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
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
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DDB-2600-3858-84-(N)

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SUMMARY	viii
CHAPTER 1 - THE WESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS	1
Section A - Soviet Peacetime Political Objectives	1
Section B - The Conceptual Framework	2
Section C - Soviet Military Objectives	4
CHAPTER 2 - PEACETIME ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES	
AVAILABLE TO THE TVD	6
Section A - Organization	6
1. Political	6
2. Military	6
3. Military Districts	8
4. The Structure of the Warsaw Pact (WP)	9
5. Soviet Groups of Forces	9
Section B - Resources Available	10
1. General	10
2. <u>Frontal Forces</u>	10
3. <u>Naval Forces</u>	13
a. Submarines	13
(1) Ballistic Missile	13
(2) Cruise Missile	13
(3) Attack	14
b. Surface Combatants	14
(1) Patrol Combatants	14
(2) Amphibious Warfare Ships	14
(3) Mine Warfare Ships	14
c. Naval Air	14
d. Naval Order of Battle	15
4. Air Defense Forces	15
a. Reorganization	15
b. Air Defense Structure	15
c. Organization	16
d. Command, Control, and Communications (C ³)	16
(1) Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)	17
(2) Aircraft	17
5. Strategic Nuclear Assets	18
a. Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)	18
b. Naval Systems	18
c. Air Armies of the VGK	19
6. Other Forces	19
a. Soviet Airborne (VDV) and Military Transport Aviation (VTA)	19
b. Internal Security	19
7. Logistic Resources	20
a. General	20
b. Rear Service Logistic Assets in the Western TVD	21
c. Transportation Assets	21
d. Role of the Military District in Logistics Operations	22

CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 3 - ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND TRANSITION TO WAR	24
Section A - Theater Structure and Organization	24
Section B - Transition to War	26
Section C - Force Generation	26
1. <u>Frontal</u> Forces	27
2. Air Armies of the VGK	37
3. Fleet Preparations	37
4. National Air Defense Forces	38
5. Strategic Nuclear Assets	39
a. Strategic Rocket Forces	39
b. Naval Systems	39
Section D - Theater C ³ Preparations	39
Section E - Theater Logistic Infrastructure: Management and Preparations	40
1. Mobilization of Rear Services	40
2. Theater Logistic Bases	41
CHAPTER 4 - MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN TVD	42
Section A - The Theater Campaign: Approach and Considerations	42
Section B - Air Operation	43
Section C - <u>Frontal</u> Operations	50
1. <u>Front</u> Planning Considerations	50
a. Mission	50
b. Enemy	50
c. Terrain	50
2. Pact Concept of <u>Front</u> Operations	51
a. Phases of TVD Operations	51
b. Operational Echelonment and <u>Fronts</u> Involved	51
(1) General	51
(2) First Operational Echelon	52
(3) Second Operational Echelon and Reserves	52
(4) Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG)	52
c. Doctrinal Concepts of <u>Front</u> Operations	53
(1) Depths and Frontages	53
(2) <u>Front</u> Immediate and Subsequent Objectives	53
(3) Army Immediate and Subsequent Objectives	53
(4) Concepts of Penetrating Forward Defenses	54
(5) Concepts of Exploitation	55

CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
d. Force Allocation and Echelonment	
Methodology	56
(1) General	56
(2) Northern <u>Front</u>	57
(3) Central <u>Front</u>	57
(4) Southwestern <u>Front</u>	57
(5) Carpathian <u>Front</u>	57
3. First-Echelon <u>Front</u> Operations	58
a. Northern <u>Front</u>	58
(1) Mission	58
(2) Enemy	58
(3) Terrain	58
(4) Troops Available	59
(5) Concept of the Operation	59
(a) Immediate Objectives--Northern Axis	59
(b) Immediate Objectives--Southern Axis	59
(c) Subsequent Objectives--Northern Axis	60
(d) Subsequent Objectives--Southern Axis	60
(e) <u>Front</u> Reserve	60
(f) <u>Fire</u> Support	60
b. Central <u>Front</u>	62
(1) Mission	62
(2) Enemy	62
(3) Terrain	62
(4) Troops Available	63
(5) Concept of the Operation	63
(a) Immediate Objectives--Northern Axis	63
(b) Commitment of the <u>Front</u> OMG	63
(c) Immediate Objectives--EGA Axis	63
(d) Immediate Objectives--Central Axis ...	64
(e) Immediate Objectives--Southern Axis	64
(f) Subsequent Objectives--Northern Axis	65
(g) Subsequent Objectives--Central Axis	65
(h) Subsequent Objectives--Southern Axis	66
(i) Subsequent Operations--EGA Axis	66
(j) <u>Fire</u> Support	66

CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
c. <u>Southwestern Front</u>	67
(1) <u>Mission</u>	67
(2) <u>Enemy</u>	68
(3) <u>Terrain</u>	68
(4) <u>Troops Available</u>	68
(5) <u>Concept of the Operation</u>	68
(a) <u>Immediate Objectives--Northern</u> <u>Axis</u>	68
(b) <u>Immediate Objectives--Southern</u> <u>Axis</u>	68
(c) <u>Subsequent Objectives--Northern</u> <u>Axis</u>	69
(d) <u>Subsequent Operations--Southern</u> <u>Axis</u>	69
(e) <u>Fire Support</u>	69
4. <u>Second-Echelon Front Operation</u>	70
a. <u>Carpathian Front</u>	70
(1) <u>Mission</u>	70
(2) <u>Enemy</u>	70
(3) <u>Terrain</u>	71
(4) <u>Troops Available</u>	71
(5) <u>Concept of Operations</u>	71
(a) <u>Immediate Objectives--Main Axis</u>	71
(b) <u>Subsequent Objectives--Main Axis</u>	71
(c) <u>Supporting Axis</u>	71
(d) <u>Fire Support</u>	72
b. <u>Belorussian Front</u>	72
(1) <u>Mission</u>	72
(2) <u>Enemy</u>	72
(3) <u>Terrain</u>	72
(4) <u>Troops Available</u>	73
(5) <u>Concept of Operations</u>	73
c. <u>Baltic Front</u>	74
(1) <u>Mission</u>	74
(2) <u>Enemy</u>	74
(3) <u>Terrain</u>	74
(4) <u>Troops Available</u>	74
(5) <u>Concept of Operation</u>	74
5. <u>Aviation Operations in Support of Western</u> <u>TVD Fronts</u>	74
a. <u>General</u>	74
b. <u>Impact of Theater Requirements on Front</u> <u>Aviation Resources</u>	75
c. <u>Front Aviation Resources in Support of</u> <u>Front Operations</u>	76

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CONTENTS (Continued)

ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Chart - Soviet Wartime Command Structure
2. Map - Soviet Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs)
3. Map - Possible Warsaw Pact Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) in Europe
4. Map - Union Republics of the Soviet Union
5. Map - Military Districts of the Soviet Union
6. Graph - Inventory of Selected Weapon Systems in Western TVD
7. Graph - Western TVD/Warsaw Pact Growth Rates Since 1970 for Selected Weapon Systems
8. Graph - Inventory of Selected Weapons in Western TVD as a Share of Warsaw Pact Total
9. Graph - Weighted Equipment Values for Selected Weapons in Western TVD as a Share of Warsaw Pact Total
10. Chart - Rear Service Resources Supporting Theater Operations
11. Map - AFCENT Corps Area Responsibilities
12. Map - Terrain Corridors
13. Chart - Echelonment of Forces
14. Chart - Soviet Front/Army Doctrinal Norms
15. Map - Examples of Envelopments in the Western TVD
16. Map - Concept of the Operation--Northern Front
17. Map - Priority [redacted]
18. Map - Concept of the Operation--Central Front
19. Map - [redacted]
20. Map - [redacted]
21. Map - GOLF II SSB/SS-N-5 Coverage
22. Map - YANKEE SSB/SS-N-6 Coverage
23. Graph - Force Generation Profile: Western TVD (Upon Completion of Alert, Dispersal, and Mobilization)
24. Graph - Force Generation Profile: Western TVD (Upon Completion of Required Training)
25. Map - Major Aviation Targets in Poland
26. Map - Major Aviation Targets in the German Democratic Republic
27. Map - Major Aviation Targets in Czechoslovakia
28. Map - Soviet Western Theater Primary Transportation Facilities
29. Chart - Front Headquarters Structure
30. Chart - Elements of an Operational Plan

(b)(3):42
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(b)(3):42
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TABLES

1. Western TVD Maneuver Forces Structure
2. Combined Baltic Fleet Order of Battle
3. MRBM/IRBM Launchers
4. Estimated Ammunition/Munitions and POL Stocks (Metric Tons)
5. Cumulative Force Generation Time Lines
6. Prepared River-Crossing Sites
7. Bridge Storage Facilities
8. Mobility of Soviet Tactical Air Regiments and Initial Munitions Requirement
9. POL Expenditures--Western TVD Operations
10. Ammunition Expenditures--Western TVD Operations

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SUMMARY

(S) The Soviets would create at least five TVD commands to control military operations in the Eurasian landmass. Each TVD would have flexible boundaries dependent upon actual and projected wartime scenarios. Three of these TVDs probably would oppose NATO, with the Western TVD having the primary role.

