smoke billowing from the Pentagon. Non-essential personnel were ordered to conduct a phased evacuation, while many other personnel stayed behind to funnel intelligence to VADM Wilson and his staff. VADM Wilson was undaunted. The day after the attack he told DIA personnel, “We will pull together…to get the job done.” In the days and months that followed, he reconstituted DIA operations, personally supported the families of the dead and injured, and grieved with his employees at the tragedy that had befallen the agency.
Everything was falling, flying, and on fire, and there was no escaping it... My eyes had a front seat to the horror... Everyone in our office area was struggling for life.

"Everything was falling, flying, and on fire, and there was no escaping it... My eyes had a front seat to the horror... Everyone in our office area was struggling for life."

- DIA employee Christine Morrison
The National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon was the hub of DIA’s support to combat operations planning as the U.S. prepared for war in late 2001.

NISTs were essential intelligence tools that were deployed by DIA in the early stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
DIA HUMINT personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the last two decades, DIA has emphasized the forward deployment of both military and civilian personnel to combat zones.

The Afghan caretaker of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul unpacks the DIA and U.S. Army seals he kept in safekeeping after the closure of the embassy in 1989. The Defense Attaché Office in Kabul was vacated in the early 1980s in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism was an expansion of DIA’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Center. It was established after the September 11th attacks.
Days after the September 11th attacks, DIA senior analyst Ana Belen Montes was arrested in her office in the DIAC and charged with espionage. Montes had been spying for the Cuban government since she joined DIA in 1985. She is currently serving a 25-year prison sentence.

President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel (right) awards DIA Director VADM Wilson with the Czech Republic Order of the White Lion, the highest Czech award presented to foreign citizens, in April 2002.
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, DIA personnel helped exploit intelligence such as this map depicting the location of the Iraqi 124th Communications Battalion and associated communications nodes (top), as well as a list of exercise objectives for the battalion and an organizational chart depicting the unit’s command and control structure (bottom). These items were discovered outside of Jaman Al Jurabi, Iraq, in April 2003.

A Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team (CBIST), part of the Iraq Survey Group, takes chemical samples during a special site exploitation mission.
The Perfume Palace at Camp Slayer served as the Iraq Survey Group’s headquarters.

Major General Keith Dayton, USA, was in charge of DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service before VADM Jacoby made him the ISG’s first Director.

MG Dayton meets with CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, USA (center), and David Kay (right), the Special Adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence for the ISG, in Iraq in the summer of 2003.
Two U.S. Army soldiers, Specialist Don Clary and Sergeant First Class Clint Wisdom, were killed in the line of duty in April 2004 while providing security for an ISG mission in Baghdad.

The ISG exploited documents pertaining to potential Iraqi WMD.

A member of the ISG’s biological team examines Iraqi equipment believed to be related to the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
DIA Director Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, USN, (right) visits Camp Slayer, Iraq, in February of 2004.

The ISG’s mission gradually evolved from hunting for WMD to supporting counterinsurgency operations. The group discovered this insurgent weapons cache in 2003.

ISG personnel also searched for evidence of the fate of Captain Michael Scott Speicher, a U.S. Navy pilot shot down over Iraq during the first night of Operation DESERT STORM.
DIA underwent a period of rapid growth in the 2000s, making expansion of its facilities necessary. Here, DIA Deputy Director for Mission Services James Manzelmann (left) briefs DIA Director Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, USN, about plans for the DIAC Expansion in 2002.

THE DIAC EXPANSION

In 2000, DIA Director Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, USN, obtained funding from Congress to expand the DIAC. DIA selected the same architect who had designed the original building to design the expansion, which was completed in the summer of 2005. The first group of employees to occupy the new expansion were 66 people from the Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) occupied the top two floors of the expansion through 2009 before moving to a facility of its own that year.

Construction of the DIAC expansion began in 2003.
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte (right) presided when Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, USN, who had served as DIA Director since 2002, was replaced by Lieutenant General Michael Maples, USA, in November 2005.

DIA’s Roland Fabia (left) briefs Vice President Cheney while camping on the Snake River in 2008.
DIA personnel deployed to Qatar conduct document exploitation and other intelligence support activities.

DIA Director Lieutenant General Michael Maples, USA, (far left) testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2007. To LTG Maples’ left is Director of National Intelligence J. Michael “Mike” McConnell, who had served as DIA’s Deputy Director of Joint Staff Support, or J-2 of the Joint Staff, during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

DIA personnel continue to deploy to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

DIA Director LTG Maples (left) hosts Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair (right) at the DIAC in early 2009.
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft continue to supply critical operational intelligence for DIA personnel in Washington, D.C., and in various Combatant Commands around the world. Many U-2 missions were managed by the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center.

U.S. Army soldiers, one a human intelligence specialist, survey a possible helicopter landing zone near Port-au-Prince, Haiti in January 2010.
DIA Director Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess Jr., USA, opened the Joint Use Intelligence Analysis Facility (JUIAF) in August 2010. The JUIAF houses DIA’s Military Forces Analysis Office, the Defense Warning Office, and elements of the Counterproliferation Support Office. At the far right is the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Major General Mary Legere, USA.

LTG Ronald Burgess, Jr. speaks at a hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2011. Seated next to LTG Burgess (from left to right) are Director of National Intelligence (and former DIA Director) James Clapper and FBI Director Robert Mueller.
DIA’s September 11 Memorial and Patriots’ Memorial are permanent monuments to the memory of DIA personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty.
The Defense Intelligence Agency was conceived and established to remove Service bias from military intelligence estimates. The agency’s original mission was to coordinate and streamline the military’s intelligence efforts for the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to provide unbiased intelligence reporting to national leadership. For three decades, DIA focused on the threat presented by communist nations around the world. Over the last twenty years, however, with the fall of the Soviet Union and its allies, threats to U.S. national security have become more decentralized and increasingly complex.

This brief overview of DIA’s first five decades reveals several enduring themes in the agency’s history: the constant intelligence support provided to Department of Defense leadership; the use of ever-evolving and improving technology in intelligence collection, analysis, and production; the recruitment of dedicated, accomplished and highly motivated intelligence professionals as collectors, producers, and analysts; and the accelerating drive towards direct operational and tactical intelligence support to the warfighter.

Over the next decades, DIA will continue to evolve in as yet undefined ways to meet new, unpredictable threats to the United States. When it was established in 1961, no one could have conceived that fifty years later, Soviet communism would be a relic of the past; or that nuclear proliferation in countries such as North Korea and Iran and unconventional threats posed by transnational terrorist groups would be the focus of so much of the agency’s effort. Yet there are lessons that can be learned from how the agency confronted historical threats and organized itself to meet new threats. These lessons demonstrate that in order to meet future challenges, DIA will need to maintain its focus on recruiting and training a diverse, talented, and motivated workforce. It will need to think creatively and flexibly about potential threats to national security. It will need to invest in technology so that it will be able to collect, analyze, and rapidly disseminate intelligence to its consumer base around the world. Using the knowledge and skills gained from fifty years of effort, the Defense Intelligence Agency will remain committed to excellence in defense of the nation.
1980s: DIA Comes of Age

(Section opener photo), Courtesy of the Defense Visual Information Center

page 32 (top left), DIA Historical Research Support Branch
page 32 (top right), Courtesy of the National Archives
page 32 (bottom left), Courtesy of the Marine Corps Times and the Associated Press
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page 35 (bottom left), Courtesy of the Ronald W. Reagan Presidential Library
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1990s: New Missions, New Adversaries

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2000s: Years of Transformation

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