(S) Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces operating in the Western TVD would come from three Soviet military districts--Belorussian, Baltic, and Carpathian; the Soviet Groups of Forces in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; the national forces of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia; and the Combined Baltic Sea Fleet. Control would be vested in the High Command of Forces in the Western TVD, commanded by a Soviet general officer.

(S) Soviet long-term political goals, when translated into military objectives for the Western TVD, include the destruction of NATO military forces, the defeat of US forces and the prevention of further US reinforcement or military action in NATO's Central Region, and the eventual Soviet occupation of the entire European continent. The Soviet Union pursues these ultimate objectives in peacetime by nurturing West European perceptions of the superiority of Soviet military power.

(S) In peacetime, the Soviets have fashioned the Warsaw Pact into an organization capable of transitioning to war rapidly, from the Ministry of Defense down to the individual military districts, fleets, and air elements. In addition to the assets subordinate to the military districts, groups of forces, and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries that would comprise operational formations, other resources include strategic forces and reserves of the Supreme High Command (VGK), such as the Strategic Rocket Forces, airborne divisions, Military Transport Aviation, ballistic missile submarines, air armies, and a variety of logistic assets.

(S) The Soviet force structure is configured so that a considerable number of forces can initiate combat operations rapidly in case war begins after only a brief period of preparations. This ready element is backed up by the remaining elements that take longer to prepare but that provide a sustaining element to their combat operation. For example, of the 104 ground maneuver divisions available in the Western TVD, 57 are considered by the Soviets as "ready" divisions that can be committed to combat after a short period of mobilization and little or no postmobilization training. The rest are "not-ready" cadre and mobilization-base divisions that require extensive mobilization and postmobilization training to attain the proficiency deemed necessary for commitment to offensive operations in a mid-to-high intensity combat environment. In addition, they have sufficient resources (road, rail, air, and inland water transportation) to assemble forces rapidly. Deployment airfields are available to support forward deployments prior to the outbreak of war. With 14 days' preparation, the Soviets can mobilize their entire force structure. The "ready" force elements would be fully prepared for offensive operations. The "not-ready"

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elements require up to 40 or more days of mobilization and training to prepare for offensive operations. Thus, the latter are not fully prepared in a 14-day scenario.

(3) An offensive in the Western TVD probably would begin with three fronts in the TVD's first echelon. At least two more fronts would be in the second echelon. The three first-echelon fronts would operate with a Soviet-Polish Front in the north, a Soviet-East German Front in the center, and a Czech-Soviet Front in the south.

(6) The Poles would provide a substantial portion of the forces for the northern approach across northern Germany into Denmark and the Netherlands. The operations of the front would be supported substantially by the Combined Baltic Fleet. Broad objectives would include gaining control of northern Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark and obtaining control of the Baltic Sea and the airspace above it. The Soviet-East German Front would attack into central FRG and facilitate subsequent operations into France. The Czech-Soviet Front would attack across southern West Germany, also facilitating operations into France. Second-echelon fronts (from the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs) probably would be committed for operations behind the Soviet-East German and Czech-Soviet Fronts, for subsequent operations into France.

(5) The Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces are not without vulnerabilities. First, as has been stated earlier, Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces would prefer to engage in conventional warfare against NATO although they would be prepared to use nuclear weapons at any time. If they intend to attack NATO after a 30-day mobilization (required to reach full combat potential), this would all but insure that NATO forces would be well prepared and positioned, thereby requiring early employment of nuclear weapons (which they would like to avoid, if possible). Second, the C³ network necessary for the conduct of a European offensive is substantial; the requirement for interoperability of this complex system may be a severe vulnerability. Third, while Soviet aviation forces are more numerous than those possessed by NATO, these aircraft (and their related equipment) are not as capable as NATO's. Fourth, Combined Baltic Fleet operations will depend on the success of the air operation. Fifth, while rear service preplanning for theater support is emphasized and the prestocking of logistic assets within the TVD has been extensive, the substantial Warsaw Pact reliance on newly mobilized rear service personnel at all levels has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of logistic system operations in wartime. Additionally, the widespread interdiction of key lines of communications (particularly along major river lines) would create lengthy delays in the forward movement of troops and materiel.

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CHAPTER 1

THE WESTERN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. SOVIET PEACETIME POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

(U) Soviet military thought on the nature of war in the Western TVD, the technological means required to wage war, and the application of force are the natural consequence of decisions made at the highest levels of the party hierarchy. These decisions are in concert with both global Soviet objectives and specific Soviet aims in Western Europe.

(U) The fundamental tenets of Soviet military doctrine are determined by the political objectives pursued by the party leadership and thus become the official policy of the Soviet Union. These objectives provide a theoretical foundation and framework from which Moscow seeks to undermine US influence and US resolve to pursue its interests worldwide, while avoiding, if possible, direct military confrontation. Moscow believes that a shift in the "correlation of forces" has created conditions which favor Soviet goals and restrain US ability to react. Moscow finds that in some regions of the world conditions are such that not only is it more advantageous, but also possible, to achieve its objectives by using nonmilitary means.

(U) Moscow views Western Europe--and the countries in the Western TVD in particular--as its highest priority objective and the centerpiece of its strategic planning. The foremost Soviet objective is to weaken and dissolve NATO's political and military cohesion (to include a forced withdrawal of US forces from Europe, leading to a neutralized Western Europe) while at the same time protecting and consolidating its hold on Eastern Europe. Control over this region and its economic and technological wealth would insure, by Soviet calculations, a decisive step toward attaining global preeminence. Moscow has attempted to accomplish this by:

- Developing an overwhelming military force, including the use of international negotiations to maintain and improve its posture.
- Fostering closer economic ties, to include obtaining economic aid from the West and gaining access to technology.
- Signing accords that codify the division of Europe while adding the illusion of stability.
- Furthering detente on Soviet terms, which does not preclude subversion and indirect support for terrorism.
- Active measures campaigns on controversial issues such as INF, enhanced radiation weapons, START, unilateral disarmament, and nuclear free zones.
- Subversion aimed at NATO's flanks: Northern Europe, Greece Turkey, and Spain.

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(U) The Soviet Union is conducting an extensive, coordinated campaign to undercut recent NATO decisions on nuclear force modernization and to erode the alliance's resolve to support collective and individual defense efforts. While the broader goal is to sever security ties between the US and its allies, the utmost emphasis has been placed on operations to block NATO's intermediate nuclear forces (INF) modernization program. This effort is important because Moscow probably calculates that a collapse of the INF program would cause a severe political crisis for the Western alliance and leave Moscow dominant in Europe. The principal target of this strategy is the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which the Soviets view as the key continental NATO member. Soviet efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the FRG from NATO undoubtedly aim at using such action as a catalyst to precipitate the demise of NATO.

(U) Economic cooperation is the other major instrument of Soviet policies in the West European countries. It aims not only at gaining access to their markets and technology, but also at developing closer ties between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Soviet Bloc. The FRG has become the largest Western economic partner of the USSR, with a tenfold increase in trade since former Chancellor Willy Brandt signed the August 1970 non-aggression treaty with Moscow. The expansion of bilateral economic agreements often has had the effect of neutralizing the ability of the European Economic Community to better manage and control trade with the Soviet Union and to prevent the formulation of commonly shared policy guidelines to govern trade with Moscow. The Soviets also have been pleased with the willingness of West European countries to participate in the construction and use of the Soviet gas pipeline and their overall reluctance to follow any US efforts to implement economic sanctions against the USSR.

(U) Although Moscow continues to pursue its objectives in Western Europe by nonmilitary means, the significance and value of its growing military strength are crucial preconditions for such policy. While refraining from blatant threats of force, the Soviet Union strives to nurture West European perceptions of the superiority and proximity of Soviet military power. The Soviets calculate that such views help bolster perceptions in the West favoring accommodation and compromise rather than confrontation. Thus, military force--specifically the threat of its use rather than its actual employment--has become a vital tool of Soviet leverage in Western Europe.

B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

(U) The political objectives sought by the leaders of the Soviet Union have generated certain military requirements. These requirements regulate both the development of the USSR's military capability and the manner in which the Soviet Armed Forces are employed. Consequently, Soviet military doctrine seeks to address these matters in a systematic and scientific manner by defining proper guidelines for the generation and application of military power.

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(C) These guidelines provide a conceptual framework for describing the nature of military operations. This framework is based on a set of "scientific principles" which help describe the nature of modern war and the requirements for successful prosecution of a military campaign. The Soviets believe correct application of these principles to be a fundamental prerequisite to determining strategic objectives, operational planning, and tactical execution. Further, the Soviets stress the need for a flexible response (not to be confused with US nuclear doctrine). Soviet theorists often note that this is particularly important in nuclear warfare, given its dynamic nature, during which dramatic, abrupt changes in the military situation must be expected.

(C) The Soviets have developed an organizational scheme, including command and control channels, that facilitates the application of military power in an effective manner. A critical element in this scheme evolves from the Soviet theory on the nature of military geography.

(C) The broadest concept in military geography is that of the theater of war (TV). A TV is "the territory of any one continent--together with the sea areas adjoining it and the air space above it--on which hostilities may develop." The concept of a TV is continuously evolving. Recent writings indicate that the TV might not have precisely defined boundaries (subject to change during the course of a war) and that it might, should the need arise, encompass more than one continent. Although the geographical extent of the TV has become less specific, its purpose--to provide military strategists with a criterion for categorizing operations on a global scale--has remained basically the same.

(C) The Soviets believe that wartime operations within potential TVs could differ significantly both strategically and tactically. In a western TV, for example, the Soviets' primary adversary would be NATO--a technically sophisticated, well-trained, and nuclear-equipped enemy. In an eastern TV, on the other hand, their primary adversary probably would be China and/or Japan and the US. A land war in an eastern TV could be more manpower intensive than one in a western TV. Other approaches to military planning and operations may be required in various TVs by differences stemming from the conduct of naval operations; terrain; social and cultural patterns; languages; military doctrine, tactics, and force composition; strategic goals; and force coalitions.

(C) The Soviets have defined theater of military operations (TVD) as "a particular territory, together with the associated air space and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), within whose limits a known part of the armed forces of the country (or coalition) operates in wartime, engaged in strategic missions which ensue from the war plan." A TVD may be ground, maritime, or intercontinental; depending upon its military-political or economic importance, a TVD may be either main or secondary. Control of TVD forces will be exercised by the Supreme High Command (VCK) through its executive arm--the General Staff (figure 1). As many as five TVDs may be established within the Soviet/Eurasian landmass (figure 2). Some of the military districts (MD) within the TVDs are pivotal and their subordinations are scenario dependent.

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~~(S)~~ Although the Western TVD is geographically rather well defined, its boundaries and force structure remain flexible. The Western TVD commands those forces facing NATO in central Europe (figure 3). The second echelon or reinforcing forces are dependent upon the situation.

~~(S)~~ During peacetime, the military district (MD) and group of forces (GOF) headquarters perform day-to-day administrative functions. During wartime, the MDs/GOFs generate the combat fronts for the TVDs. After the front staff has been deployed, the remaining MD/GOF headquarters structure would perform important local ground defense, logistics, air defense, civil defense, mobilization, and administrative functions.

~~(S)~~ The forces available to the MD or GOF commander during peacetime would be used to generate the combat oriented fronts. Strategic forces (land based missiles, strategically designated ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers) would not come under the control of the MD. Instead, they would be controlled directly by the V GK. The airborne troops (VDV), transport aviation (VTA), or the air armies of the V GK could support combat operations once allocated by the V GK (through the General Staff) to the TVD commanders. The Combined Baltic Fleet would be subordinated quickly to the Western TVD.

C. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES

~~(C)~~ The Soviets have devoted considerable energy towards achieving military superiority in the Western TVD. That superiority is essential to secure their military objectives in the region. Soviet military strength in Europe serves both peacetime and wartime purposes. During peacetime, it intimidates the NATO powers and encourages the belief that armed resistance to Soviet power is futile. It also is used as a bargaining chip to gain political concessions from other European states with the hope of eventually eliminating a US presence on the continent. The Soviet Armed Forces further serve to enforce the de facto division of Europe by protecting Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

~~(C)~~ During wartime, the Soviet Armed Forces would be used to achieve the Soviet Union's long-term political goals. When translated into military objectives for the Western TVD, these goals include the destruction of NATO's military forces, the expulsion of US forces from the Central Region, the prevention of further US reinforcement or military involvement in that region, and the eventual occupation of the entire continent.

~~(C)~~ The Soviets believe that their military goals could be achieved rather quickly by a very rapid advance through the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), coupled with a decisive defeat of NATO forces. A victory of this type, Soviet military theorists argue, would demoralize the NATO alliance and cause splits in its ranks which could be exploited further by both military and political means. To this end, military operations in the Western TVD would include attacks against Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands, with the aim of depriving the US of viable lines of communication to the North German Plain. Simultaneously, the main Soviet attack in Germany would seek to push NATO forces across the Rhine River

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before any substantial US countereffort could be mounted. This could be followed by an equally rapid advance into France, aimed at forcing the European countries to come to terms with the USSR and abandon their ties with the US.

~~(S)~~ The Soviets would prefer to conduct a conventional war, but they are prepared to fight a nuclear war, if necessary, to achieve their ultimate objectives. They have developed an armed force which can operate in a nuclear environment and one which they believe will be able to secure victory.

~~(S)~~ Soviet military victory would be followed by the establishment of pro-Soviet governments throughout the occupied region. The Soviets would enforce close political and economic ties and would seek to destroy all other potential sources of opposition to their control. Key population and economic centers would be placed under the direct administrative control of Soviet officials; the Red Army would take direct control of areas containing critical national resources.

~~(S)~~ The aforementioned military and strategic objectives are achieved by operational-strategic formations such as the front, by the reserves of the V GK, and by active units of the V GK (two active air armies designated for operations in the Western TVD, for example). To accomplish strategic aims in the Western TVD, operational objectives must be achieved, which in turn, are dependent upon the successful accomplishment of tactical objectives. Tactical objectives are achieved by maneuver divisions, regiments, and battalions to a depth of approximately 20-35 km; tactical objectives basically entail the defeat of opposing units.

~~(S)~~ Operational objectives are achieved by armies and fronts at depths greater than 100 km. Several points relating to fronts and armies should be noted:

- A front is an operational-strategic formation.
- Weapons and units may be designated tactical, operational, and/or strategic.
- Forces may be differentiated according to the echelon that controls them (V GK vice frontal forces) and the characteristics of the targets they would attack.
- A geographical line of demarcation exists within the TVD. Frontal forces have responsibility for activity up to that line; strategic forces attack targets beyond the line of demarcation.

~~(S)~~ While the weapons mix and the type of force used in the strategic operation may vary (from the air operation of the V GK, special operations groups, and airborne operations to such force types as the operational maneuver group--or a combination thereof), the target groups would remain the same. They include NATO nuclear-capable missiles, airfields, and aircraft; nuclear weapons storage sites; and critical command, control, and communications nodes.

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(U) The Council includes as participants those Politburo members with defense and security related responsibilities as well as military representatives, including Minister of Defense Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov. While final approval of major policy decisions is reserved for the Politburo, policy recommendations are formulated in the Defense Council. Council recommendations probably are ratified by the Politburo on virtually a pro forma basis. Andropov was identified publicly as Council chairman, as was his predecessor in the post of General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev.

(U) The Defense Council is served by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the GS, both of which are responsible for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Ustinov, as Minister of Defense, is charged with implementing Soviet military policy and doctrine. He serves as the principal interface between the military and the party/state apparatus. Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov is the military figure who deals directly with the uniformed military establishment and the chiefs of the five services.

~~(S)~~ The GS is the most important link between the national command authorities (the Defense Council) and the armed forces. Because the GS exercises actual operational control over the armed forces, it has the responsibility for translating strategy, doctrine, and policy into action. The GS also plays an important role at the national level by insuring that the most authoritative information is made available to the Defense Council to aid decisionmaking. The GS serves as the Council's secretariat; as such, GS officers are closely involved in preparing support documents, meeting agendas, and Council decision papers.

~~(S)~~ These responsibilities make Chief of the GS Ogarkov the single most important individual in the day-to-day operations of the armed forces. Ogarkov is assisted by a highly skilled staff of professional officers. This elite corps has been characterized as the "brain of the army" by Soviet military leaders. The GS organization is designed to provide a basic command structure for controlling the Soviet Armed Forces. Its most important element, the Main Operations Directorate, operates in part as a military support staff for the Defense Council. The Main Operations Directorate draws up war plans based on estimates provided by the GS Main Intelligence Directorate.

~~(S)~~ The Soviets attach great importance to their ability to effect a rapid transition from peace to war with minimal disruption of their command structure. DIA believes that during wartime the Soviets would create a wartime management system derived directly from their peacetime command structure. Ultimate command and control of the overall war effort probably will be vested in a single body, with functions and powers similar to those of the State Defense Committee (GKO) during World War II. In their writings the Soviets describe the GKO as a model to be followed in a future war. This has led DIA to the assumption that a modernized version of the GKO would be formed, probably around the nucleus of the existing Defense Council, with staff and support possibly from various elements in the Central Committee Secretariat and the Council of Ministers. The modernized GKO-type organization would be headed by the Supreme Commander in Chief in

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CHAPTER 2

PEACETIME ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE TVD

A. ORGANIZATION

1. Political

(U) The Soviet Union is a highly centralized political alliance of 15 union republics whose boundaries, languages, and population mix are the product of various historical influences. The structure of each republic government resembles that of the USSR itself. In the western region of the Soviet Union (the area from which forces for the Western TVD largely will be drawn) the principal republics are the Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR (figure 4). Below the union republics are territorial-administrative subdivisions which include autonomous republics (patterned in their state structure after those of union republics), followed by krays, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, national districts, cities, urban rayons, and rural rayons. At each of these latter levels, administrative authority is exercised through the chairman of the executive committee (ispolkom) in the local Soviet (council). The size and makeup of the support structure of the ispolkom varies according to its territorial level, population, and economic importance. In smaller republics, such as those in the Baltic states, authority is exercised directly from the republic to cities and rural rayons. For the remainder of the country, however, the oblast level entity represents the principal building block of Soviet state administration.

(U) State administration and economic management are conducted primarily through ministries, state committees, and comparable entities at the national and republic levels. Their managers form the various councils of ministers, the chairmen of which head the government apparatus of the USSR and those of its constituent republics. The ministerial entities are responsible for specific sectors such as defense, state security, public order, individual industries, health care, and transportation and for functions such as planning, supply, and pricing. Their activities are coordinated by the respective national and republic councils of ministers acting under guidelines established by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo and implemented by appropriate departments of the Central Committee.

2. Military

(U) In the Soviet Union, the primary peacetime body for national security policy is the Defense Council. The Defense Council's authority covers virtually all major military issues, including strategic and nuclear weapons policy, international negotiation positions, weapons acquisition choices, shifts in military doctrine, and use of the armed forces.

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his role as head of state and party. It would focus primarily on mobilizing the entire nation to support the war effort. In that capacity, the GKO-type organization would be the supreme wartime authority, defining Soviet objectives and allocating national resources to achieve those objectives.

~~(S)~~ It must be emphasized that these references to a GKO-type organization do not necessarily imply that a new organization would be created. The present peacetime Defense Council already has the legal basis and organizational resources needed for deciding and implementing strategic policy; however, this authority probably would be expanded in wartime. In the initial stages of war, it is likely that the Soviets would prefer to rely heavily on advance planning and preparations, with essential decisions reserved to Defense Council members.

~~(S)~~ Control over the actual military effort during wartime would rest with the Stavka (Headquarters) of the Supreme High Command (VGK). The military command organization would be subordinate to the GKO; the Supreme Commander in Chief would serve as chairman of the Stavka. The post was formerly held by Brezhnev and subsequently was held by General Secretary Andropov. It is not known which of the nation's senior military leaders would be included in the Stavka/VGK. Historical precedent suggests that probably the Minister of Defense, the three first deputy ministers, the Chief of the GS, the chief of the five services, and the deputy ministers for rear services and civil defense would be included. Whatever the actual membership of the Stavka, GS elements would constitute the principal source of staff support.

(U) As in the peacetime command structure, the GS acts as a critical link between the national command organization and the field units themselves. The GS would control the armed forces through intermediate-level commands established in the TVDs.

3. Military Districts

(U) The 16 military districts (MD) of the Soviet Union, not to be confused with the 15 union republics, serve as a geographical framework for military administrative purposes. The MDs are, in effect, a territorial extension of the MOD, encompassing various local military units and organizations (such as the military commissariats) and military-educational institutions. The main functions served by the MDs are training (both political and military) and mobilization. The MDs provide the organizational structure for the coordination and implementation of civil defense measures. The MDs also administer an extensive network of service and support organizations and facilities through their rear services and those branch and service representatives with rear services responsibilities. In the Western TVD, the primary MDs are the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian (figure 5).

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4. The Structure of the Warsaw Pact (WP)

(U) The primary pro-Soviet multilateral military/political alliance is the Warsaw Pact, which encompasses the Western TVD. The Pact serves both as a counter to NATO and as a formal vehicle for the perpetuation of close ties between the Soviet Union and its six East European allies. Because it is a political and a military organization, the WP brings together both the heads of the signatory governments and their military representatives. This arrangement enables the Soviet Union, as the strongest member of the Pact, to wield an indisputable degree of control over the military forces of the other Pact countries. Bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and the six other signatories reinforce Soviet control over the collective defense of the area and enhance Moscow's political dominance. The Warsaw Pact is organized to provide the Soviets with the mechanisms needed to exercise unified control over the national security structures of the non-Soviet states.

(U) The Council of Defense Ministers (formed in 1969) is the senior military organ of the Pact; it is chaired by Soviet Marshal Kulikov and includes the deputy ministers of defense from the other Pact countries. Several Soviet military representatives also sit on the Council, most notably First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff Gribkov and the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General Podgornyy. The Council meets infrequently and actual operational control over the Combined Armed Forces of the WP is exercised through the Joint High Command (JHC) and its Staff. Kulikov heads that Command in his capacity as the First Deputy Minister of Defense for WP Affairs. Each Pact country has a senior military officer as a permanent representative on the JHC Staff. A Soviet general is assigned to each of the national high commands of the Pact countries as well, with the exception of Romania.

5. Soviet Groups of Forces

(U) Large concentrations of Soviet forces organized into four separate commands known as Groups of Forces (GOF) are present throughout Eastern Europe. This formal designation was adopted first in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in March 1954 after the "occupation" function of these Soviet troops theoretically was discontinued. Regardless of this change in title, Soviet forces continue to act as military occupation forces, with a mission to remind East Europeans of Soviet military strength. These forces have been used to crush revolts in the GDR (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). During a war, the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), the Northern Group of Forces, the Central Group of Forces, and perhaps even the Southern Group of Forces would generate fronts for combat operations in the Western TVD.

~~(C)~~ The German Democratic Republic has the largest concentration of Soviet troops outside the Soviet Union. The importance of GSFG to the Soviet hierarchy is displayed by the fact that only seven positions in the Soviet military structure are designated glavnokomanduyushchiy, or commander in chief (CINC). These are the CINCs of the Warsaw Pact forces, the five Soviet services, and the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. The CINC of GSFG, General of the Army M. M. Zaytsev, is also a full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

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(U) Of the three other Groups of Forces, the Northern Group is located primarily in western Poland. The Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia is an outgrowth of the 1968 Soviet invasion of that country. The Southern Group of Forces is located in Hungary. In May 1957, following the Soviet invasion that crushed the Hungarian revolt of the previous year, the two governments signed an accord legalizing the continued presence of Soviet troops in Hungary.

B. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

1. General

~~(S)~~ Peacetime missions of those forces comprising the Western TVD include maintaining domestic order, retaining in power governments acceptable to the leadership of the USSR, training of personnel, preparing for rapid mobilization, and assuming full combat readiness.

~~(S)~~ In planning for a war against NATO, WP planners recognize that the decisive operations will occur in the Western TVD. Consequently, the WP maintains not only a large force in the area but one consisting of the most modern, best equipped, and most ready units. This is especially true of forces in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

2. Frontal Forces

~~(S)~~ Approximately 40 percent (92) of all active Warsaw Pact maneuver divisions are located in the Western TVD. Soviet and to a lesser extent, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NWSP) units in this TVD are usually the first to implement new structural changes on a large-scale basis and the first to field large numbers of newer models of equipment.

~~(S)~~ The force structure in the TVD has experienced steady growth over the past 10 years. The number of active tank and motorized rifle divisions has increased by three since 1970. Assessed peace-authorized personnel strengths have increased by about 175,000 over the same period, both as the result of new units being identified and changes in the structure of existing units. Newer items of equipment, such as the T-64 and T-72 medium tanks, self-propelled artillery, and SAM systems, have entered the force in large numbers over the past 10 years (figure 6). Noteworthy is the decline in numbers of T-64 tanks between 1970 and 1974, when they were removed from service due to reported engine problems, and the declining growth of both the T-64 and T-72 tanks beginning about 1980, probably portending the beginning of issue of the next Soviet tank to Soviet forces. The rate of introduction of the T-72 should increase, however, as Poland and Czechoslovakia begin coproduction of the T-72.

~~(S)~~ In the Western TVD, the number of main battle tanks has increased by about 7 percent since 1970, armored personnel carriers (less infantry combat vehicles) by 2 percent, artillery pieces by 61 percent, and antitank weapons by 107 percent. These rates are somewhat lower than comparative growth rates for the Warsaw Pact as a whole over the same period in all categories except antitank weapons (figure 7). Growth rates for the Warsaw Pact are influenced to some degree by the buildup along the Sino-Soviet border.

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(S) Overall, WP frontal forces in the TVD contain about 40 percent of all tanks (25,000) and an appreciable share of other weapons systems as shown in figure 8. Based on weighted equipment values (WEV), the Western TVD share of total force capability is slightly greater (figure 9) reflecting more modern weapon systems. WEV scores are determined using a methodology which awards values to various types of equipment based on their contribution to offensive combat. This methodology takes into account firepower, mobility, protection, and combat conditions. WEV scores allow units to be compared/analyzed based on qualitative factors (effectiveness of weapons assigned) as well as quantitative factors (number of weapons assigned).

(S) The tank inventory for Soviet forces in the Western TVD is composed of 45 percent of the latest models (T-64 or T-72) as opposed to 25 percent of the total Soviet force. All Soviet divisions in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have a SAM-equipped air defense regiment, as does about one-third of the divisions in the Baltic, Carpathian, and Belorussian MDs. All Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe and about 90 percent in the western MDs have one BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiment. Over 65 percent of Soviet self-propelled artillery pieces (15,200) are found within units in the TVD, and about half of all Soviet attack helicopter regiments (14) are located in the Western TVD.

(S) Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces in the Western TVD are assessed to be the most modern in terms of equipment and organization among the NSWP. The Polish and GDR forces are the best trained and equipped of the NSWP countries and come closest to matching their Soviet counterparts. Although by GSFG standards they are still equipped primarily with older models of combat equipment, newer items such as T-72 tanks, SP artillery, and SA-6/SA-8 SAM systems are now entering the inventory.

(S) Ground maneuver formations in the Western TVD can best be described as being organized and equipped to fight a fast-moving "blitzkrieg" type war against NATO forces on either a conventional or nuclear battlefield. They are tank heavy, although recent organizational changes have enhanced their capability and flexibility to conduct combined-arms operations. They are well equipped to provide their own air defense, with SAM systems ranging from the shoulder-fired SA-7/14 at company level through the SA-4 at army/front level, complemented by gun systems. Over 30 units ranging from jamming battalions to SIGINT brigades provide an excellent capability to engage in electronic warfare. Additionally, they are the best equipped and trained for chemical warfare in the world.

(S) Although equipment within units in the Western TVD is the most modern of any potential TVD, there is still a mix of newer and older types and models among and within the various forces. This will burden and complicate maintenance and logistic operations. Most equipment, even that assigned to units in GSFG, is maintained in conservation storage and is not used on a day-to-day basis. Such a practice, while assuring maximum equipment availability at the start of any conflict, does not allow for full exercise of the maintenance system during peacetime. Whereas there are large standing conventional forces, most Soviet units in the western MDs,

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plus many NSWP units, will require extensive mobilization and additional training before they could be committed with confidence to offensive operations. The mobilization system has never been fully tested.

(S) The fielding of modern equipment with both Soviet and NSWP units in the Western TVD is projected to continue. The new Soviet 152-mm self-propelled gun 2S5 and the 152-mm M-1976 are being deployed within the Western TVD as a replacement for the 130-mm field gun M-46. They have since been identified in at least five units in the GSFG. Fourteen Soviet divisions are currently known to have the new SS-21 tactical surface-to-surface missile, all in the Western TVD (10 in GSFG and 4 in the western MDs). Organizationally nondivisional artillery units in the GSFG and the Belorussian MD are transitioning from a six-gun to an eight-gun battery structure. This change is also occurring in divisional artillery, both in the GSFG and the western MDs.

(S) Frontal and Army Aviation units available for employment in the Western TVD, like their maneuver forces counterparts, are generally early recipients of the newest equipment. While total numbers of fixed-wing aircraft and associated personnel have remained fairly constant over the past years, there has been an almost total replacement of older aircraft with the latest models. In addition, there has been a significant increase in the number of attack, assault, and general-purpose helicopters at all levels of combined-arms command. Most recently these forces have undergone a force structure change to streamline the C³ employment of air assets.

(S) In addition to helicopters, modern FLOGGER B/G counterair fighters, FITTER C/D/H/K and FLOGGER D/J fighter-bombers, and FITTER H/K and FOXBAT B/D reconnaissance aircraft have entered service with aviation regiments throughout the region. FOXBAT E interceptors and FENCER deep strike aircraft are now stationed in the GDR and would be employed as frontal assets in wartime. The modernization process has resulted in the complete phase out of FIREBAR, FITTER A, FRESCO, and most FISHBED aircraft from Soviet units. A few BREWER D/E aircraft retain reconnaissance and electronic warfare roles. The types and capability of aviation ordnance also have improved dramatically since the early 1970s, with the addition of a variety of air-launched missiles, including tactical air-to-surface and anti-radiation missiles (TASMs and ARMs). Improved air-to-air missiles (AAMs), cluster bombs, and other specialized conventional munitions are also available.

(S) Improvements in the East German, Czech, and Polish AFs have been less dramatic. Sizeable numbers of the FRESCO, FAGOT, BEAGLE, and older FISHBED aircraft remain, although later model FISHBEDs, FLOGGERS, and FITTERs of various types are entering the inventories. Some of the ordnance and munitions improvements appearing in Soviet aviation are beginning to reach NSWP units, but ASMs have yet to be provided. Improvements of NSWP helicopter forces likewise have been slow, with a small number of HINDs appearing to supplement existing HOUND, HIP, and HOPLITE units.

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~~(S)~~ Additional significant resources available to Western TVD frontal forces include air assault brigades (assigned at front level) and battalions (at CA/T army level). These units give these commanders an additional option for conducting operations in depth and seizing key objectives in advance of overland forces. The establishment of Army Aviation in Western TVD fronts and front components provides these same commanders the helicopter airlift necessary to employ these forces in pursuit of assigned objectives. Air assault forces are available for early capture of enemy airfields or potential mobility obstacles such as bridges and river-crossing sites, road junctions, mountain passes, or other likely choke points. They also would be useful for raiding operations and neutralization of opposing nuclear weapons systems and C³I facilities. Their parachute assault capability allows them to deploy in the enemy rear from front or VTA fixed-wing transports as well as assigned helicopters. See table 1 for a summary of major frontal force elements assigned to the Western TVD.

3. Naval Forces

~~(S)~~ The Western TVD will be supported by the combined forces of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Polish and East German Navies linked together in the joint forces structure of the Combined Baltic Fleet (CBF). The Combined Baltic Fleet would be commanded by the Commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet--currently Admiral I. M. Kapitanets--who, in turn, would report to the TVD High Command. Portions of the CBF would be subordinated to the Northern Front commander when conducting operations in support of that front.

~~(S)~~ Combined Baltic Fleet surface assets are designed for operations in the closed seawaters of the Baltic; few are likely to deploy from this area in wartime. The fleet includes few principal surface combatants, but it does have a large number of patrol combatants and mine warfare units. All submarines, including six ballistic missile submarines assigned to the fleet, are conventionally powered.

a. Submarines

(1) Ballistic Missile

~~(S)~~ Since 1976, six GOLF II Class conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines (SSB) have been assigned to the Soviet Baltic Fleet

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USC 2162 (a) [redacted] Likely targets for these units are in Europe, possibly naval bases. Choke points in the Baltic Sea offer an opportunity for ballistic missile antisurface ship strike operations; however, there is no evidence that the GOLF IIs will be used for this type target.

(2) Cruise Missile

~~(S)~~ Cruise missile submarines (SSG) assigned to the Soviet Baltic Fleet are of the older, conventionally powered WHISKEY LONG BIN, and JULIETT Classes. Their mission is antisurface ship attack, possibly including anticarrier warfare (ACW) in the North Sea.

(3) Attack

~~(S)~~ The general-purpose attack submarines (SS) assigned to the fleet are also of older, conventionally powered classes, principally the WHISKEY Class. A few of the submarines could be expected to be deployed into the North Sea or its approaches to attack targets such as carriers and amphibious groups or to conduct barrier operations. They also probably will lay mines in the approaches to the Danish Straits. In the Baltic, SSs would be a part of the mixed naval force tasked with countering the eastward movement of NATO units.

b. Surface Combatants

~~(S)~~ Combined Baltic Fleet surface forces are designed for operations in the close-in waters of the Baltic Sea. Based on normal operating and training patterns, most surface ships would remain in the Baltic to participate in sea supremacy operations, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW), disruption of NATO minelaying, and protection of Warsaw Pact sea lines of communication. CBF surface combatants also would provide naval gunfire support of amphibious operations.

(1) Patrol Combatants

~~(S)~~ A large number of missile-equipped patrol combatants and coastal patrol craft are assigned to the CBF. These units would have the primary mission of countering a NATO eastward advance and supporting CBF offensive operations.

(2) Amphibious Warfare Ships

~~(S)~~ The fleet has substantial assets for transporting amphibious assault forces in support of the Northern Front. These include landing ships and craft and air cushion vehicles. Merchant ships, both conventional cargo and roll-on/roll-off, also will be used mainly to transport follow-on forces.

(3) Mine Warfare Ships

~~(S)~~ Warsaw Pact military writings stress the disruption of minelaying operations as the most effective mine countermeasure. Failing this, the CBF would use more than 200 mine warfare ships and craft to clear NATO offensive and defensive mines.

c. Naval Air

~~(S)~~ The Combined Baltic Fleet Air Force would have the major responsibility for antishipping attacks against NATO surface ships in the Baltic and North Seas. Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) units also will participate in minelaying operations (particularly in straits areas), ASW operations in conjunction with naval surface forces, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare operations.

d. Naval Order of Battle

(U) Table 2 provides the naval order of battle for the Baltic.

4. Air Defense Forces

a. Reorganization

(S) A major reorganization of the Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces beginning in 1978 has resulted in changes to both Soviet Air Forces and PVO Strany. For the most part, the new structure features a realignment of air and air defense assets positioned in the peripheral military districts of the Soviet Union. This restructuring enhances the Soviet capability for a more timely transition from peacetime to wartime posture and improved operational command through centralization of force authority at the front and theater echelons. At the national level, the reorganized PVO Strany has been designated Voyska PVO, meaning air defense forces.

(S) The consolidation of Soviet air defense units in the Western TVD merges the control of the ground-based tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAM), strategic SAMs, and air surveillance assets. These SAMs and air surveillance radar units are controlled by the MD commander of the GOF commander through the air defense (AD) of the MD or the AD of the GOF. (Military District control of strategic SAMs in some MDs has been authorized in only part of the MD. The term Air Defense Area (ADA) has been introduced to describe the area within the MD where strategic SAMs are controlled by the MD commander; for the Western TVD, ADAs coincide with the MDs.)

(S) In these same peripheral areas, interceptor units have been removed from the old PVO system and combined with most of the former Frontal Aviation (FA) units to form the Air Forces (AF) of the MD. Although many units within the AF of the MD may retain their pre-reorganization mission as their primary mission, the MD or front commander may now allocate his air resources more flexibly in accordance with his needs in a particular situation.

b. Air Defense Structure

(S) As shown previously in figure 5, the Western TVD includes three Soviet MDs and the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These are also the geographic boundaries of the air defense units subordinate to the Western TVD. As a result of the reorganization, it is difficult to define which air units will be used in an air defense role. Indeed, some units may be used for air defense during part of the war or for strike or strike support at other times. When a front is formed, it is anticipated that the mobile SAMs and radars integral to armies, divisions, and regiments will deploy out of the MDs, leaving behind strategic homeland air defense units under the control of a residual MD command.

~~(S)~~ A similar situation occurs for the tactical and strategic air formations within the TVD. Units with a primary tactical air mission most likely will move forward with the front, while the aircraft with a strategic intercept role will remain to protect MD areas. The MD air defense commander or the national air defense HQ of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia each has three major operational components for air defense: interceptor aircraft, SAMs, and air surveillance radar units. The structure provides for point defense of airfields and important industrial centers and area defense of ground force formations, national territorial airspace, and the air approaches to the Soviet Union.

c. Organization

~~(S)~~ Each NSWP country is perceived as a Soviet air defense district (ADD) for purposes of air defense. Even in the reorganized MDs, air defense continues to be controlled through air defense zones (ADZ). Each MD or ADD usually is subdivided into two or three ADZs. Full operational authority probably is delegated to the air defense weapons operations center (ADWOC) that usually is located at a bunkered zone level headquarters. It is believed that The ADZ HQ also includes a filter center for collating, selecting, and forwarding pertinent air surveillance tracking data and a communications center. The ADZ HQ operationally can control subordinate SAM regiments and brigades and fighter regiments.

~~(S)~~ A senior GCI controller is located at the ADZ level and coordinates fighter operations through regimental tactical controllers (RTC) at each fighter base and fighter direction post (FDP) located at designated radar sites. Some weapons control centers below the ADZ have been consolidated. These combined command posts (CP) have been established to improve coordination of AD weapons and to reduce the overall vulnerability of an ADZ in the event the ADZ command post is neutralized or destroyed. By collocating a radar filter center at each combined CP, the weapons controllers benefit from some near realtime tracking data even when the ADZ is nonoperational. The air defense district, zone, combined command posts, SAM brigade/regiment, and fighter regiment control centers usually are protected by underground bunkers and are linked by landline and various types of aboveground communications.

d. Command, Control, and Communications C³

~~(S)~~ Air defense assets of the Western TVD are directed through a series of command, control, and communications (C³) nodes which are located in bunkered primary and alternate command posts or deployed in highly mobile vehicles. It is believed that the bunkered facilities control operations of the air defense units that remain at or near their peacetime locations. Mobile CPs add flexibility in maintaining command and control of the various air and air defense units.

~~(S)~~ Communications support for air and air defense forces is highly redundant, creating the optimum possibility of communications survivability. Landline is in place and is the most secure and reliable mode of communication. Multichannel voice, HF, UHF, VHF, and troposcatter are also used.

(1) Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)

(S) Strategically employed SAMs are organized into regimental or brigade structures which are, in turn, subordinate to division level ADZs. The number and type of units subordinate to a SAM regiment or brigade can vary significantly. The number of regiments and brigades subordinate to an ADZ also may vary. A SAM regiment typically will control some 3 to 6 SA-2 and/or SA-3 battalions, while a brigade typically will control more battalions than the regiment and usually include SA-5 units. Brigades frequently are seen in defense of primary penetration corridors and priority target areas.

(S) As noted, the SA-5 is often integrated into the SAM brigade structure with SA-2 and/or SA-3 battalions. Although this is the predominant structure, the SA-5 may be deployed remotely, having no other SAM units in the area, as an independent regiment directly subordinate to the ADZ headquarters.

(S) To help cope with the modern air threat (low-altitude, high-speed penetration) and to facilitate the management of their increased air defense resources, the Soviets are emphasizing automated command and control systems such as ASURK and Vektor-2, supported by expanded communications systems. Such systems can aid the regimental or brigade commander in making near-real-time target assignments. It is believed that a semi-automatic command and control system will become the primary means of C³ in all, or virtually all, strategic SAM regiments and brigades in the near future. Furthermore, the ASURK probably is being replaced as the primary automated C³ system, a shift which began in the early 1970s, probably as a result of the increased reliability, accuracy, and capacity of the newer system.

(S) Several benefits can be derived from such a C³ network. Among these are more efficient battle management, more precise resource allocation, and more accurate data transfer. Another important benefit is the timely passing of tracking data to the firing sites, allowing the firing site to shift its fire control radar in a more efficient maneuver to a target's projected path and altitude. In this mode, the site could remain "radar silent" until the target could be engaged, thus delaying the target's knowledge of impending attack and thereby delaying evasive or countermeasure reactions.

(2) Aircraft

(S) Each of the airfields which houses aircraft primarily dedicated to air defense is equipped with navigation aids, including precision approach radars, instrument landing systems, air traffic control communications, and surveillance radars; some also have height finders. These facilities are common to most Warsaw Pact airfields that are in continuous operation.

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~~(S)~~ The fighter regiment headquarters normally is located at or near the airfield, and ready rooms are maintained for the pilots on alert duty for possible scrambling. The regimental CPs from which the fighters are controlled usually are located in a bunker at the airfield. The minimum radar equipment at the regimental CP probably is an early warning radar and a height finder. The regimental CP normally will pass the fighter to an outlying fighter direction post (FDP) which will vector the intercept. The capability of a given FDP is limited by the available communications and supporting radars.

~~(S)~~ Ground controllers communicate with airborne fighters using clear text HF/VHF/UHF voice transmissions or the visually displayed "LAZUR" data link system. All of the later generation aircraft assigned to fighter aviation regiments are assumed to carry "LAZUR" receivers and data display consoles. Also, probably all RCPs and FDPs in the forward area are LAZUR-equipped.

5. Strategic Nuclear Assets

a. Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)

~~(S)~~ An extensive force of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM/IRBM) launchers is deployed in the three western MDs (Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian) of the western USSR and is believed to be intended primarily for use against Western Europe. Currently there are 216 SS-4 MRBMs, and 135 SS-20 mobile IRBMs deployed in the three western MDs. Eight SS-4 and 18 SS-20 launchers are located in the Kiev MD. For purposes of this scenario the 90 SS-20 launchers in the Ural MD have been allocated to the Southern TVD--subject to change depending upon the situation faced by the Soviets. Table 3 provides a breakout of the MRBM/IRBM force.

~~(S)~~ In addition to the significant assets of the MRBM/IRBM force, the Soviets have the option of employing a portion of their ICBMs in a peripheral role, if conditions warrant.

b. Naval Systems

~~(S)~~ Employment of ballistic missile submarines (YANKEE, DELTA, and TYPHOON) for SLBM strikes in support of operations in the Western TVD would be at the decision of, and under the direction of, the Soviet VGK. Although DELTA and TYPHOON SSBN Classes could strike theater targets if necessary, it is believed that these platforms are intended for intercontinental strike and as a strategic reserve. However, unlike the DELTA and TYPHOON SSBNs, a portion of the YANKEE SSBN force--probably at least two units--is estimated to be dedicated to continental theater strike missions. Fifteen YANKEE Class SSBNs (14 YANKEE I and 1 YANKEE II) are currently operational in the Northern Fleet (NORFLT). All of these platforms are home-ported at Sayda Guba submarine base on the Kola Peninsula.

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c. Air Armies of the VGK

(S) Three of the five air armies of the Supreme High Command (VGK) would participate in Western TVD operations. At one time or another aircraft from the Smolensk, Legnica, and Vinnitsa Air Armies would be allocated to perform a variety of functions. Air army assets include medium bombers, fighters, fighter-bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. The Soviets view these forces as the basic shock elements of the initial air operation in the Western TVD. Their unique structure and organization enable these air armies to be employed rapidly wherever a need for massive firepower is required, regardless of location or local command responsibility. As VGK assets, they may operate directly under the authority of the VGK or under subordinate command levels as the VGK directs.

(S) The deployment of such aircraft as BACKFIRE, FENCER, FLOGGER, and FOXBAT has made the air armies potent forces with good combat capabilities. Only the BADGER, BLINDER, and BREWER aircraft are relatively old. These aircraft can deliver a variety of munitions, including the latest bombs and missiles to operational and strategic targets. With FOXBAT and FENCER reconnaissance aircraft, the Soviets can provide intelligence collection coverage to the same depth as the strike operations.

6. Other Forces

a. Soviet Airborne (VDV) and Military Transport Aviation (VTA)

(S) Airborne units allocated to the Western TVD, along with supporting VTA elements, are administratively supported in peacetime by the MD in which they are located. In peacetime, two airborne divisions are located in the Baltic MD.

b. Internal Security

(U) The KGB (Committee for State Security) constitutes the principal forces by which the CPSU sustains its control over Soviet society. The KGB has several responsibilities, including intelligence collection and warning, internal and border security, covert operations, and leadership protection. Certain of these tasks are unique to the KGB. Others parallel the activities of ministerial entities, as in the case of communications. The KGB operates a highly centralized command structure from its Moscow headquarters down to local departments. Through this apparatus the Politburo is able to exert its power over all forms of activity within the USSR.

(S) Regulation of the public order, as opposed to state security, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The MVD maintains national police and firefighting forces and operates the nation's prison system. Some MVD militia units also supplement KGB border troops and would be integrated into the civil defense service during wartime.

~~(S)~~ In the Western Border Guards District, which includes the three MDs in the Western TVD, the Soviets have both KGB border detachments and MVD divisions deployed. There are 17 KGB border detachments in the Western Border Guard District, with numerous small elements throughout the MDs. There are possibly two full MVD divisions assigned to the district, as well as additional MVD regiments.

7. Logistic Resources

a. General

~~(S)~~ The rear service infrastructure supporting the Western TVD incorporates a large and diverse number of multinational logistic units and resources ranging from tactical to strategic level. More specifically, the military logistic establishments of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are divided into three support elements: the tactical, operational, and central rear services. Tactical rear services directly support units of division size (or their equivalent) and below, and are organic to tactical units. The operational rear services are tasked to provide logistic support to armies, fronts, or fleets and are included in the composition of such operational groupings. Most logistic resources, however, are found in the central rear services, which comprise the strategic logistic components of the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) Armed Forces. The central logistic components of each Warsaw Pact military establishment include a variety of rear services units, depots, and facilities capable of providing all kinds of logistic support. That is, within the central rear services there are motor transport, maintenance, recovery and evacuation, traffic control, lines of communication, construction and repair, security, medical and other units; ammunition, fuel, technical supply, major end item, clothing, ration, and other storage depots; and maintenance fabrication, medical, and other facilities. In addition to those logistic units and resources which are organizationally a part of the armed forces, all Warsaw Pact states have provisions for incorporating mobilized resources from their national economies into their central (as well as tactical and operational) rear services. These resources may be used to constitute logistic units or augment materiel holdings. The central rear services also receive newly produced materiel from the national economies for storage or distribution. A portion of the State Reserves in at least some Warsaw Pact countries is designated for use by the central rear services as well.

~~(S)~~ Central rear service resources are controlled operationally and/or administratively in peacetime by Ministry of Defense organizations and directorates, by force component headquarters or main directorates, and military districts. In wartime, central rear services would constitute in large measure, the reserves of the V GK and the NSWP High Commands. Central logistic assets also may be allocated to the Western TVD commander or to operational groupings within the TVD.

~~(S)~~ Central logistic organizations stock and supply huge quantities of military materiel and perform a variety of logistic functions in strategic rear areas. They serve as the link between Warsaw Pact national economies and deployed operational groupings, while at the same

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time serving as the strategic reserve of logistic resources for Warsaw Pact forces. Central rear service responsibilities extend far beyond serving as national military resource pools or supply conduits for materiel produced by national economies. That is, central rear service components are expected to deploy and support directly operational formations in TVDs, and also are designated as the principal means of providing logistic support to national units and formations which become part of coalition armies, fronts, and fleets.

b. Rear Service Logistic Assets in the Western TVD

(S) Logistics resources have been accumulated, echeloned, and prepositioned in peacetime within the Western TVD. A number of reasons for this are cited by Pact planners. It is recognized, for example, that the destruction of industrial facilities in a nuclear war could severely limit wartime production and the subsequent resupply of material items. The possibility of industrial destruction, then, is an integral factor in determining the amount of reserves to be stored in tactical, operational, and central-level depots and prepositioned within the Western TVD. Other factors that determine the amount of stocks to be accumulated, and the requirement for their echelonment and prepositioning include: the distance of the TVD from the USSR, projected expenditure rates, allowances for contingencies, required level of reserves, and--particularly in light of enemy interdiction means--the potential of LOCs and the transportation system to provide uninterrupted materiel support.

(S) In recognition of these factors, the Warsaw Pact has established large prepositioned stockpiles of consumable supplies for all command levels, to include stocks subordinate to Pact central rear services organizations. DIA's estimate of ammunition and POL stocks within the Western TVD is shown in table 4. It is not known what portion of these stocks is centrally subordinated. One early Soviet proposal was for prepositioned stocks of central subordination to be maintained at two echelons--in the "border zone" (NSWP countries and the border districts--MDs) and in the USSR interior MDs. Specifically, the proposal called for 50 to 60 percent of total prepositioned central stocks to be maintained in the border zone, with the remaining 40 to 50 percent retained in the USSR interior MDs. Numerous central depots and units have been identified in the USSR itself. Additionally, it appears that substantial prepositioned logistic resources in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR--both Soviet and NSWP--are centrally subordinated. It is believed that at least in part these centrally subordinated stocks are designated to constitute the rear service reserves of the Western TVD commander.

c. Transportation Assets

(S) Highway, water, and air transportation means may supplement rail supply to the forward areas. In estimating the extent to which various transport means will be used, the following is projected by Soviet planners:

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- Eighty to 85 percent of the total shipments may be carried by rail in a nuclear environment, with some 90 to 100 percent of total quantities shipped by rail in nonnuclear operations.
- Ten to 15 percent of the total may be shipped by motor transport.
- Five to 10 percent may be transported by water means. Air transport probably would be limited to the shipment of high priority items such as missiles and critical medical supplies.

(S) The mobilized avtokolonny motor transport assets will provide the majority of highway movement of supplies to the forward area (see chapter 4, section 3). The Soviets, however, recognizing that the strategic movement of armored forces by rail is increasingly vulnerable, have developed an additional strategic land transport capability. The three heavy-lift transport regiments that would be committed in the Western TVD have the capability to lift the armor assets of 50 Soviet tank battalions (31 tanks per battalion) from the Soviet Union across Eastern Europe to staging areas opposite NATO forces in 48 hours or less. These fully fueled and combat-loaded vehicles would arrive ready for immediate commitment to battle.

d. Role of the Military District in Logistics Operations

(S) The military districts in the Western TVD are assigned a major role in war effort support as the control for the process of reconstitution of military forces as well as civil defense and territorial air defense.

(S) During the period of hostilities the peacetime MD commander directs front assets, while a residual MD commander assumes responsibility for the successful conduct of reconstitution, civil defense, MD air/air defense, and rear services efforts. It is essential that the MD commander during wartime coordinates mobilization plans, deployment of field forces, and rear services with the operations of civil defense and air/air defense.

(S) Successful accomplishment of the MD mission during wartime depends to a large extent on the pre-war coordination of various MD assets. As military units deploy to assembly areas and disperse logistic stocks, and civil defense elements carry out extensive evacuation plans, the likelihood of transportation problems, for instance, takes on increased intensity. The Soviets have realized the integration of MD assets during peacetime at MD and subordinate levels will help ease the transition to a wartime period.

(S) Nuclear strikes will compound the problems of, and increase the need for, close coordination among MD elements. This will result in enormous responsibilities on the residual MD forces to provide extensive operations and to replace the potentially large amount of neutralized elements supporting mobilization, civil defense, and other MD missions.

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◀ Since the military district maintains the overall control of non-frontal assets during war, it becomes evident the MD is assigned an important role in the Soviet strategy for stabilizing rear echelon activities. As such, the MD may be assessed a priority mode in the conduct of successful Soviet/Warsaw Pact military operations.

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CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND TRANSITION TO WAR

A. THEATER STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

(S) The Warsaw Pact theater force structure is controlled by the Soviet General Staff. A High Command of Forces in the Western TVD probably is set up to control operations within the geographic boundaries of the TVD. It occupies a bunkered facility and communicates via an extensive array of fixed and mobile communications facilities. Major wartime assets of the TVD probably include up to five fronts, the Combined Baltic Fleet, and the various national air defense forces. The latter are located in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in the western MDs of the USSR and are organized into a coherent, integrated air defense system under theater control. The Supreme High Command (VCK) probably retains control of certain forces that can be used to support TVD operations. These include the SS-4, and -20 MR/IRBM forces in the western USSR, the Legnica and Smolensk Air Armies, airborne forces, and front assets that include a sixth front held as an element of the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVCK).

(S) The Soviets organize theater forces into operational echelons in the theater. This refers to the deployment of theater forces in depth in accordance with the TVD commander's plan of operations. The first operational echelon consists of fronts, separate armies, and other groupings that initiate operations. The second operational echelon consists of forces in the interior of the TVD which are to be introduced into battle after D-day to sustain the offensive. The roles of second operational echelon formations include: reinforcing or providing replacements for first operational echelon formations; exploiting the success of first operational echelon formations on the main axes and helping secure subsequent operational and strategic objectives; initiating operations on new axes; and defending against deep enemy penetrations. In the Western TVD, the first operational echelon consists of three fronts formed from forces based in the forward area (GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and drawn from air, missile, and fleet assets. The first-echelon fronts are as follows:

-- The Northern Front is composed primarily of Polish forces; its headquarters staff is drawn from the Polish Ministry of Defense. It is deployed in wartime to northern GDR and attacks into northern FRG, the Netherlands, and Denmark. It also is tasked to seize the Danish Straits in conjunction with airborne and amphibious operations. Under some contingencies, the Northern Front is not part of the first operational echelon. If preparation time is lacking, the Pact may initiate an attack with only two fronts formed from forces based in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The Northern Front would be committed to battle several days after D-day. In this situation, the front is part of the second operational echelon.

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-- The Central Front is formed from GSFG, NGF, and East German forces, with its headquarters staff drawn from the GSFG headquarters. This front will conduct the main theater attack across central FRG into Belgium, the southern Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

-- The Southwestern Front is composed of Czechoslovak forces; its headquarters staff is drawn from the Czechoslovak western MD headquarters. The Soviet CGF, organized as an army, is also assigned. The front's mission is to attack from Czechoslovakia into southern FRG and secure objectives on the FRG-Swiss-Austrian border (appendix A contains a detailed troop list of forces assigned to the fronts).

(S) Ground maneuver forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs are the primary constituents of the second operational echelon. Some forces in these MDs will be assigned to the first-echelon fronts. The bulk of forces will be used to form additional fronts. The Soviets refer to these as second-echelon and reserve fronts. Second-echelon fronts are force organizations planned to be committed at a preplanned time and place. This planning normally is highly generalized prior to D-day but is refined as the theater campaign progresses. In the Western TVD, at least two such fronts (a Belorussian, a Carpathian, and, under some contingencies, a Baltic Front) will be formed. These fronts will be formed from MD assets, including the front headquarters and combat formations. (An MD headquarters will continue to exist and perform vital functions.) Significantly, until just prior to commitment to combat, these fronts are not organized for combat with a complete, planned force structure. Some first-echelon forces will be assigned to the control of a second-echelon front prior to the front's commitment in order to facilitate the front's entry into combat. Likewise, the front will have virtually no fixed-wing (and few combat helicopter) aviation units until commitment. It is not assessed that these combat aviation units in the western MDs will be assigned initially to the second-echelon fronts, that is, withheld from combat until those fronts are committed. Instead, they will be assigned, as appropriate, to the first-echelon fronts or retained under MD control. The front will have some helicopter units and aviation staffs so that future aviation operations can be planned and coordinated. However, the required aviation units will be assigned only shortly before the planned commitment of the front. Therefore, fronts of the second echelon, while they are mobilizing and preparing deploying forward, and waiting in concentration areas behind the first-echelon fronts, are incomplete fronts whose force structures will be expanded prior to commitment.

(S) Reserve fronts are elements of the Supreme High Command (VCK) or possibly theater reserves, and prior to the commencement of the theater operations, are not assigned a time and place for commitment. They will be assigned missions in response to unplanned developments in the Western or adjoining TVDs. A typical mission may be to replace a first-echelon front rendered ineffective by enemy nuclear strikes. Prior to commitment, a reserve front has a smaller force structure than a second-echelon front. It may be no more than a skeleton of command and control and combat support units to which only a few maneuver units are assigned. A Baltic Front may be formed as a reserve front.

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